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In this issue, there is a call for the establishment of a
new commission, patterned after the Stratton
Commission, to study the implications of the Law of
the Sea Convention in view of the United States'
refusal to approve the Treaty. We would add that
there is also a need today for someone to act as "chief
oceanographer" of the marine community a Mr.
or Mrs. Oceans, if you will to provide the
enthusiasm, the knowledge, the vision, and the
influence to get things that need to be done, done.
In the past, the Mr. Oceans sobriquet has
gone to Senator Warren G. Magnuson, Democrat of
Washington, and to Vice President Hubert
Humphrey, Democrat of Minnesota. One might
argue that, in the latter case at least, the title was
applied because of a set of special circumstances,
and that the leadership in marine affairs provided by
these men is unlikely to be duplicated in the future.
Ideally, the candidate for Mr./Mrs. Oceans should
have the ear of the President and the eye of a
sea-going scientist, much the same as Humphrey
had:
The Marine Sciences Council under Humphrey
demonstrated what can be done, given the statutory
authority, the willingness ofthe President to utilize it, and
the personal inclinations of the Vice President. By virtue of
these prerequisites, the Vice President assisted the
President in identifying unmet needs and in developing
programs and policies to serve them; in recommending
priorities and matching resources to goals; in clarifying
and coordinating responsibilities of various participating
agencies where the field crossed departmental lines,
coordinating their activities, and resolving differences; in
developing long-range evaluation of future
developments and conflicts; in assessing the quality of
on-going programs to eliminate the marginal; and in
integrating diverse technical, economic, and political
considerations . . . Humphrey contributed to success of
the Council largely from his own qualities of intellect,
style, enthusiasm, and leadership. Indeed, the Council
revealed qualities of Humphrey unknown to the general
public: conciseness in addressing issues, sharpness in
phrasing alternatives, impatience with bureaucratic red
tape, and breadth of vision in relating government to
needs of future generations. In the theater of action
associated with marine affairs, Humphrey was an
Administration Vice President, and an effective one.
Ed Wenk in The Politics of the Ocean
Given a Republican President, it would appear
that the Mr. or Mrs. Oceans of the moment should
be a Republican, although there are several
Democrats who have excellent qualifications for the
position. One wishes that one of the prime requisites
for the post would be a degree in bipartisanship.
Nevertheless, the importance of the need for
a Mr./Mrs. Oceans looms larger when one considers
the likelihood of the United States recognizing a
200-mile Exclusive EconomicZone in the near future.
This would make Mr./Mrs. Oceans the benefactor of
avast territory, an area far greater than any state, but,
unfortunately, without a voting constituency. Still,
the natural resources within this area are such that
the position will become important and powerful.
Where then should this strong leader come
from Capitol Hill , the Executive Branch, academia,
or a government agency? After all, he or she
must be able to act as a catalyst for the many
recommendations coming out of the studies of
various committees and boards in such institutions as
the National Science Foundation, the National
Academy of Sciences, and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, to name but three.
We have gathered the names of a few
candidates who could hold the title of Mr. Oceans,
but certainly the list is far from exhaustive. We think
of Senator Ted Stevens, Republican of Alaska, a man
with a long coastline whose waters are graced with an
abundance of natural resources; Senator Bob
Packwood, Republican of Oregon; Representative
John Breaux, Democrat of Louisiana, a state
experiencing the rewards and problems connected
with offshore oil and gas exploitation; Senator Ernest
F. Hollings, Democrat of South Carolina; Senator
Claiborne Pell, Democrat of Rhode Island;
Representative Gerry E. Studds, Democrat of
Massachusetts; and Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr.,
Republican of Connecticut. This list of contenders is
drawn from Capitol Hill and thus all are subject to the
time constraints imposed by the voting public.
We also are reminded that Vice President
George Bush has some prior involvements with the
oceans, involvements that might be capitalized on by
leaders of the marine community. We refer to his
wartime years as a lieutenant (jg.) in the Navy and his
12-year stint as cofounder and president of Zapata
Off-Shore Company.
Wherever he or she may be, though, it is time
tor another Mr. or Mrs. Oceans to step forward and
preside over our marine environment as we advance
toward the 21st century.
Paul R. Ryan
Introduction:
Marine Policy
for the 1 980s and Beyond
by John A. Knauss
"I Illow fully and wisely the United States uses the
sea in the decades ahead will affect profoundly its
security, its economy, its ability to meet increasing
demands for food and raw materials, its position and
influence in the world community, and thequalityof
the environment in which its people live." Thus
began Our Nation and the Sea, the 1969 report of the
Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and
Resources, better known as the Stratton
Commission. Subtitled A Plan for National Action,
this report laid out in some detail its recommen-
dations and its rationale for realizing these goals.
The Stratton Commission was the culmination
of a decade of effort, much of it Congressionally
driven, to provide focus and momentum to this
nation's marine efforts. It began with the 1959 report
of the National Academy of Science Committee on
Oceanography (NASCO), which was followed by a
host of similar efforts including A National Ocean
Program (1964) for the National Security Industrial
Associates; a second NASCO effort, Oceanography,
7966; Effective Use of the Sea, a 1966 report of the
Panel on Oceanography of the President's Science
Advisory Committee (PSAC) ; and The Ocean Science
Program of the U.S. Navy, Accomplishments and
Prospects (1967),fortheOceanographerof the Navy.
Most important was the passage of the Marine
Resources, Engineering, and Development Act of
1966, which established the National Council on
Marine Resource Development (the Marine
Council), a federal, cabinet-level interagency
committee, chaired by the Vice President, and the
aforementioned Commission on Marine Science,
Engineering, and Resources. The bill was a
compromise between the Senate, which pushed for
the Marine Council, and the House, which thought
recommendations on federal organizations should
come from a presidentially appointed commission.
While it lasted, the Marine Council, under its
enthusiastic chairman, Vice President Hubert
Humphrey, and a hard-driving council staff headed
by Ed Wenk, did indeed provide focus and
momentum. Its annual reports for the years 1967
through 1970, Marine Science Affairs, document new
initiatives, growing budgets, and general enthusiasm
for this nation's marine programs. Wise program
managers are always attuned to the new buzzwords
of Washington, and a number of existing programs in
such agencies as the Coast Guard, Geological
Survey, and Army Corps of Engineers suddenly
became part of the nation's marine science affairs
effort; but at least some of the growth was real, as we
saw the start of such programs as Sea Grant and the
International Decade of Ocean Exploration.
The two main organizational recommen-
dations of the Stratton Commission were to form an
independent agency for the oceans and the
atmosphere, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), and a public advisory body
to the President and Congress, the National Advisory
Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere (NACOA).
The Stratton Commission believed that with these
organizations in place there would no longer be a
need forthe Marine Council. President Nixon agreed
to establish NOAA, but housed it in the Department
of Commerce rather than making it an independent
agency, and Congress passed legislation establishing
NACOA. The Marine Council was then allowed to
officially dissolve, but it already had been killed
effectively by administrative indifference. A
high-level interagency group is only as effective as its
chairman's commitment. Vice President Humphrey
was an ocean enthusiast, and under him the Marine
Council prospered. Marine Affairs were not high on
Vice President Agnew's agenda, and after 1969 the
Marine Council rarely met.
Many hoped the Stratton Commission would
signal a new beginning in federal ocean interest, but
by 1969 this nation had more urgent matters to
address. The ghettos were exploding and Vietnam
was dividing the country as few issues have in recent
memory. "Ocean" was no longer a Washington
buzzword. However, those who view the mid-1960s
with nostalgia may be missing an important point:
this nation's commitment to ocean activities has
grown and deepened since the Stratton Commission
report. One measure of this deepening involvement
is the extent of federal interest. The Stratton
Commission reported that ocean activities were
located in six departments, four independent
agencies, and 17 agencies and subagencies within
departments. One of the principal reasons for the
establishment of NOAA was to centralize some of
these ocean activities. NOAA is now the premier
federal civilian ocean agency, but a 1978 Department
of Commerce report, U.S. Ocean Policy in the 1970s,
Status and Issues, notes that ocean programs were by
then administered in 10 departments, eight
independent agencies, and 38 agencies and
subagencies within departments. The oceans'
influence on our government and its people is
pervasive, and no new organizational plan will ever
again purport to centralize this nation's ocean effort.
The growth of ocean activities and their
influence on national policy can be measured in a
number of ways. Among them are: number and size
of programs, diversity of activities, economic
growth, opportunities for future growth, and
national security implications. This issue of Oceanus
focuses on many of the important ocean-related
issues of the last 15 years. If there is a common thread
to these articles, it is that this nation and the world are
continuing to increase and diversify the use of the
oceans and their resources, and with these
opportunities comes a host of problems. These
include boundary delimitations between nations,
such as the United States and Canada, the rational
management of fisheries, and the urgent need to
better understand the implications of using the
oceans as receptacles for society's ever-growing pile
of waste.
A second common thread in these articles is
"creeping jurisdiction." As we make more use of the
ocean and its resources, we extend our jurisdiction
seaward. The Coastal Zone Management Act applies
to the breadth of the territorial sea. The Fishery
Conservation and Management Act extended U.S.
jurisdiction over fisheries to 200 miles from shore.
The Law of the Sea (LOS) Treaty provides every
coastal nation with a 200-mile Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ), in which it has sovereignty over all the
natural resources and jurisdiction over all marine
scientific research. The ocean management and
policy issues of the 1980s are more extensive and
more complex than those of the 1960s.
It is often easier to develop ocean policy in
federal legislation than it is to implement it. As Walsh
notes in his article, the Coastal Zone Management
Act of 1972 was the result of Stratton Commission
recommendations. The concept was simple. The
coastal zone was being subjected to increased use
and to often-conflicting multiple uses. Often there
was a commonality of interest that stretched beyond
the perspectives of local town zoning boards. Many
times the interests were "national," but the federal
government was perceived as too remote to serve as
an effective coastal zone manager. Thus the states
were given the charge, and with it, as Walsh points
out, a series of carrots to induce them to take on the
difficult, albeit important, task of rational
management and development of the nation's
coastal zone. The results have been mixed. At a
minimum, the mere act of developing a coastal-zone
plan raised the consciousness of many state
governments that had never before considered the
issue. Coastal zone management today in some
states is just a paper tiger, but in many the Act has
been a strong and generally positive force that has
made significant contributions to wise development
and conservation.
Vice President Hubert Humphrey was an ocean science
booster. He is shown here observing a demonstration of
equipment aboard the research vessel Atlantis II. The cruise
was part of his 7967 visit to Woods Hole, Massachusetts.
(WHOI photo)
The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (MFCMA) of 1976 resulted from the
widely shared belief within the United States that our
fish stocks were being badly depleted because of
significant overfishing by foreign fleets. Passage was
aided by the Congressional perception that the LOS
Treaty, then under negotiation, would provide
national jurisdiction over fisheries resources out to
200 miles. There was a conscious attempt by
Congress to make the Act consistent with the
expected provision of the Treaty. For example, the
MFCMA excludes tuna, billfish, and other highly
migratory species from its management provisions
because in 1976 there was some suggestion that
these species would be subject to international
management agreements, a position that did not
prevail in the Treaty negotiations.
As Apollonio makes clear, it is one thing to
pass a law establishing a management framework; it
is another to manage wisely. The administrative
deficiencies in the MFCMA can be handled, and
given the revolutionary character of its management
scheme a series of regional councils manned by
public members of adjacent coastal states, whose
plans must be approved by the Secretary of
Commerce it is remarkable that the system has
needed as few administrative and legislative
adjustments as it has. However, the development of
management plans that achieve optimum yield,
however defined, is quite another matter. Fisheries
science has made significant progress in the last 20
years, but many believe that rational management of
a complex mixed fishery, as described by Apollonio,
is beyond our present capability. More worrisome,
some believe that even if we knew how, the cost of
the resultant observational system would be a
significant fraction of the value of the fishery. Many
think it will be difficult enough to achieve the
minimum management objective of preventing the
collapse of fisheries stocks.
Perhaps the most difficult, complex, and
far-reaching policy issues are those addressed by
Farrington, Capuzzo, Leschine, and Champ. It now
seems clear that the earlier goal of zero ocean
dumping is unrealistic and probably unwarranted.
The ocean does indeed have a large assimilative
capacity. It has accepted enormous amounts of
waste in the past; it can undoubtedly accept more in
the future. The public health risks of ocean dumping
would appear to be significantly less than for many
forms of dumping on land. But how much can be
dumped? What are the consequences of incineration
at sea versus on land? Should we pick a few specific
oceanic sites and dump everything there a sort of
underwater landfill or should we try to disperse
the material over as wide an area as possible? There
are no simple answers, nor, as Farrington and his
colleagues point out, should one ever expect final
answers. As we learn more, our solutions are refined
and occasionally dramatically altered.
All marine scientists associated with ocean
dumping issues are concerned that, to use
Farrington's phrase, the present snowball of ocean
dumping does not suddenly increase to an
avalanche. Unfortunately, there is a real possibility
such might occur. As more and more landfills are
shutdown because of contaminated drinking water,
as incinerators are closed because of concern about
heavy metals and imperfectly combusted organics
escaping from the smokestacks, as we improve our
legal and technical surveillance of industrial
pollution, we are faced with an ever-increasing
amount of waste material and ever-fewer places to
put it. To many, the oceans appear to be an
increasingly attractive option. Given the very real
possibility of an avalanche in ocean dumping, the
amount of scientific research in this area is
inadequate.
Wise use and development of the oceans
depends on scientific understanding. That is clear
in coastal zone management, fisheries management,
and waste management. It is also true for the use of
the ocean by the military, as Winokur and Gonzales
point out. World War II re-emphasized for the Navy
that the side with the best knowledge of the
environment has a distinct advantage. And with the
addition of the ballistic-missile-launching
submarine, the Navy's traditional mission of
projection of power and sea control has taken on
an additional dimension. The Navy's interests are
worldwide, and the service has adopted a
high-technology approach to the development of
weapons systems. Although the Navy no longer plays
the preeminent role in support of basic marine
scientific research that it did 20 years ago (that role is
played by the National Science Foundation), the
Office of Naval Research maintains a strong and
far-ranging interest in most aspects of marine
science. In particular, it has provided support for
large, complex new techniques, such as underwater
mapping (SEABEAM), remote sensing from aircraft
and satellites, and acoustic tomography (see
Oceanus, Vol. 25, No. 2, p. 12). With the decision of
the Reagan Administration to modernize the Navy
and increase its size, one might assume that Naval
support of marine science will at least remain steady,
and might grow.
The single most important ocean policy issue
of the past decade has been the United Nations Law
of the Sea negotiations, recounted in this issue by
Paul Fye, who, along with his colleagues, calls for a
new commission, patterned after the Stratton
Commission, to study the implications of this
nation's rejection of the Treaty. A new chapter in U.S.
ocean policy has begun; U.S. rejection of the Treaty
does not mean that we can ignore it. As Conant notes
in his article on the Arctic, in addition to all the other
problems resulting from the lack of a clear Arctic
policy, the United States needs to reach
accommodation with Canada, a strong Treaty
advocate, on a number of Arctic ocean issues
affecting both nations. Ross points to the problems
marine scientists can expect as a result of the Treaty
and the particular problems U.S. marine scientists
face because the United States will not be party to the
Treaty.
One result of the Law of the Sea negotiations
has been that nations have had to think through all
their ocean interests. For a number of developing
nations (and perhaps many developed ones) this may
have been the first time anyone at the highest level of
the foreign ministry had focused on ocean policy.
Apparently, a number of coastal nations were
dismayed at what they found. The problem for many
coastal nations was that they had little idea of the
extent of resources within 200 miles of their shores,
and few, if any, had facilities and trained people to
determine, let alone exploit, those resources. One
consequence, as Ross points out, has been a rapid
increase in the budget of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization's
Division of Marine Sciences, the UN agency whose
primary mission is to help develop a nation's marine
infrastructure.
Finally, there are policy issues that it was not
possible to address in a single issue of Oceanus.
Despite years of legislative efforts dating back to at
least 1936, this nation's merchant fleet continues to
shrink. A series of proposals by the Reagan
Administration is aimed at increasing the percentage
of our trade that is carried in U.S. vessels. With the
adoption of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development's Code of Conduct for Liner
Operations, which allows a port state to insist that 40
percent of freighter cargo is carried in ships carrying
the flag of the port state, and the possibility of this
policy being expanded to tankers and bulk carriers,
shipping and port development may become major
ocean policy issues of the 1980s.
Although most discussion of fisheries policy in
the last five years has centered around the
implementation of the MFCMA, there are other
fisheries issues that may take on increasing
importance. For example, the MFCMA applies only
to fisheries between three and 200 miles. Inside our
three-mile territorial sea, fisheries are subject to state
law only. Finding a means to reconcile state and
federal differences in fisheries management, where
they exist, is likely to become an increasingly
important and vexing problem. A second issue
concerns tuna, billfish, and other highly migratory
species. Whether or not these species should remain
outside the scope of the MFCMA may be a hotly
debated issue once the Law of the Sea Treaty is
widely adopted. A third issue is sport fishing.
Saltwater recreational fishermen now number more
than 15 million and the total is growing rapidly. It is
estimated they catch at least 700 million pounds of
fish a year, more than 10 percent of the commercial
catch. In some fisheries, such as the West Coast
salmon fishery, recreational fishermen have a
significant impact on the commercial fishery. It is
likely that conflicts between commercial and sport
fishermen will grow.
And finally, a fourth fishing issue for the 1980s
is the role of aquaculture. A major, commercially
viable aquaculture industry has been just around the
corner for more years than its proponents care to
admit. Recent developments, however, have
convinced many that a significant number of the
critical biological problems have been solved. What
may be more difficult to solve are the political and
policy issues related to such matters as the assigning
of certain rivers for salmon culture, or the leasing of
certain grounds for shellfish culture.
There are other ocean policy issues of the
1980s that one can foresee: offshore mineral
development (see Oceanus, Vol.25, No. 3); conflicts
between fisheries and other ocean uses, such as
offshore oil and gas development; the possible
extension of the breadth of the territorial sea from
three to12 miles; the possible development of ocean
thermal energy conversion (OTEC); and the role of
the federal government in providing "services" to
the ever-growing number of ocean users. As the uses
and users of the ocean continue to grow in number,
so do the issues of ocean policy.
John A. Knauss is Dean of the Graduate School of
Oceanography and Vice President for Marine Programs at
the University of Rhode Island. He was a member of the
Stratton Commission and is currently Chairman of the
National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere
(NACOA).
A production drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico. (Photo
courtesy of American Petroleum Institute)
The Law of the Sea
by Paul M. Fye
It is now 15 years since November 1, 1967, when
Arvid Pardo, then Malta's Ambassador to the United
Nations, proposed to the UN General Assembly that
the resources of the oceans beyond national
jurisdiction should be the "common heritage of
mankind." He further pointed out that chaos
threatened the seas; nations were claiming the
waters and marine resources 200 miles and more
beyond their coasts, threatening the free passage of
ships and aircraft and provoking conflicts over fish
and minerals. He called for a major conference to
negotiate a new legal constitution for the oceans.
Three years later, after debating the issues
involved, the 25th General Assembly set forth a
Declaration of Principles in which the Assembly
unanimously agreed that the deep-sea resources are
indeed "thecommon heritageof mankind" and thus
belong to everyone. The Assembly also proposed an
international conference to draft a comprehensive
law for the sea.
Even though the concept had been suggested
earlier by others, the phrase "the common heritage
of mankind" rang throughout the world with great
resonance. UN delegates from some of the newer
nations assumed that if this were indeed part of their
heritage, then somehow by ways mysterious and
unclear, science and technology would provide the
means to harvest resources so rich as to supply all
their needs. Unhappily, national greed and pride
during 15 years of negotiations have bargained away
most of the visions of enormous wealth and
resources created by Pardo's "common heritage."
Laws controlling the use of the seas date back
to the ancient mariners of the Mediterranean. By the
13th Century, city-states were demanding heavy
tributes from passing ships. In the 15th Century,
Spain and Portugal attempted to divide the oceans
between them underthe powerof a papal grant, and
it was generally accepted that the seas could be
appropriated by powerful nations.
In 1609, a young Dutch jurist named Hugo
Grotius proposed in his treatise Mare Liberum that
the high seas should be free "for the innocent use
and mutual benefit of all." For more than three
centuries, nations generally went along with this
highly permissive doctrine for the high seas and
limited their sovereign jurisdiction to a narrow strip
typically three miles from their coast.
The Grotius principle was not seriously
challenged until 1945, when President Truman, by
proclamation, unilaterally claimed the natural
resources of the seabed of the continental shelf for
the United States. Although the waters above the
seabed, under the Truman doctrine, remained the
high seas, many Latin American nations starting
with Chile, Peru, and Ecuador claimed sovereignty
over the ocean out to 200 miles from their coastlines.
These unilateral declarations, which followed shortly
after the Truman proclamation, have been primarily
concerned with fishing rights and, more recently,
with oil and gas.
In the six years between Pardo's speech and
the first organizational meeting of the Third UN
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) in
December 1973, much happened that influenced the
conduct of this Conference. Seventeen nations
expanded their claims for territorial seas to 12 or
more miles. Advances were made in marine
technology that would prove to be influential in UN
debates. The capability of drilling for oil in waters up
to 1 ,000 meters deep and sampling the ocean bottom
to a depth of several miles made the oceans more
exploitable than ever before. The engineering
Hugo Grotius (Portrait courtesy of the Rijksmuseum,
Amsterdam)
capability for mining deep-sea manganese nodules
was demonstrated. Mechanization of distant water
deep-sea fishing fleets allowed them to become
more self-sufficient and to stay at sea for months at a
time.
Years of Preparation
Perhaps the most significant event during these years
was the formation, in late 1967, of the Ad Hoc
Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed
and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction. This Seabed Committee, as it soon
became known, had the difficult job of preparing for
the formal conference which was to follow. The
Committee was initially composed of 34 nations but
finally grew to 91 before it passed its work over to the
Third UN Conference.
In the interim, while the Seabed Committee
was working on the preparation for UNCLOS 111, the
General Assembly took two related actions of
significance. In 1969, it passed the Moratorium
Resolution, which stated that "nations are bound to
refrain from all activities of exploration of the
resources of the area of the seabed and ocean floor,
and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of
jurisdiction." The United States, fearing this
resolution would deter technologic development in
the deep ocean, voted against it.
Second, the UN adopted the Treaty on the
Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons
and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the
Seabed and Ocean Floor and Subsoil Thereof. The
United States, Soviet Union, and some 60 other
nations signed this treaty in 1971 and thus agreed not
to place weapons of mass destruction more than 12
miles from their respective coastlines.
Also in parallel with the meetings of the
Seabed Committee, the United States and the Soviet
Union undertook bilateral negotiations concurrently
with a number of other nations with a view to
obtaining international agreement on a territorial sea
of 12 miles, freedom of transit through international
straits overlapped by such territorial seas, and
agreement on fishing rights in the area beyond 12
miles. However, it was not the intention or desire of
either the United States or the Soviet Union that
these limited negotiations should become a part of
an all-inclusive new legal regime for the oceans.
Instead, the intent was to handle different ocean
problems separately, in manageable pieces. The
majority of other members of the United Nations did
not agree. Most developing countries, along with a
number of others, wanted to deal with the legal
problems of control of the oceans in a
comprehensive way, including other subjects such
as the exploitation of the continental shelf and the
deep sea, protection of the marine environment,
scientific research, and a variety of others in a single
negotiating effort.
The Seabed Committee was given special
instructions by the General Assembly to prepare
draft articles for a comprehensive regime for the
seabed and ocean floor, as well as a list of themes and
issues for consideration bytheformal Conference. In
its six-year lifetime, the Committee held many
informal meetings under its Chairman, Ambassador
H. Shirley Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka, but was able to
reach only one agreement: the adoption of a list of
themes and issues that could serve as a framework
for the discussion of draft articles. The Declaration of
Principles, adopted by the General Assembly in 1970,
was formulated only after a great deal of bargaining
and negotiation in the course of examining the
report of the Seabed Committee.
The General Assembly, in debating the
Seabed Committee's report, finally agreed that the
Committee had fulfilled its mandate and that the
preparatory work was sufficient for a successful
Conference. It also agreed that the goal of the
Conference would be to produce a single,
comprehensive, unified Convention rather than
several treaties. The General Assembly adopted a
gentlemen's agreement to the effect that the
Conference should make every effort to achieve a
Convention acceptable to all nations through a
consensus approach and that no vote on substance
should be taken until all efforts to achieve a general
agreement had been exhausted.
Thus the plans were laid to convene a new
Conference on the Law of the Sea. The first session,
held in New York City in December of 1973, devoted
most of its time to procedural questions, election of
officers (Ambassador Amerasinghe was elected
President of the Conference), the organization of its
work, and the composition of different committees.
The Conference organized itself into three working
committees with the responsibility for drafting
articles for a draft convention.
The First Committee was concerned with the
international regime and machinery for the seabed
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, usually
referred to as the "international area" or the deep
seabed. The mandate to construct a new
international regime that could give substance to the
concept of "the common heritage of mankind" was
exciting. Visions of a more perfect international
community got tangled up with economic ideology
and sometimes obscured the pragmatic purpose of
the First Committee mining manganese nodules
on the ocean floor. The Committee Chairman was
Ambassador Paul Bamela Engo of Cameroon, with
Ambassador Christopher Pinto of Sri Lanka serving as
chairman of a negotiating group.
The Second Committee had the broadest and
most complex mandate of the three committees,
embracing virtually all of the traditional Law of the
Sea subjects. These included issues regarding the
territorial sea, straits, archipelagos, the high seas, the
economic zone (including living and non-living
resources), the continental shelf, and access to the
sea. This Committee was chaired by Ambassador
Andres Aquilar of Venezuela.
The Third Committee was concerned with
marine pollution, scientific research, and the transfer
of technology. Ambassador A. Yankov of Bulgaria
was elected Chairman, with Ambassador Jose
Vallarta of Mexico as chairman of the informal
sessionson marine pollution, and Cornel Metternich
of West Germany serving as chairman of the informal
sessions on scientific research and transfer of
technology. It was the work of this committee that
was followed most closely by the United States ocean
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science community. Chief U.S. representatives to
the Third Committee over the years included Donald
McKernan, Thomas A. Clinghan, Terry Leitzell, and
Norman Wulf.
Another working group that evolved
informally out of discussions among delegations of at
least 30 nations during the 1974 Caracas session was
the Informal Croup on Settlement of Disputes. This
group was chaired initially by Ambassadors Calindo
Pohl of El Salvador and Ralph Harry of Australia, with
Professor Louis Sohn of the Harvard Law School
serving as rapporteur.
Decision By Consensus
Two aspects of the long negotiations in UNCLOS III
that will be of great interest to parliamentarians of the
future are the mechanism of arriving at decisions
through consensus, as mandated by the General
Assembly and adopted by the Conference in June
1974, and the unusual delegation of power to the
committee chairmen. In a desperate move to speed
up the consensus process, President Amerasinghe
proposed that the chairmen prepare the negotiating
texts. This procedure was adopted by the
Conference in April, 1975, at the second substantive
session meeting in Geneva.
Reaching decisions by consensus had been
tried in a more limited way in previous UN bodies.
During the first substantive session of UNCLOS III in
Caracas and partway into the second session in
Geneva, the Conference tried passive consensus
procedures. It was hoped that the high desire for a
successful outcome would provide the momentum
toward compromise. It became clear to President
Amerasinghe that this process was becoming highly
protracted. In a sense, this consensus process was a
continuation of the procedures used in the Seabed
Arvid Pardo in 1965. (UN photo)
Committee, but even the more intense atmosphere
of the full-scale conference did not eliminate the
repetitious rhetoric or speed up the negotiating
process.
President Amerasinghe put to the delegates
an inspired proposal, namely that the chairmen of
the three main committees be mandated to produce
Informal Single Negotiating Texts covering the
agendas of their respective committees. The
delegations agreed to transfer to the chairmen their
collective right and responsibility to draft a text
agreed on by consensus. The advantage of this
procedure was that it gave the initiative in
formulating compromises to the chairmen, and
thereby enabled the negotiations to overcome the
unwillingness of delegations to abandon their own
positions. This innovation became the central
procedural mechanism of the Conference,
dominating subsequent sessions. It was the heart of
the active consensus procedures developed during
UNCLOS III. No previous exercise in treaty-making
or international law-making has been so extensive,
so complex, so ambitious, nor so controversial, and
many observers believe that this new way of
negotiating compromises will be used in future
attempts at complex treaty-making.
And so the process rolled on. The Informal
Single Negotiating Text became the Revised Single
Negotiating Text, which in turn became the Informal
Composite Negotiating Text each version having
many revisions. Finally, in the spring of 1982, after 11
sessions (several of which were in fact double
sessions), the Conference produced a Draft
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which is in reality a
new Law of the Sea Treaty.
The U.S. Pulls Out
This only happened after the United States had
effectively called a halt to negotiations in the spring
of 1981 . It was generally felt that the delegations were
close to the end of their long and tedious sessions
and that one more "final" session was all that was
needed to iron out the few remaining differences.
Only days before this, the 10th session, was to begin,
President Reagan fired the U.S. delegation that had
been appointed originally by President Carter and
instructed the new team, headed by James L.
Malone, to defer additional negotiations until a
comprehensive policy review had been completed.
This review was to be conducted by all appropriate
government agencies and was to determine how
satisfactorily U.S. interests would be served by the
draft treaty. It was conducted largely in secret and
engendered contusion in both national and
international circles.
Ten months later, in January 1982, President
Reagan announced the results of this review. After
emphasizingthe importanceof the oceans, which he
called "a frontier for expanding scientific research
and knowledge" (the only mention of scientific
research in his entire statement), he set forth the
changes the United States wanted in the deep seabed
miningprovisions. Heconcluded by stating that "the
United States remains committed to the multilateral
treaty process for reaching agreement on law of the
sea." The specified changes all related to seabed
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was chairman of the United States delegation to the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. (Photo by
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mining and can be summarized as follows: In order
to satisfy the United States, the Treaty should 1) not
deter development of any deep seabed mineral
resources; 2) assure national access to and promote
the economic development of these resources; 3)
provide for a fair decision-making role in the new
regime; 4) not allow amendments to come into force
without approval of participating nations, including
in our case the advice and consent of the Senate; 5)
not set undesirable precedents for international
organizations; and6) be likely to receive the consent
of the Senate. In this regard, the treaty should not
contain provisions for the mandatory transfer of
private technology nor for participation by and
funding for national liberation movements.
Following the President's statement, a serious
attempt was made by the new President of the
Conference, Ambassador Tommy T. B. Koh of
Singapore, and many other delegations to meet the
United States demands. A number of important
concessions were made, including the provision that
the U.S. (if the
"largest consumer" of seabed
minerals) would have a seat on the Council of the
International Seabed Authority, provisions for
preparatory investment protection (which gave the
U.S. companies that have pioneered deep seabed
mining guaranteed access to a specific mine site up
to 150,000 square kilometers), and certain other
marginally useful improvements. The failure to
obtain other compromises, which would have
brought the draft treaty closer to the President's
goals, was due, according to Leigh S. Ratiner, Deputy
Chairman of the U.S. Delegation, to an overly rigid
attitude on the part of the U.S. Delegation, together
with concurrent attempts on the part of the United
States to arrange a separate mini-treaty with our allies
outside the framework of the UN Conference. This
latter position convinced many developing countries
that the United States was not negotiating in good
faith and had little interest in the successful outcome
of the Law of the Sea Treaty.
Finally, on the last day of the 11th session of
UNCLOS III, at the request of the United States, the
Conference voted on the acceptance of the Draft
Convention as it had developed during almost nine
years of extremely hard work by many diplomats. A
total of 151 states voted, with 130 voting to accept the
Convention, 17 abstaining, and 4 voting against
acceptance (Israel, Turkey, the United States, and
Venezuela). The group of 17 who abstained included,
among others, Belgium, West Germany, Italy,
Britain, and the Soviet Union, along with the block of
associated East European countries. Most observers
believe that many of these abstainers will sign the
Treaty when it is open for signing in December and
January. The Treaty will go into force, for those
nations ratifying it, 12 months after 60 nations have
filed ratification papers with the UN. Some believe
this could be as early as 1984 or 1985.
The Conference officials and most of the
delegations had devoutly wished to adopt the Treaty
by consensus, but the U .S. request for a vote blocked
this goal. It is significant that in the nine years of
negotiations this was the first vote on a substantive
issue. It is beyond the scope of this article to detail
the accomplishments of this massive and complex
constitution for ocean law. The main body of the text
consists of 320 articles, with an additional 118 articles
Tommy T. B. Koh of Singapore, President ofthe Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. (Photo by Yutaka
Nagata UN)
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in 8 annexes, and covers all of the subject matter
assigned to the tour working groups.
Key Features
The Convention on the Law of the Sea lays down
rules for all parts and virtually all uses of the oceans.
The following are some of its key features:
Coastal nations have sovereignty over a
territorial sea of 12 miles, with foreign vessels
allowed "innocent passage" for purposes of
peaceful navigation.
Ships and aircraft of other nations are allowed
"transit passage" through straits used for
international navigation.
Archipelagic nations have sovereignty over a
sea area enclosed by straight lines drawn
between the outermost points of the related
islands, with the ships of other nations
enjoying the right of passage through sea
lanes within these waters.
Coastal nations have sovereign rights in a
200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone with
respect to natural resources and certain
economic activities and also have certain
types of jurisdiction over scientific research
and environmental preservation. All other
nations have freedom of navigation and
overflight in the zone, with land-locked
nations and nations "with special
geographical characteristics" having the right,
under certain circumstances, to share in the
zone's fisheries.
Coastal nations have sovereign rights over the
seabed of the Continental Shelf, extending to
at least 200 miles and out to 350 miles or even
beyond under specified circumstances,
without affecting the legal status of the water
or the air space above. There isprovision for
sharing revenues derived from exploiting the
shelf beyond 200 miles with the international
community.
All nations retain the traditional freedoms of
navigation, overflight, scientific research, and
fishing on the high seas.
A
"parallel system" is established for
exploring and exploiting the international
seabed area. All activities on the seabed are
under the control of the International Seabed
Authority, which is authorized to conduct its
own mining operations through its Enterprise.
The Authority can contract with private and
national companies for mining in specific
mine sites provided the Enterprise is awarded
a site of equal size or value. The resources of
the area (primarily manganese nodules) are to
be managed as a "common heritage of
mankind." Mining concerns having contracts
with the Authority must be willing to sell their
technical knowledge to the Authority.
Production ceilings are set in the treaty to
protect land-based producers, and a group of
"pioneer operators" is to be guaranteed
mining contracts.
UNITED REPUBLIC
OF CAMEROON
Paul Bamela Engo of Cameroon, who chaired the First
Committee of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea. He prepared negotiating texts for articles
dealing with the international seabed regime. (Photo by M.
Grant UN)
Nations are bound to prevent and control
marine pollution by "the best practical means
at their disposal."
All marine scientific research in the Exclusive
Economic Zone and on the Continental Shelf
is subject to the consent of the coastal nation,
which is obligated to grant consent provided
certain criteria are met and the research is for
peaceful purposes (see page 13).
Nations are bound to promote the
development and transfer of marine
technology "on fair and reasonable terms and
conditions."
Nations are obliged to settle differences by
peaceful means using arbitration procedures
if necessary.
Standing Alone
The refusal to approve the Treaty leaves the United
States standing alone in isolation from most of the
nations of the world. President Reagan has stated that
most provisions of the Convention are consistent
with U.S. interests. Included among these are
provisions for commercial navigation and overflight,
mobility of air and naval forces, fisheries, marine
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mammals, scientific research, control of marine
pollution, dispute settlement, and many more.
The Reagan administration appears to be
relying on the development of a mini-treaty with a
limited number of nations. This would permit
deep-sea mining as a means of protecting our
strategic interest in the nickel, copper, cobalt,
and
manganese available in the nodules on the seafloor.
However, many maritime experts doubt that a
mini-treaty could provide a regime which would
provide the stability and security necessary to entice
funding agencies to invest the $1 .5 billion that a
deep-sea mining project may require.
So it appears that the United States wishes to
seek the advantages of those portions of the treaty
which it likes while turning its back on the portions it
dislikes. Only time will tell whether the majority of
the nations of the world will be this tolerant with the
nation whose commitment to the rule of law
contributed so much to the foundations of the Law of
the Sea treaty.
As far as our interests in conducting scientific
research are concerned, I believe we would be better
off under the treaty than with the United States
standing aside. Coastal zones are where most
important scientific questions arise. In recentyears,a
significant portion of our research (perhaps a third to
a half) has been conducted in foreign waters within
200 miles of a coastal nation. Now oceanographers
are reluctant to plan such research, for fear they will
be denied access at the last minute. For those coastal
nations who resent the failure of the United States to
support the treaty, the easiest way to show this
resentment is to deny U.S. research ships access to
their waters. The resulting confusion, in both our
State Department and foreign ministeries, can only
be harmful to the pursuit of oceanography.
Two fellows of the Marine Policy and Ocean
Management Program at the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution, Robert W. Knecht and
Robert E. Bowen, have just finished a study entitled
the Implications of the Law of the Sea Convention for
U.S. Policy in the 1980s. I would like to quote briefly
from their study, which is scheduled to be published
in a forthcoming issue of the Marine Technology
Society Journal:
"It should be clear to most observers that the
Convention on the Law of the Sea will be an
important factor in U.S. ocean policy-making in the
1980s. It seems likely that the treaty will serve as an
important guiding force in the future development of
international legal norms for the oceans. The United
States will not be able to isolate itself from the
impacts of the significant changes in marine law and
practice that the next few years will witness. The
likely entry into force of the treaty by the end of the
decade and the actions of individual nations leading
up to that event, will require a broad range of
responses [Table 1 ] by the United States regardless of
the status of the treaty in the U.S. ...
"We believe that a new commission,
patterned along the lines of the earlier Stratton
Commission, should be constituted to review
existing programs and to explore the general
implications of the LOS Convention as well as the
specific actions that the Preparatory Commission and
Table 1 . Conclusions reached by Robert W. Knecht and Robert
E. Bowen in their study entitled the Implications of the Law of
the Sea Convention for US. Ocean Policy in the 1980s.
Given the magnitude and diversity of U.S. ocean interests,
the United States will be significantly affected by the Law of the
Sea (LOS) Convention even if it does not become a party to the
treaty in the foreseeable future.
Over time, the Convention will have its most important
impact on international law (and consequently, on the United
States) to the extent that its provisions serve as the authoritative
guide to a consistent and uniform practice of coastal states.
Domestic action, probably involving legislation in most
cases, will be required to take advantage of parts of the
Convention consistent with our interests, for example,
establishment of an Exclusive Economic Zone.
The United States also will find it necessary to take action to
mitigate the adverse effects of certain other LOS provisions,
such as those dealing with marine scientific research and
seabed mining.
Reviewing and deciding upon appropriate courses of action
in connection with these issues will be a major preoccupation
of ocean interests in the 1 980s.
Such reviews must take into account the status of the LOS
Convention in international law and the possible reaction of
other countries to a U.S. refusal to sign and ratify the treaty.
Given that certain of the LOS-triggered issues are politically
volatile and co-mingled with existing coastal and ocean
management problems (for example, the expansion of the U.S.
territorial sea), the creation of a "study commission," is
suggested as a means of reaching a national consensus on them.
other coastal nations may take in the near future.
Ideally, such a commission should have a clear
congressional mandate and a carefully worded
charge and be staffed and funded for a period of at
least two years. The staff would receive balanced
policy guidance from a high-level group of
commissioners, representing important ocean users,
government, academia, and the public at large. The
report and recommendations of the commission
would be transmitted both to the appropriate
congressional committees and to the executive
branch upon completion of the study."
In conclusion, I would like to quote
Ambassador Elliot L. Richardson, who headed the
U.S. delegation to UNCLOS III from January 1977 to
October 1980:
The real importance of the Law of the Sea Treaty
cannot be found either in the sum of its parts or
in its extraordinarily comprehensive whole. It
lies rather in its demonstration of the capacity of
760 sovereign states to work out rational
accommodations among vital competing
interests. This is an achievement whose
significance will loom even larger as the world
increasingly finds itself forced to come to grips
with its own inseparability.
Paul M. Fye is President of the Corporation of the Woods
Hole Oceanographic Institution. He is also a Senior Advisor
in the Marine Policy and Ocean Management program.
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An Indian scientist sorts samples ofplankton at the UNESCO-supported Indian Ocean Biological Center in Cochin, India.
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International Marine Science:
An Opportunity for the Future
by David A. Ross and Michael C. Healey
Ihe style and techniques used by marine scientists to
conduct research in foreign waters are clearly
entering a period during which major changes will be
necessary if many research activities are to continue.
In the United States and other developed countries,
marine scientists are experiencing decreased
funding for research and a reduction in the size of
academic oceanographic fleets. Furthermore, since
the United States has declined adoption of the Law of
the Sea Treaty, uncertainties and complexities for
U.S. scientists in the international arena have
increased. One technique that could counteract the
curtailment of research that these events suggest and
also lead to improved international opportunities in
marine research is to foster new or improved
mechanisms for cooperation among marine
scientists, institutions, and governments.
Cooperation in marine science is not a new
idea. It has been a valuable and effective technique
since the beginning of the field, especially on the
individual scientist-to-scientist level. Unfortunately,
the individual approach will probably not be as
effective in the future because of increased
regulation under the Law of the Sea Treaty, especially
the requirement that international communications
and negotiations concerning research programs "be
through official channels" (Article 250 in the treaty).
Because of this requirement and other aspects of the
treaty, as well as the realities of the modern world, it
appears that the more institutionalized approaches
to cooperation in marine science will prevail in
coming years. Certainly institutionalized
cooperation could reduce some of the enthusiasm
and spontaneity of scientific interactions, at the same
time adding to an already increasing bureaucracy in
marine science. The alternative, however, could be
either forestalled or lost research opportunities in
foreign waters. International cooperation can take
several forms and, when the politics are kept to a
minimum, should be acceptable to most scientists.
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Background
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS III) is entering its second decade of
debate, but on April 30, 1982, a Law of the Sea Treaty
was approved by a vote of 130 to 4 (the United States,
Israel, Turkey, and Venezuela voted no) with 17
abstentions. There are still several hurdles the treaty
must clear, including ratification by 60 countries,
before it actually takes effect. Many countries,
however, already have incorporated parts of the
treaty into their national law. The UNCLOS 1 1 1
debates and the resulting treaty cover almost all
aspects of ocean use and are considered to be the
most complex negotiations ever undertaken. To the
average observer, however, these negotiations
probably seem to have focused mainly on the conflict
over deep-sea mineral resources, in particular
manganese nodules, which cover a major portion of
the deep ocean floor and contain high
concentrations of manganese, copper, cobalt, and
nickel (see Oceanus, Vol. 25, No. 3).
Perhaps less obvious to the casual observer of
UNCLOS III is that a large portion of the ocean will
(and in several instances already has) come under
coastal-nation jurisdiction. Although it is far from
clear how the seaward boundaries ultimately will be
drawn, at least 40 percent of the ocean will be
involved a region about equal in size to the
present continental area of this planet. In addition,
the remaining 60 percent of the ocean will come
under an international administrative regime (the
International Seabed Authority) for mineral resource
development and other activities.
In the summer of 1982, the Reagan
Administration announced its decision to withdraw
from further UNCLOS III negotiations because of
unhappiness with the treaty articles that will cover
exploitation of deep-sea resources. In defense of this
decision, the points are often made that deep-sea
minerals are important to the United States and that
American companies have already invested more
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than $100 million in preliminary mining operations.On the other hand, many knowledgeable individuals
doubt that deep-sea mining will occur in this century,
in large part because of uncertain economic
conditions. Likewise, it is not clear that the United
States could legally mine the deep sea if it were to
remain outside the regime of the treaty.
Another group, less well publicized than the
deep-sea miners, also has made large investments in
the ocean and could be affected by expansion of
jurisdiction and by the U.S. decision to remain
outside of the treaty. We refer to the distant-water
oceanographic research community: those
institutions and individuals that conduct marine
research in the 40 percent of the ocean that is to
come under coastal-nation control.
The treaty has a section on marine scientific
research that details the requirements and specific
conditions for getting consent from foreign
countries for work in their waters. Pros and cons of
these scientific research provisions have been
discussed elsewhere (Ross and Knauss, 1982). Suffice
to say that there are many articles that may frustrate
and delay oceanographers in the planning and
conducting of research in foreign waters. The basic
point is that coastal nations will control research in
their internal waters, their territorial sea, a 200-mile
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and in some
instances even further offshore. More than 80
countries have already established some form of
control over these waters. This is an important point,
since sufficient national legislation already exists to
restrict the distant-water oceanographer, regardless
of the ultimate fate of the treaty, and these rules,
according to some, are already part of established
international law.
Consequences for Oceanography
The conditions tor getting permission for marine
scientific research within foreign EEZs are not the
subject of this article, but these conditions clearly
will make the logistics of distant-water research more
difficult, more costly, more time-consuming, and,
therefore, less likely to occur. Successful projects
will have to be developed in close cooperation with
foreign countries and scientists. The procedure to
develop such cooperative foreign programs often
will be hard for individual scientists to ascertain and
follow. Indeed it is not even clear how marine
science funding organizations and the U.S. State
Department will respond to the treaty's articles on
marine scientific research. A potentially frustrating
"Catch-22" situation can result if permission to
conduct research is required from a foreign country
before a project can be funded, while at the same
time the State Department does not admit that
coastal nations possess such authority.
There are other potentially annoying aspects
of the treaty, especially since the United States has
decided not to participate in future negotiations.
One that should be mentioned is the question of
what will happen if the State Department requests
permission to conduct research within the EEZ of a
country and that country responds that permission is
dependent on acceptance of the marine science
articles in the treaty. Acceptance of such a condition
by the State Department could be interpreted as tacit
acceptance of the treaty, which is contrary to the
present position of the U.S. government. In this
situation, the State Department would probably
withdraw the request a political decision resulting
in cancellation of a scientific project that scientists in
both countries may have spent several years
planning and promoting. Such political niceties may
be of little interest to the practicing scientist. But the
question remains, how do we continue to do our
important oceanographic research without being
harassed or stymied by the bureaucrats of the world?
One approach is to increase and improve our
international cooperative oceanographic activities
on the scientific as well as the diplomatic front. This
approach should lead to significant benefits for the
U.S. oceanographic community, but it will not be
easy.
Reasons for Cooperation
There are several very good reasons for having
cooperative programs with foreign countries,
especially developing ones. Certainly among the
most important is the altruistic motive of sharing the
knowledge and benefits of research. There also are
important scientific consequences of assisting
foreign scientists and technicians to reach high levels
of competence, in that the work these people
conduct in the future will be more professional and
of a higher caliber. Most scientists who participate in
cooperative foreign programs find them to be very
satisfying for scientific as well as personal reasons.
The treaty will create another motivation for
cooperative international projects access to
foreign waters but it will not be a straight quid pro
quo. To develop a program will require a better
understanding of a foreign country's marine
scientific research needs and expectations, the latter
of which are very often different from ours.
Many foreign countries, especially developing
ones, look to the ocean as a source of food, energy,
raw materials, and tourism rather than as a place to
test scientific hypotheses. Environmental protection
may not have a high priority, at least at the present
time. Some coastal countries have no tradition of
marine scientific research, and it is only because of
their newly acquired jurisdiction over a large part of
the ocean that they now look seaward. Thus, while
foreign countries may be anxious to participate in
cooperative marine research, their main interests will
be in applied research that will focus on the
assessment and exploitation of real, potential, or
imagined marine resources. They also may be more
interested in research on marine policy, marine
economics, or coastal zone management than the
more specific and traditional subdisciplines of
oceanography. It has been mainly for these reasons
that a number of developing countries have taken an
active role in some international organizations.
Foreign countries, and their scientists, will
expect to take a much more active role in the
The final planning session for the Joint Air-Sea Interaction
project (JASIN), a five-year (1977 to 1982) scientific
investigation involving 60 scientists from nine countries. At
this meeting in Wormley, England, the group coordinated
schedules for 14 ships and four aircraft that were used in a
two-month expedition northwest of Scotland. (Photo by
Mel Briscoe WHOI)
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planning and execution of cooperative scientific
programs than they have in the past. An important
point in effective cooperation is that it should include
individuals with compatible skills. Some of the newer
countries, especially those which lack backgrounds
in marine science, may have few appropriately
trained people who could participate in a
cooperative project. For this and other reasons, the
host country may require as a condition of access that
the visiting country offer practical training courses
(shipboard training may be especially appealing) and
assistance with developing national expertise in
assessing marine resources. Most countries also will
want samples of all materials collected and copies of
all data and reports. None of these potential
requirements is unreasonable and, if approached
creatively, may actually lead to more interesting and
productive projects.
Major Facilitating Organizations
Some official international organizations already
exist for coordinating and promoting marine science.
Unfortunately some of them have not been very
successful, but it is their potential rather than their
past performance that we should consider.
International organizations fall into two
general categories governmental and
nongovernmental. Either can be organized on a
global or regional scale. There are several global and
regional oceanographic forums in which the United
States participates and which are or could be
effective vehicles for developing international
marine activities. Among these are the
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission
(IOC), the Scientific Committee on Oceanic
Research (SCOR), the International Council for the
Exploration of the Sea (ICES), and United Nations
organizations such as the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO). In addition, there are other ways that the
United States could foster marine science programs
in foreign waters. These include bilateral science and
technology agreements as well as trade and aid
agreements that include access for marine science.
Also worthwhile are specific programs like the
International Decade of Ocean Exploration (IDOE)
program of the 1970s, which stressed international
cooperation (see Oceanus, Vol. 23, No. 1). It would
be exciting to see a new effort such as this develop
for the 1980s. International Sea Grant might have
fulfilled this role but, unfortunately, has fallen victim
to U.S. budget cuts.
Probably the first effective international
governmental organization for cooperation in
marine science was ICES, formed in 1902. ICES now
has 18 member countries, mainly from Europe and
North America (including Iceland), and essentially all
have considerable expertise in marine science. ICES
has focused mainly on living resources and pollution
research, and sponsors important annual meetings
on these subjects. Although there are national
delegates to the Council, most of the scientific
deliberations are handled by working committees of
scientists so that recommendations of the Council
are based mainly on scientific rather than political
considerations. This separation of science and
politics has been an important reason for the success
of ICES. It should be noted, however, that ICES is an
organization of developed countries having similar
social and economic goals and that its members are
fully supported by their governments.
Several nongovernmental international
groups, with links to marine science, have developed
within the International Council of Scientific Unions,
including the International Association for the
Physical Science of the Ocean; the International
France, Britain, and the
United States are
represented here as three
scientists look over charts
aboard the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution
(WHOI) research vessel
Atlantis II in 1973. They are
(left to right) Jean-Marie
Auzende of the Centre
National pour I'Exploitation
des Oceans; Michael Purdy,
then a graduate student at
Cambridge University and
now with WHOI; and Elazar
Uchupi of WHOI. As part of
the Eastern Atlantic
Continental Margin Project
of the International Decade
of Ocean Exploration
(IDOE), the three were
working off the coast of
Morocco to study the
Azores-Gibraltar plate
boundary. (WHOI photo)
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Union of Biological Sciences; and the International
Union of Geological Sciences. These organizations
are known for the scientific symposia they sponsor
and for their affiliation with SCOR. This group was
formed in 1957 in recognition of the interdisciplinary
nature of oceanographic research and the need to
bring the disparate and isolated marine disciplines
together. The organization has scientific
representation from 34 countries and is well known
to most of the marine scientific community. SCOR is
an active organization. It has working groups looking
at specific problems, sponsors scientific meetings,
and provides scientific advice to UNESCO. SCOR,
like ICES, draws its membership mainly from
developed countries.
In 1960, UNESCO sponsored an
intergovernmental conference on oceanographic
research that led to the formation of the
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission,
and to the recognition of SCOR as the scientific
advisory group for UNESCO. IOC was created to
coordinate international marine scientific programs,
and one of its first activities was to take charge of the
International Indian Ocean Expedition, which had
been initiated by SCOR. This was ultimately a
successful project that involved many countries and
demonstrated the considerable potential of IOC.
More recently, however, there has developed a
general disenchantment with IOC. A 1982 Ocean
Policy Committee study suggested that the growing
ineffectiveness of IOC was a consequence of two
factors. First, the general conflict between
developed (North) and less developed (South)
countries that has pervaded many United Nations
forums (including UNCLOS III) also has affected
scientific cooperation. Second, large-scale
descriptive studies, such as that done in the Indian
Ocean, for which IOC was a suitable coordinating
body, are now an uncommon type of research.
International projects are more localized, involve
only a few countries, and could (before the treaty) be
arranged on a more personal basis. Nevertheless, the
IOC still has the potential to foster international
cooperation. For example, projects approved by a
coastal nation within an international forum such as
IOC shall also be deemed to have been authorized by
that country. To successfully fill such a role,
however, the IOC will have to regain the scientific
focus it had at its inception.
Other U.N. Agencies
There are other specialized agencies within the
United Nations that emphasize cooperation in
marine science and technology. These include the
Ocean Economics and Technology Branch (OETB),
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), the
World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the
United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), and
UNESCO's Division of Marine Sciences. FAO is well
known to marine scientists, as it has made many
contributions to work on fishery-related problems,
especially through its field programs in developing
countries. OETB has focused on studies relating to
ocean energy, deep-sea minerals, and marine
technology transfer and application. It has
Russian scientists prepare to test an acoustic release owned
by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. Three
Woods Hole oceanographers were aboard the Soviet
research vessel fora brief cruise in 7975. A cooperative
experiment was conducted, comparing Soviet and
American current meters. (Photo by Robert Heinmiller -
WHOI)
sponsored workshops and published technical
analyses on these subjects. The IMO, previously
known as the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization, concerns itself with
shipping and related matters, such as pollution from
ships. The WMO has been especially successful in
developing international cooperation and
coordinating marine meteorological projects. It
could serve as a valuable model for other marine
science organizations.
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Chinese scientists prepare to deploy a surface buoy that will
mark the location ofmoored instruments, as part ofa recent
joint research program involving oceanographers from
China and the United States. (WHOI photo)
monograph series on oceanographic methodology,
technical papers in marine science, reports on
various UNESCO marine activities, and a quarterly
newsletter, the IMS Newsletter,* which details UN
efforts in the marine field. The manpower program
provides fellowships, expert advisors, and small
grants fortravel and research, and organizes training
courses, specialized curricula, and workshops. The
Division's budget has been increasing relatively
rapidly. It is presently $6 million, which is distributed
among national programs in 17 countries and
regional efforts in Asia and Africa.
In general, these UN activities are not well
known to the average marine scientist. This is
unfortunate, as they can offer opportunities for work
in foreign waters or in the development of regional
plans through an international infrastructure that is
already well established. Although the research
opportunities might not be the type most U.S.
scientists are familiar with, they still could result in
valuable scientific opportunities.
Governmental Agreements
International research cooperation can also be
facilitated when governments are willing to develop
specific bilateral or multilateral agreements. Bilateral
agreements with countries such as Canada and
Mexico, within whose waters a large portion of U.S.
foreign marine research occurs (usually more than 50
percent of U.S. research clearance requests go to
these two countries), or with other parts of the world,
could lead to many scientific benefits for both sides.
For the United States, one benefit should be
improved predictability with regard to clearance and
obligations in conducting research. There also can be
UNEP was established following the 1972
United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, where the oceans were identified as a
priority area. Probably its best known activity is the
Regional Seas Program. In this capacity, UNEP has
acted as a catalyst for regional efforts involving
governments and national institutions. Through
meetings, consultations, and other activities UNEP
has developed a series of action plans for 10 regional
seas, such as the Mediterranean and Red Seas. The
action plans attempt to assess the causes of
deterioration in environmental qualityof the sea and
to provide scientific links with management and
development of the coastal and marine
environment.
UNESCO has an especially visible role in
marine science activities, largely through two
specific programs: the Division of Marine Sciences
and the previously discussed Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission. Both programs are
especially important to developing countries. The
Division of Marine Sciences has emphasized
research on coastal marine systems and
development of trained manpower and technical
infrastructure. Efforts of the Division, as with many
United Nations activities, are developed in
consultation with members of the scientific
community and SCOR. The Division also publishes a
*IMS Newsletter, Division of Marine Sciences, UNESCO, 7
Place de Fontenoy, 75700 Paris, France.
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Dr. N. M. Ali, left, of Egypt's Ain Shams University, looks
over data with Dr. David A. Ross on a joint Egyptian-United
States study of the Nile River delta in 7975. They are aboard
the U.S. research vessel Chain. (WHOI photo)
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negative aspects, such as increased costs and time
taken in negotiations and planning; compromisesor
additions to scientific objectives that result in
extensions or modifications in the cruise track;
increased costs associated with providing berthing
for foreign scientists; and the broader distribution
and analysis of data. One way to minimize these
impacts is through active collaboration with
institutions in the host countries. Some U.S.
institutions already have developed cooperative
relations with similar institutions in foreign
countries.
These arrangements can lead to valuable
cooperative research and educational opportunities,
often at modest costs. In any such arrangement,
however, it must be understood that permission for
research in foreign waters is a prerogative of the
government, and that universities and institutions
may have little influence in such matters.
Nevertheless, such institution-to-institution
arrangements can usually provide opportunities for
scientists to work on foreign research ships or in
foreign institutions and may occasionally lead to
more ambitious projects.
The coming years clearly are going to present
a challenge to distant-water oceanographers. The
legal challenge of doing marine science in foreign
waters could become as complex as the scientific
challenge. New and established mechanisms for
cooperation could reduce the problems and
frustrations while opening up new research
opportunities.
David A. Ross is Director of the Marine Policy and Ocean
Management Program at the Woods Hole Oceanographic
Institution, where he is also Sea Grant Coordinator and a
Senior Scientist in the Geology and Geophysics
Department. Ross is also a member ofthe U.S. Delegation to
the 7982 Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission.
Michael C. Healey is a Research Scientist with the Canadian
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and a Senior Policy
Fellow in the Marine Policy and Ocean Management
Program at Woods Hole.
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The Coastal Zone
Management Program
\
WU1 Revenue\Sharing
Save itA
y James P. Walsh
\
Mr. President, today legislation is being introduced in
a bi-partisan spirit by myself and 14 ofmy colleagues
on Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas revenue
sharing with coastal states. This is an idea which has
been discussed for years in the Congress. A number
of factors have recently converged that convince me
that the time is right to implement the proposal.
There is a myriad of coastal and ocean related issues
which have been recognized over the years by the
Congress, and had previously received generous
annual Federal support: fisheries research and
management, coastal management effects, sea grant,
coastal energy impact mitigation, port development,
coastal energy development and research. The list
goes on. Budgetary problems and the state of the
overall economic health preclude us from continuing
this support year in and year out at previous levels.
However, these issues will not go away and it would
be irresponsible to assume otherwise, merely
because Federal funding is withdrawn.
Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)
U.S. Senate Floor
July 27, 1982
I hus began the campaign in the United States
Senate to find a more secure funding source for
several federal ocean and coastal programs, all
threatened with financial termination by the Reagan
Administration. Senate Bill 2792, introduced by
Senator Stevens and other Senators supportive of
these programs, is the counterpart of House
Resolution 5543, the Ocean and Coastal Resources
Management and Development Block Grant Act,
which passed the House of Representatives
September 29, 1982. Senator Lowell Weicker
(R-Conn.) has introduced his own version of a
revenue sharing bill, S. 2794.
The goal of these bills is to tap the royalties
paid to the United States from the leasing and sale of
publicly owned oil and gas resources located on the
U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), which extends
seaward from the edge of coastal state jurisdiction, in
order to fund various existing ocean and coastal
programs. The programs specifically identified for
funding in these revenue-sharing proposals were
characterized by the Reagan Administration as being
state or local in nature and thus candidates for the
phasing out of federal support, like many other
"discretionary" civilian federal assistance programs.
One such program, or set of activities, is that created
by the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972.
The Beginnings of a National Coastal Program
The 1969 Stratton Commission Report, Our Nation
and the Sea, identified the need to come to grips with
the accelerating and complex problems of growth at
the water's edge. That report, among the most
perceptive ever done by the federal government,
triggered legislative action to implement its
recommendation for a comprehensive national
Overleaf: Beach in northern California. The state
government has gone to court to prevent drilling in waters
off northern California. (Photo by George Daniell PR)
system of coastal resource management, with
primary reliance on the individual states backed by
federal finance assistance and other incentives. The
report concluded that poorly managed development
in coastal areas was a matter of national, not just
local, concern.
On October 27, 1972, after considerable
tugging and hauling between the Nixon
Administration and the Congress, the Coastal Zone
Management Act became law. The essential features
of the Act, which have been the source of its
resiliency even in the context of today's "New
Federalism," are the following:
- a stated purpose of preserving, protecting,
developing, and, where possible, restoring
or enhancing the resources of the nation's
coastal zone for this and succeeding
generations;
- financial assistance, on a matching basis, for
coastal states that voluntarily engage in the
process of developing and implementing
management programs to achieve wise use
of the land and water resources of the coastal
zone, giving full consideration to ecological,
cultural, historic, and aesthetic values, as
well as to needs for economic development;
- a requirement that all federal agencies
cooperate and participate with state and local
governments in accomplishing the purposes
of the Act, and a mandate that certain federal
activities, such as the granting of permits, be
"consistent" with a completed and approved
state management program (these features
are often referred to as the "consistency
provisions"); and
- a directive that the public and all levels of
government be encouraged to participate in
the development of state coastal zone
management programs.
The original 1972 Act also contained a
provision for funding assistance for the acquisition,
development, and operation, by coastal states, of
estuarine sanctuaries that would be used as "natural
field laboratories" for studying the natural and
human processes at work in the coastal zone.
The fight over the CZM Act was intense, due
mainly to the lukewarm interest of the Nixon
Administration. After passage, bureaucratic
obstacles held up the formation of an effective
administering office and, of greater consequence,
funding for the program was initially refused.
Congressional maneuvering finally pressured the
Nixon Administration into releasing the funds, and
the program began in March of 1974.
Initially, some states did not consider the
incentives of the original Act strong enough to
overcome traditional local resistance to a
government "planning" process. Consequently,
Congress began to consider other incentives. The
first one enacted was inserted in the Deepwater Port
Act. It established, as a condition of licensing a
deepwater port, the requirement that the adjacent
coastal state to which the port is connected by
pipeline either 1) have an approved coastal zone
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/4 portion of the South Slough Estuarine Sanctuary, near Coos Bay, Oregon. This was the first sanctuary acquired with Coastal
Zone Management Act funds as a "natural field laboratory" for the study of natural and human processes in the coastal zone.
(Photo courtesy of Oregon Division of State Lands)
management program or 2) be making reasonable
progress toward developing an approvable program.
This incentive was among the inducements that
brought a coastal zone management program to
Louisiana, where this nation's only offshore
deepwater port is now located.
In 1976, the first state management program
was approved, the one developed by the state of
Washington. That same year Congress added further
incentives to the Act in response to heightened
national concern, following the Arab oil embargo, for
secure sources of energy. A large new "Coastal
Energy Impact Program," authorized to funding
levels in excess of $1 billion, was created to help
coastal states cope with expanded energy
development efforts in or affecting the coastal zone,
such as oil and gas drilling, port development,
transportation, refining, and general support
activity. To receive the assistance provided by this
program, a coastal state had to be receiving funds for
developing or implementing a coastal zone
management program "consistent with the policies
and objectives of the Act."
Federal assistance could be used tor: 1) loans
to help provide public facilities and services required
by coastal energy activity; 2) bond guarantees for
new or improved public facilities; 3) grants to pay off
coastal state credit assistance if the "boom and bust"
cycle left a community unable to pay tor expanded
public facilities and services; 4) grants to ameliorate
environmental losses not attributable to any
identifiable source; 5) grants to study and plan for
economic, social, and environmental consequences
from expanded coastal energy activity; and 6)
"formula" grants to coastal states, based on a
calculation of acreage leased and oil and gas
produced near a particular state, oil and gas landed in
that state, and increased employment tied to Outer
Continental Shelf energy development.
The new program's sponsors argued that it
would build on the Coastal Zone Management
Program in dealing with the drive for new energy
sources and stave off coastal state demands for
untargeted (and therefore potentially wasteful) OCS
revenue-sharing. Congress later added authority to
use these funds for assisting states wishing to
participate in the OCS leasing decision process.
After 1976, momentum behind the Coastal
Zone Management Program began to build. By the
time Congress conducted the first in-depth program
oversight hearings in late 1979 and 1980, more than 20
states and territories had received approval of their
coastal management programs from the Office of
Coastal Zone Management in the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration; the California
program approval had been challenged and
successfully defended in court (American Petroleum
Institute v. Knecht, 1979); and the consistency
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LOOP
The Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP) platform complex,
18 miles offthe Louisiana coast. The largepumping platform
has two decks measuring 275 feet by 204 feet about an
acre. Crude oil is received through a pipeline from
supertankers at moorings further out to sea and then
pumped ashore bypumps on the lower deck. The upper
deck houses gas-turbine generators to furnish electric
power. The smaller controlplatform, connected to the large
platform by a pedestrian bridge, measures 70 feet by 70 feet
and contains shops, storage areas, and emergency
equipment on its lower deck; a control room and offices on
its second deck; and living quarters and recreational
facilities for the staff of35 on its third deck. The third deck
roof serves as a heliport, with the arrow pointing north.
Congress induced Louisiana to institute an acceptable
coastal zone management program by linking the program
to the licensing of LOOP. (Photo courtesy of LOOP, Inc.)
\ he only deepwater port in the United States is
18 miles at sea in the Gulf of Mexico. This is the
Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP), which
unloaded its first tanker in May of 1981 . Because
the United States lacks a developed harbor deep
enough to receive supertankers, which can have
drafts as deep as 90 feet, a group of oil
companies built a facility that can pump 1 .4
million barrels a day.
The incoming supertanker is boarded by
a specially trained mooring master, who guides
the ship to one of three mooring buoys. Here
the ship's pumps transfer crude oil through
floating hoses to the buoy's base and into a
pipeline buried in the seafloor. This pipeline
leads to the LOOP pumping platform complex
more than a mile away, where oil is "boosted" to
shore through another pipeline. After reaching
the mainland, the oil continues inland, beneath
28 miles of marshland, to the Clovelly Salt
Dome, a complex of mined underground
cavities. A network of pipelines delivers the oil
from the storage cavities to refineries in
Louisiana, Texas, and the Midwest.
Although LOOP is the only system of its
kind in North America, there are approximately
200 similar systems in the world; they are used
for loading supertankers as well as unloading. If
it doesn't use LOOP, a supertanker with
U.S.-bound oil can pump its cargo into storage
tanks at one of several deep Caribbean harbors
or into a series of smaller tankers at sea.
f -M
-
,:
The Hilda Knudsen, a supertanker of 417,000
deadweight-tons, unloading oil at a LOOP mooring buoy.
(Photo courtesy of LOOP, Inc.)
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Disconnecting a length of
dhllpipe on an offshore rig.
(Photo courtesy ofZapata
Corporation)
provisions had been invoked by a coastal state
(California) in a controversy over an OCS lease sale
by the Department of the Interior.
The Coastal Zone Management Act
Amendments of 1980 made no major changes in the
basic features of the 1972 Act, as it had been
amended in 1976. Fine tuning, with an appropriate
emphasis on evaluation, was clearly the
Congressional intent, as well as a reaffirmation of the
Act's inherent partnership between the federal
government and state and local governments.
Significantly, no alteration of the sensitive
consistency provisions was attempted by the
legislators.
The Budget Crunch Cometh
By 1980, however, the size of the federal government
and its budget and the bewildering number of
national
"categorical" assistance programs had
become political issues that no politician could
ignore; these became major issues in the
presidential campaign. The Carter Administration,
supportive of the 1980 amendments yet sensitive to
the need to reduce federal program costs, wanted
much lower authorization levels, increased state
matching funds, limits on the number of years a state
could receive assistance, and declining federal
assistance under the Coastal Zone Management Act.
Compromises were reached, and with the election
looming large, the 1980 amendments were signed
into law. The future of the program seemed secure.
But it was a false security. The Reagan
Administration moved quickly to implement the
President's proposed New Federalism by
significantly altering the executive branch budget
request pending before the Congress on
Inauguration Day, 1981. The revised Reagan budget
request for fiscal year 1982 called for the elimination
of funding for nearly all elements of the Coastal Zone
Management Program. In the President's message to
Congress of February 18, 1981 , entitled "America's
New Beginning: A Program for Economic Recovery,"
the termination of the program was described
tersely:
Funding will be terminated for the Coastal
Energy Impact Program (CEIP) and the Coastal
Zone Management (CZM) state grant program.
The Administration proposes to terminate the
CEIP program because the local impacts from oil
and gas development have proven to be far less
than originally anticipated and well within the
capability of states and localities to handle. The
overall coastal population is only expected to
increase by about 8,000persons a year as a result
of coastal energy development. Louisiana,
which has received a large portion of CEIP funds,
also received severance taxes from oilandgas -
amounting to roughly $500 million in 1979. These
funds could be used to assist persons in
relocating.
The CZM program has largely achieved its
purpose. States covering 78 percent of the
coastline already have received seven years of
federal assistance to develop, implement, and
administer their coastal zone management
programs. Continuation of the state CZM
programs and any additional improvements
should be financed by the states.
These changes are consistent with the original
intent of the coastal programs to provide
federal assistance only when essential and for
front-end seed money.
The real message was simple: let the states pick up
funding for the program because the federal
government can no longer afford it.
Congressional supporters of the CZM
program and the coastal states immediately began to
attack the assumptions in the President's budget
proposal at Congressional oversight hearings on the
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Riprap prevents further erosion at a small park in Calcasieu
Parish, Louisiana. Wake from ship traffic in a nearby ship
channel had eroded the park's beach. Because the ships
were travelling to and from petrochemical plants that were
built because of oil rigs offshore, the state of Louisiana
applied for and received a federal grant under the Coastal
Energy Impact Program. The money was used to restore the
beach with sandfilland riprap and to purchase picnic tables.
The park is popular with the employees of the nearby oil
refineries. (Photo courtesy of Louisiana Department of
Natural Resources)
implications of terminating federal assistance for the
coastal management effort. The Coastal States
Organization (CSO) submitted to the Congress on
April 27, 1981 , a paper setting forth several arguments
against accepting the Reagan proposal:
Congress had just reauthorized the Act and
recognized the importance of coastal zone
management.
States are not yet in a position to assume the
full financial burden of coastal
management.
Significant national benefits will be lost if the
Coastal Zone Management Program is
terminated.
The majority of state programs are not yet
institutionalized.
The Coastal Zone Management Program is a
cost-effective program which complements
the Administration's desire to transfer the
focus of decision-making to state and local
governments.
The termination of funding is unfair and
inequitable, and will undoubtedly generate
ill will toward energy activities in coastal
states.
A poll taken by the CSO indicated that
termination of funding will mean abandonment of
the program in 10 states and significant curtailment in
10 others. In only five states will the program remain
intact, though reduced in scope. In addition, seven
states now in the development process would not be
able to proceed further. The CSO claimed that
individual states, faced with declining revenues,
could not continue all the federal assistance
programs shifted to them by the Reagan proposals.
Putanother way, coastal zone management would be
pursued when budgets were not tight, but for most
states other public programs take precedence over
coastal planning when overall public funds are
reduced.
Starting in early 1981 , the Congress began to
focus all its energies on the broader implications of
the federal budget and the threat of unprecedented
deficits. The Coastal Zone Management Program is
one of many national grant-in-aid programs that were
targeted for elimination. Its supporters had, and still
have, genuine cause for concern.
Revenue-Sharing to the Rescue?
The Coastal Zone Management Act passed its 10th
year on October 28, 1982. As of this writing, 28 states
and territories have reached the approved program
threshold and one (Virginia) is still seeking approval
(Table 1 ). Six states have opted not to participate at all
in the program. The fact that the Office of Coastal
Zone Management continues to process and
approve coastal state programs (two in 1982) is a sign
of continuing interest in the program despite the
threat of termination. Furthermore, despite court
decisions adverse to the Department of the Interior
and the oil and gas industry (requiring consistency
between lease sales and approved state coastal
management programs), no movement to repeal the
Coastal Zone Management Act is evident in
Congress.
The resiliency of the Coastal Zone
Management Act and the strong interest of the
coastal states provided sufficient reason for the
Congress to reject the proposed elimination of the
basic administrative grant program (section 306). The
House and Senate appropriations committees
provided $33 million through the end of fiscal year
1982 for state programs. But the source of the money
was the Coastal Energy Impact Program, which
Congress decided to jettison in favor of section 306.
With these funds and with judicious use of unspent
money from last year, the Office of Coastal Zone
Management was able to financially support all state
activities through September, 1982. Now, state
programs have begun to wither. Congressional
appropriations committees would have to come up
with another $33 million to fund another year of
assistance at the 1982 level. The Reagan
Administration has requested only $4 million for
fiscal year 1983, mainly to fund the bureaucratic costs
of overseeing and conducting program evaluation,
administering outstanding loans, dealing with
consistency issues, and running the estuarine
sanctuary program (Table 2).
If the coastal program's Congressional
supporters are unable to insert the necessary funds
in the fiscal year 1983 appropriation bill,
the
predictions of the CSO will become reality: state
programs will be reduced substantially and
approximately 50 percent of staff laid off. Funding
losses could be greater than 50 percent.
In those states where public sentiment favors
coastal management independent of federal
assistance and where the consistency provisions are
seen as a valuable tool, as in California, the state
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programs would survive at a minimum level, just
adequate for maintaining approvability under the
Act. These states would be a decided minority of the
coastal states, however.
It is in this context that the revenue-sharing
concept has been embraced as a means of providing
funds, in the form of block grants to the states, to
assure a future for coastal zone management
activities. But the success of this move remains
uncertain. The outcome will determine the future of
the Coastal Zone Management Program as well as
Sea Grant and several other federal ocean and coastal
assistance programs.
The Prospects
The revenues generated by leasing publicly owned
oil and gas resources found beneath the nation's
rather substantial Outer Continental Shelf are large,
and will increase with the ambitious drilling efforts
now under way. Second only to income taxes as a
source of revenue, the bonus bids, royalty payments,
and rents received are deposited in the General Fund
of the U.S. Treasury. The Office of Management and
Budget views these revenues as a major offset to
other federal expenditures, reaching a level of $15 to
$17 billion a year by 1985.
To co-sponsors of H.R. 5543, S. 2792, and
similar measures, these funds are an appropriate way
to support the national interest in wisely managing
and using ocean and coastal resources. The pattern
of laws now on the statute books defines a special
federal-state relationship that has been carefully
constructed since 1947, when the Supreme Court
determined that the federal government, and not the
states, owned the mineral resources underlying the
territorial sea (out to three miles) and beyond. With
the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, Congress returned
ownershipof the land underlyingthe territorial sea to
the states, retaining federal ownership of the Outer
Continental Shelf beyond three miles. The sponsors
of most of the revenue-sharing proposals want to
Table 1 . Status of state coastal zone management programs.
State
Washington
preserve the vitality of these laws and programs. One
proposal, however, introduced by Representative
John Breaux (D-La.), would give states OCS money
without tying it to ocean and coastal programs.
Yet the economic difficulties of the nation are
such that a good number of worthwhile government
programs (along with some bad ones) have already
lost their funding, and others will expire in the
future. It may well be that revenue-sharing will not
arrive, or will arrive too late, to provide the funds
needed to save the Coastal Zone Management
Program, at least at the scope of today's activities.
The first and foremost reason is the size of the
forecasted federal deficit ($175 billion in 1984).
Because the Congress has generally gone along with
the President's budget priorities (more defense
spending, fewer social programs), the odds are
against coastal management funding.
Second, the President's financial advisors
surely will object vehemently to mandatory use of
OCS revenues of up to $300 million a year for
programs President Reagan has recommended
eliminating. Moreover, OCS revenues are already
earmarked for general Treasury receipts in the
President's economic program through 1985. Can
there be any doubt that his advisors will recommend
a veto of any revenue-sharing bill similar to H. R. 5543
or S. 2792?
Finally, unless the supporters of the
revenue-sharing concept are successful in obtaining
automatic transfer of OCS revenues to the coastal
states without the need for annual appropriation,
funding will still be subject to the annual budget
process, in which budget-cutting is the present
norm. The chances of bypassing the appropriation
process are not good. Ironically, the federal Coastal
Zone Management Program, though it has been
judged successful and has all the elements of the
"New Federalism," will probably deteriorate,
perhaps irretrievably in some coastal states.
The federal government's role will then be to
review continuing eligibility for approval. With
approval comes the right to invoke the consistency
provisions for federal projects and activities. Once
approval is lost, consideration of the "national"
interest in certain land and water use decisions will
be more haphazard and will depend on factors
external to the policies in the Coastal Zone
Management Act.
Perhaps the goals of the Coastal Zone
Management Act will be embraced in other federal
statutes, for example the Clean Water Act or the Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act, or in some other
manner. For Senator Stevens is correct the
problems of bad or inefficient management and
coordination between government entities will not
go away. Either some method of coping with these
problems will be invented or all the difficulties
identified by the Stratton Commission will come
back to haunt the nation, and the progress fostered
by the Coastal Zone Management Program will be
lost.
Clam shells on a barge are sprayed by high-pressure hoses
into water off the coast of Louisiana. Funded with a federal
grant under the Coastal Energy Impact Program, this project
provided material on which larval oysters could attach
themselves, thus rehabilitating or relocating oyster reefs
which were damaged by petroleum industry activities.
(Photo courtesy of Louisiana Department of Natural
Resources)
lames P. Walsh is an attorney in Washington, D.C. He is a
former Deputy Administrator of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration.
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Fisheries Management
by Spencer Apollonio
/Vlarine fisheries management entered the 1980s
carrying with it, in the United States at least, the
mandate of law and a considerable burden of
mythology and tunnel vision. The mythology centers
on the assumption that commercial species exist in
isolation from each other and their environment, and
that fishing is the dominant variable affecting
abundance. The tunnel vision is centered on a
limited range of perceived fisheries policies or
management objectives, all implicitly assuming that
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is the proper and
possibly the only objective.
Fisheries management has already
encountered, in the New England Groundfish
Management Plan, for example, some of the
unpleasant circumstances that are inevitable when
wishful or conventional thinking encounters the real
world. At the moment, however, the full
appreciation of the discrepancy between hypothesis
and actuality does not appear to be widespread. If
fishery management is to avoid repetition of painful
experiences and is to manage fish in any rational and
beneficial manner, some very fundamental
reappraisals are in order.
Limited Experience
The United States had very little formal and practical
management experience prior to the mid-1970s.
There were some success stories, such as Pacific
halibut and Pacific salmon. These were successfully
managed fisheries. They also were very special, even
unique, cases; indeed, how special they were
became obvious in the 1960s when Pacific halibut
were subjected to the bottom-trawl fishery for
pollock by Japan. At that point, the successful
management of halibut faded remarkably. The
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There are eight Regional Fishery Management Councils. The majority of voting members on each council are selected by the
Secretary of Commerce from lists submitted by the governors of the states in that region. Other mandatory members include
the regional director of the National Marine Fisheries Service and the official from each state who has principal responsibility
for marine fisheries management. Nonvoting members include the regional director of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the
commander of the Coast Guard district, the executive director of the Marine Fisheries Commission for the geographical area
concerned, and a representative of the Department of State.
mixed-species, bottom-trawl fisheries are where we
seem to be unable to respond to ever-increasing
fishing pressure.
In addition to the relatively few examples of
successful single-species management, the U.S.
experience included multi-species management
within the International Commission for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF). In a sense, this
also was a special case, in that the common
denominator of maximum sustainable yield a
purely biological management objective allowing the
maximum yearly harvest that will not seriously
reduce a fish population was generally accepted
by 17 nations and underlay ICNAF policies. In other
words, ICNAF functioned with a commonly-agreed-
upon, though quasi-quantifiable, management
objective. In these several cases of national fisheries
management experience, the decisions were largely
in the hands of full-time professional managers, who
generally understood the nature and limitations of
scientific advice offered to them as well as the need
for commonly perceived and commonly accepted
management policies.
A revolution in fish management was
mandated in 1976 by the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act (MFCMA) , which
required that all stocks be managed as units
throughout their ranges to achieve "optimum yield,"
an ill-defined and, as it turned out, elusive concept
that allows social and economic considerations.
Incidentally, Canada and the European Economic
Community also adopted optimum yield as their
management goal, but apparently they have not
extended the idea much beyond traditional MSY.
The MFCMA created eight regional
management councils consisting of persons serving
on a part-time basis for staggered three-year terms,
charged with setting fisheries policy and making
management decisions. Few members came to the
councils with any previous scientific or fisheries
management experience or much familiarity with the
volume, limitations, and subtleties of fisheries
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science and management literature. Many come,
even if unconsciously, with the notion that MSY is
the proper and possibly the only legitimate goal of
management, despite its rejection by most fisheries
scientists, and are unaware of "Larkin's epitaph."*
Further, the council structure and process are not
conducive to close scrutiny of particular fisheries
problems, nor to the thoughtful development of any
other long-term management objectives. The
infrequent meetings are often dominated by
bureaucratic busywork and discussions of
procedure.
Probably the council members are reinforced
in their implicit loyalty to MSY by the scientific advice
available to them. Fisheries scientists have few
working models for management, and the objective
of most models is something closely akin to
maximum sustainable yield orto maximum yield per
year-class. Any professional advice they can offer
must focus rather narrowly for lack of scientific
options on only one or a few of a wide variety of
possible management objectives. Thus scientific
advice to managers may be slanted strongly toward a
preconceived management objective.
To many new managers it may be unclear that
MSY has little to do with conservation or restoration
of a stock. And if one ventures to break from MSY as
the management objective, science suddenly has
little to offer for guidance, and the managers
sometimes find themselves adrift in a turbulent
ocean of subjective judgments and arbitrary social
decisions all highly controversial and difficult to
define, explain, or defend, however valid they may
be. It is an uncomfortable position.
There is a wide variety of valid fisheries
management purposes. It is useful to recognize, for
example, that often-condemned "pulse-fishing" is a
perfectly legitimate management technique if it
serves an agreed-upon public policy for a particular
fishery. The objective of this method is to accumulate
maximum protein as rapidly and cheaply as possible
by catching most of the fish in one area and then
moving on to another.
Undefined Objectives
Despite the wide range of available options,
experience has shown that it is difficult for councils
to define their management objectives. For more
than a year, the New England Fishery Management
Council (NEFMC) has been struggling to define both
herring and groundfish management goals without
success. Casual examination of fisheries
management plans (the 14 implemented to date)
shows, in many cases, very generally stated
objectives. For example: "promote the growth of the
*ln 1977, fisheries scientist Peter Larkin of the University of
British Columbia wrote:
Here lies the concept, MSY
It advocated yields too high
And didn't spell out how to slice the pie,
We bury it with the best of wishes,
Especially on behalf of fishes.
We don't know yet what will take its place,
But we hope it's as good for the human race.
U.S. commercial fishery, including fish tor export";
"provide the greatest degree of freedom and
flexibility to all harvestOrs of these resources
consistent with the attainment of the other objectives
of this plan"; "to promote conservation of stocks
throughout their range." Many of these objectives
are so general that they amount, one suspects, to no
clear objective at all. Why this is so is not clear. I have
argued elsewhere that this crucial problem may
result from structural weakness of the councils -
their part-time nature and their high turnover rates.
Whatever the cause, the difficulty of identifying
practical objectives is a serious hindrance to
beneficial management: it can lead to ambiguous,
ill-conceived, unenforceable, or inappropriate
regulations; to lack of consensus on the progress or
accomplishments of management; and, eventually,
to dissatisfaction with the management program.
Managers are not in any real way constrained
in their choice of management policies. The
MFCMA, by setting undefined "optimum yield"* as
the goal of fisheries management, in effect has given
extraordinary latitude to the regional councils in
setting policy. In practice, optimum yield is whatever
the regional managers say it is. Delegation of
authority for such broad policy determination to the
regional councils is undoubtedly appropriate;
fisheries by their nature are regional, not national, so
regional authorities should be best qualified to set
practical policies. Indeed, some regional fisheries
were managed prior to MFCMA by some kind of
de facto policy which, to some degree at least,
conformed to economic, biological, or social
realities of the region. For example, the Maine clam
fishery has traditionally been managed with an
implicitly social goal that of providing at least
part-time employment to as many people as
possible. Such policies may be criticized, but the fact
that they may not correspond to preconceived
biological or economic models does not alter the fact
of some sort of management for legitimate,
regionally-devised ends.
In any case, the councils have a very wide
choice of management options. But it may be that the
formality of the structure of the procedures of the
councils in some way constrains the managers'
*The MFCMA contains the following definition :
(18) The term "optimum" with respect to the yield from
a fishery, means the amount offish -
(A) which willprovide the greatest overall benefit to the
Nation, with particular reference to food production
and recreational opportunties; and
(B) which is prescribed as such on the basis of the
maximum sustainable yield from such fishery, as
modified by any relevant economic, social, or
ecological factor.
Five years experience suggests that this definition is so
general as to amount to no definition, because it leaves
unanswered the question of how "optimum" is to be
defined and measured.
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Japanese businessmen at a meeting of the North Pacific
Fishery Management Council in Anchorage, Alaska.
Representatives of the Japanese fishing industry attend the
meetings regularly, as Japan is the major nation fishing the
Bering Sea. (Photo by Alfred Chandler National
Fisherman)
perceptions of options to a much narrower range of
possibilities than had evolved informally prior to
MFCMA. And what is now slowly being learned is
that the imposition of more conventional
management objectives, which often lie within that
narrow range, may be very difficult on certain
regional fisheries. In some cases, the attainment of
such objectives may be politically impossible or not
worth the cost.
Another long-recognized problem in fisheries
management is the need for knowledge of the
relative abundance and trends of fish stocks, for it is
of course useful under any policy to have some idea
of the quantity of fish with which one is concerned.
By relatingthequantity, average age, and sex ratioof
fish caught commercially and in scientific sampling to
the historical performance of a given fish population,
it is relatively easy to assess present stock abundance
with accuracy sufficient for most practical purposes.
But these assessments do not have great predictive
value. Thus managers have neither the means of
anticipating natural trends in stock abundance nor
the means of foreseeing the consequences of their
actions or inaction.
Much of the difficulty stems from the current
focus on single-species management by both
scientists and managers. Scientists by necessity
concentrate on single-species models, recognizing
their shortcomings, for lack of a usable multi-species
model. Similarly, managers traditionally think in
terms of single-species regulations because of the
obvious complexities of dealing with several species
simultaneously, as one must deal with mixed-species
trawl fisheries and often should with other fisheries.
This difficulty is magnified by the mandate of
MFCMA, which prescribes optimum yield as the
proper goal. A moment's thought convinces most
people thatoptimum yield (however defined) cannot
be obtained simultaneously from several species
taken together, and thus fisheries managers are
presented with a serious dilemma: howto
accomplish that which may not be possible.
Managers are further hindered by an inability
to assess the possible consequences of their
decisions within the ecosystem. It is routinely
acknowledged in an abstract sense that fish are part
of a larger system, but currently there is no apparent
predisposition by managers to think of multi-species
or systems management, nor are there practical
models available to predict the impact of
perturbations on other fish components of the
system, even though such impacts are likely under
the heavy fishing pressures that are common in many
of our regional fisheries. Neither can we distinguish
those man-induced impacts from disturbances that
are the result of natural forces within the system.
Several problems of serious magnitude thus
converge on the regional councils: 1) the problem of
articulating a clear management objective; 2) the
problem, if the managers choose nonbiological
objectives for their policy, of defending subjective
judgments; and 3) the problem of understanding
what the system of fish is likely to do under a
particular management plan, given the range of
possible environmental fluctuations. To put these
concerns into a specific context, it is useful to review
the history of groundfish management by the NEFMC
in 1977-1978. The review shows an interesting, if
unintended, evolution of management goals as well
as some of the unanticipated consequences,
resulting finally in the overthrow of an entire
management approach.
Fiasco in New England
I n the fall of 1976, the NEFMC was advised that it must
deal immediately with stocks on the edge of collapse,
particularly haddock and yellowtail flounder.
Therefore the council set very restrictive annual
quotas for haddock and yellowtail flounder. The
quota for haddock, in fact, was intended only to
make legal the unavoidable bycatch of haddock in
the cod fishery, the scientific advice being that no
haddock at all should be caught if a collapse were to
be avoided. At that time the council did not realize
how restrictive the annual quotas actually were; it
was even anticipated that the annual quotas would
not be reached. However, the reported catch
(undoubtedly less than the actual catch) approached
the quotas less than six months after implementation
of the plan because of an unanticipated abundance
of haddock. So abundant was the haddock that
fishermen reportedly were throwing away large
quantities of small haddock in order to land larger,
more valuable fish within the quotas.
Thus the industry faced a total cod closure for
up to six months an intolerable prospect -
because of the mixed bycatch nature of haddock in
the otter trawl cod fishery. The council quickly
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A Coast Guard HC130 flies
over a foreign "mother ship"
and one of her trawlers
within the United States
200-mile Fisheries
Conservation Zone. At sea
for five to nine months at a
time, the large ship has a
crew of several hundred,
including a medical staff.
Trawlers tie up alongside to
unload their catch, which is
then processed and frozen.
The Coast Guard identifies
such ships and later checks
to see if they are properly
licensed to operate where
they were sighted. The
arrangement of a trawler's
nets and other equipment is
often enough to tell an
airborne observer what
species are being caught.
(Photo courtesy of the U.S.
Coast Guard)
implemented quarterly catch allocations within the
annual quotas, in order to spread the catch
throughout the year and thus avoid closures of
several months duration. The plan objective thereby
shifted significantly from a purely biological
objective, that of stock restoration, to a partly
economic objective, that of insuring at least some
income to the fleet throughout the year. Even so,
industry argued quickly and loudly that vessel-class
allocations also were necessary to insure that large
vessels, capable of year-round, all-weather
operations, did not usurp entire quarterly allocations
before the smaller inshore vessels had a chance.
Vessel-class catch allocations were then adopted,
shifting management objectives once again to
include social considerations: preservation of
traditional day-trip fishing in small boats.
It is interesting that this evolution of at least
implied objectives in the Groundfish Management
Plan paralleled the general evolution of fisheries
management objectives since the 1930s. At that time,
when the first usable management models were
developed, the accepted objectives were distinctly
biological. Later, in the late 1950s and 1960s,
economic objectives attained brief preeminence, to
be followed rather quickly by optimum yield, which
attempted to accommodate quite broad social and
other quasi-definable considerations.
Cod (Cadus callanas)
And so it went in New England in 1977: soon
after adopting a purely biological objective, with its
very restrictive catch quotas, the NEFMC inevitably
was forced to deal with economic and social
considerations. Whereas the original biological
objective was comprehensible and enforceable
(even if at great cost), the subsequent modifications,
forced by political, economic, and social
considerations, were so vague and arbitrary, had so
many unforeseen and undesirable consequences,
and carried so little public understanding and
support as to be virtually unenforceable. This
problem of credibility was strained even more by the
unanticipated appearance of strong year-classes of
regulated species concurrent with the imposition of
uniquely restrictive regulations on the New England
groundfishing fleet, consisting of more than 1 ,000
vessels. Further, the rather subjective, implicit, and
arbitrary nature of the evolving objectives left the
NEFMC uncertain as to its own purposes and thus
vulnerabletopolitical pressures of all kinds. Without
clear objectives, there is no way to measure the
success or failure of a plan.
The result of this unsatisfactory and
counterproductive situation was that in April, 1982,
upon council recommendation and urging, the
Secretary of Commerce scrapped the entire
groundfish plan, replacing it with a much simpler
plan of the council's devising. The new plan
essentially involves only mesh regulations to allow
juvenile escapement and closed areas to protect
concentrations of spawning fish, principally
haddock. This plan is a "fall-back" position,
recognizing that the more ambitious effort failed and
that in the process of failing, created many serious
difficulties. These difficulties included the
mislabeling and misreporting of catches; the
discarding of excess catches at sea; the landing of
excess catches at more than one port to avoid trip
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New England fishermen
prepare to sort the various
species ofgroundfish
trapped at the end of a
conical net called a trawl.
(Photo by Richard Allen)
limits; the setting of dual prices for legal and illegal
catches (legal-catch prices being pulled down by the
market impact of lower "illegal" prices); and the
serious deterioration of the quality of landings data in
general, upon which scientific stock assessments are
heavily dependent.
The new system, which is partly intended to
avoid such problems, is generally recognized as
providing acceptable, if minimal, stock protection. It
Unloading pollock at the Boston Fish Pier. (Photo by Susan
Peterson WHO/)
does not attempt to avert a stock collapse, nor does it
attempt to attain "optimum yield" in any positive
sense, except insofar as optimum yield is considered
to be that catch actually taken under the prevailing
minimal rules.
A lesson from the New England experience is
that fisheries management is not as easy as it looks.
Granted that stocks are to be "restored and
maintained," that "overfishing" is to be prevented,
and that
"optimum yield" is the goal, the practical
difficulties of complying with these rather vague and
general directives, particularly in mixed-species
fisheries, are clear only to those who have tried. The
first difficulty is to attain common agreement on what
these terms mean, with sufficient precision so as to
provide a base for regulatory action. To what level of
abundance shall stocks be restored? And at what
rare? With what degree of stability shall stocks be
maintained? At whatpo/nf are stocks "overfished"?
And what are the regulatory costs associated with the
answers to these questions? The answers to these
quantitative questions are of practical importance
because they govern the nature of regulations
necessary to implement a plan, and thus determine
how the plan will be received by the fishing industry.
It was the failure to ask or even to recognize the
importance of these questions that, in great degree,
led to the failure of the New England groundfish
plan.
Soul-Searching
Fisheries policymakers are at the moment in a state of
soul-searching, or should be. Now that fishery
management is mandated by law and the nation
spends hundreds of millions of dollars annually on
management-related activities, the managers are
faced with the key question management for what
end? Or more difficult management for whom?
Frequently the issue becomes one of allocation
among competing users, and managers must be
prepared to answer these questions with sufficient
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specificity to satisfy the concerns of those who wi II be
directly affected by the necessary regulations.
The task of identifying and acting upon
positive management policies, in the spirit of
attaining a form of optimum yield as put forth in the
MFCMA, will be a very substantial challenge tor the
regional fishery management councils. I suspect that
it will be a long time before this issue is adequately
addressed, and even longer before it is adequately
mastered. Until it is, there will be continuing
acrimony and dissatisfaction.
In the meantime, there remains the acute
need to understand what the stocks and the fishery
system are likely to do given environmental changes,
increasing fishing pressure, and the probable
absence of effective restraint on effort. Managers
need assessments of current stock sizes and
early-warning devices to apprise them of probable
future stock variations, for use both before and after
the implementation of management programs. The
facts that fish species have characteristically different
responses to fishing effort and are characteristically
mo re or less amenable to conventional management
methods should strongly influence management
policies for several reasons: to avoid excessive
management restraints and costs that may be
inappropriate for some species; to insure that
management efforts are directed to those species
particularly vulnerable to fishing effort; and, most
important, to understand the probable impacts of
cumulative fishing pressures throughout the system
of which the fish are part. Such impacts include the
possibilities of "species-switches," the replacement
of high-value commercial species with low-value
"weed" species; increased frequencies and
amplitudes of abundance variations of some species;
and prolonged reduction of those species
particularly sensitive to fishing effort.
The need for such an ecosystem approach was
summarized by the National Academy of Sciences in
1980, but recognition of the probable fact of systems
interactions and systems responses to fishing
pressure is slow in coming to those who set fisheries
policy. The fact seems to be that in fully developed
fisheries and under intense fishing pressures there
can be unforeseen and undesirable consequences of
management actions taken in isolation and without
regard to systems interactions. For example, the
current management regime in New England an
area of fully developed or overdeveloped fisheries
may be contributing to destabilization of the stocks
and to exacerbation of stock fluctuations.
This viewpoint arises from the fact that
groundfish are now essentially unregulated, or
minimally so. This is a potentially destabilizing
arrangement because of certain energy-hierarchy
concepts articulated by Howard Odum of the
University of Florida (see below). Assuming, in
accord with those concepts, that herring represent a
lower quality of embodied energy than do
groundfish (individually or collectively), such
concepts predict that unrestrained power input from
the higher-quality energy end of the spectrum (the
fishing effort) imparts oscillations of increasing
amplitude through the progressively lower-order
energy components of the system. The apparent
Odum's Energy-Hierarchy Concept
The energy-hierarchy concept is an extension of
familiar predator-prey or, more formally,
trophic-dynamic ideas. It includes the idea that
fish, and indeed all marine organisms, exist at
different energy levels in the ecosystem; that
species "embody" energy from their prey at
underlying levels and thereby acquire higher
value.
Haddock, for example, being a carnivore
high on the food chain, embodies the energy of
its many prey species and of their prey species.
As a high-value species, it attracts intense
fishing effort. Because of differing levels of
"embodied" energy, the organisms at various
levels in the hierarchy exhibit differing degrees
of predictability or stability, with characteristic
responses to natural environmental variations
or to fishing pressure.
Oscillations within the system thus may
be caused either by natural environmental
perturbations or by fishing effort. Natural
perturbations, as a rule, enter the system at the
"lower" end of the hierarchy via those species
especially vulnerable to such disturbances,
such as plankton. The oscillations tend to be
damped as they progress upward through the
hierarchy toward those species of higher
embodied energy.
Fishing effort, by contrast, typically
introduces perturbations at the "higher" end of
the hierarchy on the high-value species, such
as haddock. The energy-hierarchy concept
predicts that such effort may cause
disturbances that travel toward the lower
levels, in a direction opposite to that of natural
perturbations. And the concept predicts -
most importantly that these perturbations are
not damped as they progress through the
various levels of the energy hierarchy, but, in
fact, are amplified, thus tending to destabilize
the system.
Thus unrestrained fishing effort on
high-value species may destabilize other
fisheries within the system, leading to greater
uncertainty and increasingly difficult
management problems. An understanding of
how the system works as a whole can suggest
critical pressure points, where management
could be applied to minimize problems
elsewhere in the system.
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irony of applying this concept is that those species
that are most attractive and vulnerable to fishing (and
therefore most appropriate for management
constraints) are the most difficult to manage in
conventional ways because they typically occur in
mixed-species trawl fisheries and multi-species
aggregations. In contrast, those species that are most
amenable to conventional management because
they occur as pelagic schooling fish in single-species
aggregations (herring, mackerel, or squid, for
example) are in less need of management because
they are inherently more variable and have less
impact on other components of the system. Thus,
largely from consideration of expedience,
conventional management restraints may be applied
in counterproductive ways that tend to destabilize
the system. If this is correct, the current management
arrangement in New England, encompassing the
principal landed species, clearly holds the potential
for inducing species oscillations of a surprising and
destabilizing character.
The Aggregate Approach
From the inevitable, though long-overdue, serious
study of the fisheries systems, there may emerge
useful clues to guide the future development of
effective fisheries policy. As Lloyd Dickie of the
Marine Ecology Laboratory in Dartmouth, Nova
Scotia, has noted, systems tend to have more stable
output than do their individual components. Given
the apparent inseparability of various components
of, for example, the mixed-species trawl fishery
system (not forgetting that fishermen are a part of the
system), more attention is being given to the
possibility of aggregate "biomass" management. The
Estimating fish
populations
the hard way.
Herring (Clupea harengus)
feasibility of realizing stable aggregate biomass
output appears to be much greater than that of
managing any single component species for MSY, as
perhaps is reflected in the highly-adaptive harvesting
strategies of fishermen, shifting from species to
species as they are available. Dickie maintains,
the ability of fishermen to choose among alternative
activities may be the dominant force translating
variable individual species catches into stable overall
output."
Probably, regardless of whatever other ends
are desired from fisheries management, all would
agree that stable aggregate production is desirable;
thus any management policy should maintain the
maximum flexibility in fishermen's ability to harvest
fish. Unfortunately, most conventional management
techniques reduce flexibility. An unsolved problem
is that of insuring that the harvesting shall not focus
on the high-value-species components of the
system yellowtail flounder, for example thus
leaving lower-valued species (Odum's species of
lower-embodied energy) to dominate the
ecosystem.
As these issues of effective fisheries
management are examined under the imperatives of
MFCMA and the increasing exploitation of finite
resources, some fundamental principles assume
great practical significance for policy determinations.
As experience accumulates under the mandate of
fisheries management, and as more careful thought
is given to the pu rposes and methods of constructive
management, several seemingly inherent
contradictions emerge. These are both implicit and
explicit in the foregoing discussion. They include the
following:
1) While the legally mandated public hearing
process of implementing fisheries policy forces
managers to be rather precise in their statement
of management objectives, there is a serious
question whether such precision in fact works
against successful management. John Culland
of the United Nations Food and Agricultural
Organization observed that "... hope fo define
in this way [precisely] the Holy Grail of fishery
conservation is in vain, and . . . it is impossible to
define a 'best' fishery policy because what is
'best' will vary from time to time. . . . the stricter
the definition made at the present, the more
likely it is this definition will make it difficult to
pursue some objective that later becomes
apparent . . . .
" The paradox is obvious: an
enforceable regulation requires considerable
precision in the statement of objectives or
policy, but such precision precludes options for
the future and adjustment for those options in a
timely fashion.
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Restacking a seine aboard the Independence^ tuna seiner based in San Diego, California. (Photo by William High NOAA)
2) Though we wish to preserve fishermen's
harvesting options and fishing flexibility, most
conventional management techniques are
essentially restrictive. A closed season for
haddock, for example, is unavoidably a closed
season for all other species in the area of closure.
3) The otherproblem with a policy of flexibility is
the implication that fishing effort will then be
directed at the high-value species, those that are
inherently difficult to manage but which are
priority candidates for management because of
their vulnerability to fishing and because of the
consequences for destabilization through the
rest of the system in the absence of
management.
4) Finally, there is the contradiction of trying to
reconcile the positive, upbeat note conveyed by
the idea of
"optimum yield" as the mandated
objective of fisheries management with the
probably more realistic, though
negative-sounding, management objectives of
preventing stock collapse and excess catching
capacity (Gulland, 1978).
Whether a particular fishery is carried on by a
homogenous group of fishermen concentrating on a
single species or shows the diversity of species and
harvesters that most do, it is part of a larger system
and thus contributes to and is affected by
perturbations that ripple through that system. A
large, seemingly unmanageable, number of
questions appeared in this article. That is partly
because we have been in the habit of approaching
each species as a separate management issue, each
complicated by the diversity of fishermen dependent
upon it.
Prescription for Progress
Real progress in effective management will come
when several things happen. First is the recognition
that a focus on single species is inadequate; that
striving solely for MSY is unproductive. Second is the
realization that not all fish are created equal; that fish
behave differently and react differently to the
pressures in the system. Third is that different
objectives, or at least different management
techniques, are appropriate tor different species.
There will be the possibility of real progress
when managers recognize that fisheries exist as part
of a comprehensible system and make the
commitment to systems management based on the
workings of the system as a whole. Science at the
moment probably cannot supply us with a full
understanding of the workings of any fisheries
system. This is primarily for lack of attention to the
problem; the scientists will undoubtedly deliver
when the managers ask systematic, rather than
species-specific, questions. But there probably are a
number of useful suggestions that are now available
from our present partial understanding of how
systems work. We already know, for instance, that
certain species like ocean perch, cusk, and dogfish
(no longer "trash fish" in today's society) are highly
vulnerable to fishing pressure and are prime
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Small boats rigged for
longline salmon fishing,
moored at Shelter Cove, in
northern California. (Photo
by Jack White California
Department of Fish and
Game)
candidates for careful management. Likewise, we
know that other species like menhaden or herring
are inherently variable and therefore not logical
candidates for the sort of management suitable for
ocean perch or cusk or dogfish.
It is safe to predict in a qualitative way, based
on existing understanding, that as heavy fishing
pressure continues across a large number of species,
as on Georges Bank off the coast of New England,
surprising and disturbing fluctuations in fish
abundance will occur. Managers should expect
increasing uncertainty in the systems under their
jurisdictions as long as single species management
prevails. The managers must take these probabilities
into account, and can do so if they avail themselves of
existing information. Progress can be made, without
waiting for full understanding, if we allow ourselves
to be guided by useful, if incomplete, information on
how systems work. But the first step is
acknowledgment that a fish cannot be managed in
isolation.
Spencer Apollonio is Commissioner of Maine's Department
of Marine Resources and as such is an ex officio member of
the New England Fishery Management Council. He was the
council's first Executive Director (1976-1978).
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Ocean
Dumping
by John W. Farrington,
Judith M. Capuzzo,
Thomas M. Leschine,
and Michael A. Champ
EDITOR'S NOTE: This article was originally scheduled
to be written by Buck Ketchum, an authority on coastal
processes and ocean dumping. He was at mid-point in
writing a first draft when he died this past summer. It is
some measure of the man that it took four colleagues to
fill his wading boots.
Simplicity is the most deceitful mistress
that ever betrayed man.
Henry Brooks Adams
[1838-1918]
Ihis statement summarizes the past situation in
regard toocean dumping. The oceans have immense
volume. They are dynamic and have powerful
dispersal forces. A simple extrapolation of these facts
has appealed historically to those segments of
society searching for a means of waste disposal. The
dilution and dispersal forces at work in the oceans,
coupled with a capacity to degrade or deteriorate
many materials, seems to point to the ocean for
waste disposal with few accompanying adverse
effects. The attractiveness of this idea is illustrated by
recent compilations of major ocean dumping
locations and total amounts dumped over the period
1976-1979 (Figures 1 and 2).
The contentious issues of ocean dumping
revolve around the question : what is the capacity of
the ocean for receiving wastes without adverse
effects? Logically, the answer to that question
depends on the composition of the waste, the
proposed disposal site, the duration of the disposal,
and the definition of an adverse effect. Within that
context, we seek to review briefly the history of
ocean dumping in the United States and make some
recommendations for the future.
Why Was Ocean Dumping Restricted?
In the decade of the 1960s and into the early 1970s,
research clearly demonstrated that man-made toxic
Nine sewerage authorities in the New York City area have been dumping sewage sludge into the Atlantic Ocean since the
1920s at a site 72 m//es equidistant from New York and New Jersey beaches. Here a tug guides a barge full ofsludge out to the
site. The tug and barge keep moving during the discharge in order to disperse the waste. Some authorities use self-propelled
tankers. (EPA photo)
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Figure 7. Ocean dumpsites in 1979 usedby parties to the London Dumping Convention. (Courtesy of I. W. Duedall, eta/., 7983
in press)
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wastes could be detected in the farthest and deepest
reaches of the oceans. The quantities detected were
very small : 10'
6 to 10' 12 grams per gram of marine
organism tissue or oceanic sediment. However, the
chemicals detected, such as DDT, PCB, and the
radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons tests, had
been in use only 10 to 40 years. Given the vastness
of the oceans, the rapid invasion by even trace
quantities of these chemicals was viewed with
concern by several scientists, because laboratory
experiments and field observations in near-shore
areas had demonstrated real or potential toxic effects
across a wide variety of marine biota. The pathways
of entry and movement of wastes through oceanic
ecosystems are illustrated in Figure 3.
Concurrently, there were a few incidents of
toxic chemicals entering the coastal areas of the
oceans and becoming a health hazard to man. For
example, in Minamata Bay, Japan, mercury in a
chemical plant's effluent entered the bay in sufficient
Figure 2. The total number ofpermits issued and estimated
tonnages (in metric tons), on a global basis, for the disposal
of wastes in the sea. The tonnages for the "others" category
are notgiven because of insufficient data. (Courtesy of I. W.
Duedall, et a/., 7983 in press)
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Figure 3. The pathways of entry and movement for wastes in oceanic ecosystems.
quantities to pollute shellfish and fish to the extent
that many people who ate these organisms became
seriously ill, or died. (See Oceanus, Vol. 24, No. 1,
p. 34).
A second example, not as tragic, involved
contamination offish by polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs). These organic chemicals, whose production
and distribution was banned in the 1970s, were used
in electronic components, such as capacitors and
transformers, mainly since the 1950s. They leaked
into the environment in a variety of ways and
eventually entered the oceans. Fish caught in some
coastal areas contained high enough concentrations
of PCBs, in a few cases, to cause a significant number
of reproductive failures when fed to minks over a
period of time. Although obviously there are wide
differences between minks and people, the fact that
both species are mammals understandably caused
concern about the release of PCBs to the
environment and subsequent adverse effects on
humans. Other more extensive evidence eventually
led to a ban on production of PCBs in several
countries and restrictions on PCB use in others.
There were several additional incidents that
led to increased concern about ocean pollution. Of
course, there also were numerous examples of
disposal of wastes in the ocean for which no threatto
man nor overt adverse impacts were noted;
however, the few documented adverse impacts
served as warnings of problems in the future. The
fact that some bodies of water smaller than oceans
had serious problems (the Thames River in Britain,
the Houston Ship Channel, and Lake Erie, to name a
few) bolstered the arguments for caution against
waste disposal in the ocean. For some, the cries of
"polluted lakes today, the North Atlantic tomorrow"
or "the oceans are dying" were simple
extrapolations. The combination of a tew concerned
scientists and environmentalists, a larger body of
concerned citizens, and concerned elected and
appointed officials was sufficient to begin the
process of regulating and limiting waste discharge in
the oceans.
New laws were passed by the U.S. Congress,
and rules and regulations were promulgated and
implemented. These laws built upon earlier marine
pollution control laws dating back to the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899.
Retreat from a Ban on Ocean Dumping?
In the 1976 to 1978 period, a few engineers and
scientists began to realize that, while marine
scientists were pointing to the real and potential
effects of ocean disposal of urban sewage sludge,
among other materials, other engineers and
scientists dealing with the pollution of rivers, lakes,
and groundwater were successfully advocating
construction of advanced sewage treatment
facilities. However, no one had planned adequately
for the disposal of the new sludge.
In 1977, Congress adopted a 1981 statutory
phase-out deadline tor sewage sludge that might
cause unreasonable degradation of the marine
environment. This placed New York City, in
particular, on the horns of a dilemma. Where could
New Yorkers dispose of the sludge they had been
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dumping in the New York Bight? As the 1981 deadline
approached and economically reasonable
alternatives for New York's sludge disposal were not
at hand, there was considerable socio-economic and
political pressure to re-examine the ban on ocean
dumping. Several court cases evolved in regard to
New York City's sewage sludge disposal in the New
York Bight and the criteria by which sludge could be
judged as acceptable or not acceptable for disposal at
a given site in the ocean.
During this same period, the United States
citizenry was awakened to the seemingly more
immediate problem of festering hazardous waste
disposal sites on land. We cannot recount here the
many examples, such as Love Canal. It suffices to
state that the problems with land disposal made it
seem ludicrous to ban unequivocably ocean
dumping.
In July of 1979, a group of scientists,
engineers, and a few observers met at Crystal
Mountain, Washington, to re-examine the issue of
waste disposal in the oceans. After lively debate and
agonizing writing and rewriting, a report,
"Proceedings of a Workshop on Assimilative
Capacity of U.S. Coastal Waters for Pollutants," was
issued. Although there were many important
cautionary statements and caveats in the report, the
principal message was that in certain circumstances
the oceans probably could be used as receivers of
waste without undue harm to the oceans or to man.
At the very least, said the group, the issue should be
examined in context with the other alternatives for
waste disposal. The National Advisory Committee on
Oceans and Atmospheres (NACOA) reached a
similar conclusion two years later after again
examining the issues.
Testimony during May, June, September, and
November of 1981
,
and in March of 1982 before the
House Subcommittee on Oceanography, the
Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation and the Environment, and the
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
addressed the contentious issue of waste dumping.
John A. Knauss, Acting Chairman of NACOA,
This cartoon of a
"sludge
monster" coming ashore is
one expression of public
concern over the dumping of
sewage sludge in the New
York Bight. It appeared in a
Long Island, New York,
newspaper in the mid-1970s.
(Gary Viskupic Newsday)
summarized the problem in his testimony, which
identified a legislative crisis in regulating the disposal
of wastes:
Five federal statutes affect the management of
society's waste material. They are: Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA, often referred to
as the Clean Water Act); Marine Protection
Research and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA, often
referred to as the Ocean Dumping Act); Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA); and the
Clean Air Act. It was impossible to implement all
five statutes simultaneously and as a result the
implementation of each shifted the burden of
receiving society's waste products to the
medium that was least regulated at the moment.
An industry or municipality faced with the
problems of what to do with its waste may well
find that the Clean Air Act effectively prohibits
incineration, the FWPCA and the Ocean
Dumping Act similarly limit disposal at sea, and
the RCRA and the SDWA effectivelyprohibit land
disposal or deep-well injection. Based on our
review of this history and the statutes, NACOA is
concerned that this medium-by-medium
approach has produced groups of regulations
whose primary objective is to protect a particular
medium from its use as a waste disposal medium
without any regard for the impact of these
regulations on other media.
The problem to which Knauss referred is illustrated in
Figure 4, taken from a NACOA report to the President
and the Congress.
The Present Situation
Most of the concern about ocean dumping and
ocean sewer outfalls is derived from the presence of
toxic chemicals, viruses, and pathogenic bacteria in
much of the waste discharged to the ocean. Viruses
and pathogenic bacteria enter sludge in sewage
treatment plants as a result of processing human and
animal wastes. Known or potentially toxic, mutagenic,
or carcinogenic chemicals, such as PCBs and
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CAA Clean Air Act
FWPCA Federal Water Pollution Control Act
MPRSA Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act
RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
SDWA Safe Drinking Water Act
Figure 4. The jurisdictional boundaries ofkey environmental
laws. (From NACOA, 198V
chlorinated pesticides (DDT and chlordane, tor
example) can enter sludge as a result of rain washing
material from the atmosphere or by dust falling from
the atmosphere to city streets. The chemicals are
then transported to and through sewers by rainwater
runoff. Factories add still more toxic chemicals
directly into municipal sewer systems. In older East
Coast cities, such as New York, the problem is
compounded by combined storm and sanitary sewer
systems which convey normal rainfall to sewage
treatment plants and also flush some untreated
sewage directly into nearby ocean waters when there
is an overflow.
Sewage sludge is mostly the remains of solid
wastes and a mass of bacteria that has been
degrading some organic products from human and
industrial wastes. In simple terms, the sludge sewage
treatment process is a larger, more sophisticated
version of a backyard septic system. As with septic
systems, bacteria in the plant periodically need
refurbishing. The old bacterial mass is removed.
Along with this mass of bacteria, there are
recalcitrant chemicals, such as PCBs, many
chlorinated pesticides, and some petrochemicals,
that are difficult to break apart or degrade
biologically. Many of these chemicals are not very
soluble in water and are adsorbed onto the surfaces
of bacteria" during the treatment processes. Other
chemicals interact with the sludge in chemical
reactions, which results in their removal from the
sewage as it passes through the treatment plant. The
net result is sludge containing elevated
concentrations of toxic chemicals.
Environmental concern with sludge disposal is
focused on 1 ) the accumulation and transfer of these
toxic chemicals in marine food chains, 2) the toxic
effects of such chemicals on survival and
reproduction of marine organisms, and 3) the uptake
and accumulation of pathogenic bacteria and viruses
in commercially harvested species destined for
human consumption.
Dredging spoils from urban harbors, rivers,
and estuarine areas often contain elevated
concentrations of pollutant chemicals because of
industrial and municipal sewer discharges to these
areas and runoff from land carrying the fallout from
urban air pollution. The pollutant chemicals are
present in elevated concentrations in both sludge
and dredged harbor sediments as the result of the
initial attempt to release the chemicals to the
environment for dilution to innocuous
concentrations.
Chemical wastes from industrial chemical
operations also are dumped at sea and are candidates
for increased ocean dumping in the future. Again,
the problems revolve around the toxic portion of the
waste, which is often a very small part of the total
mass of material.
Aside from the greater concern about toxic
chemicals and pathogens, there are still concerns
about arbitrarily releasing degradable organic matter
and nutrients to the ocean. If these substances are
discharged in high enough amounts to some oceanic
areas of poor dispersion and mixing energy, then
depletion of oxygen in the area as a result of so much
microbial degradation of organic matter may become
a threat to some species of commercial importance.
Eutrophication of coastal areas from nutrient
enrichment may result in changes, both in the types
To determine the environmental effects ofsludge dumping,
biological samples from the New York Bight are analyzed by
the National Marine Fisheries Service in Sandy Hook, N.J.
(Photo courtesy ofNOAA)
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of species that live in a given area and in the dynamics
of marine food chains, with consequent loss of
commercial resources. For example, during the
summer of 1976, poor water circulation and high
nutrient inputs to the inner continental shelf off
northern New Jersey resulted in a bloom of the
dinoflagellate Ceratium tripos off the New Jersey
coast. This species of algae is rarely used as a food
source by zooplankton; thus, a great deal of organic
matter not utilized by marine food webs was left to
decompose. This resulted in a high rate of oxygen
consumption by bacteria decomposing this organic
matter (the dead algae), creating hypoxic, or
low-oxygen, conditions in near-bottom waters and
on the ocean floor. These adverse conditions caused
mass mortality of fish and shellfish and commercial
losses.
On the other hand, it may be possible, under
certain controlled-release conditions, to stimulate
the biological productivity of an area and increase the
yield of valuable seafood. For the majority of the
cases, we suspect that the disposal process itself will
be of sufficient social or economic benefit so as not
to warrant the extra effort required to demonstrably
increase a yield of seafood. The emphasis is now (and
will be for several years) on preventing adverse
effects, which carry with them social and economic
costs.
Waste Management Strategies
The give and take of the Congressional hearings on
ocean dumping during 1981 and early 1982 illustrates
that we are in a critical period of transition from a
regulatory stance that was approaching a ban on
ocean dumping to ... what? The scientific,
engineering, and political debates are intense (see
Oceanus, Vol. 24, No. 1). Policy-makers who govern
regulatory actions may be about to embark on a more
rational course, toward multi-media (air, land, sea)
assessment prior to decisions about where to dump
or discharge wastes in the future, though many
important issues remain and may require a decade to
be resolved.
There are five general waste management
strategies, with several options within each category.
The costs and benefits of each option should be
evaluated and should enter into the decision on how
each type of waste is managed. This appears to be a
rational and straightforward approach. It/s rational.
However, it is not straightforward, because much of
the knowledge required to make meaningful
cost-benefit comparisons is not available.
Reducing and Recycling Waste
The Global 2000 Report prepared for President Jimmy
Carter provided a sobering look to the future. A
growing shortage of materials of various types will
occur as we proceed toward the year 2000. Thus, we
expect that incentives to conserve will increase.
There is a growing movement already in the United
States toward recycling in local neighborhoods and
communities, encouraged nationwide by some
manufacturers. The recent documentation of
reduced energy utilization, and thereby reduced
fossil fuel consumption, may be a further indication
of such a trend. We think these are indications that
society can adjust its life-style in a relatively short
time.
During the 1970s, the production of several
toxic chemicals was reduced. The restricted use of
DDT and a few other chlorinated pesticides, and the
ban on PCB production in the United States,
followed a few decades or less after scientific
evidence emerged suggesting these chemicals
caused environmental damage. Perhaps the
alternatives were less effective and more costly, but
the important point is that adjustments have been
made. Thus, if the evidence is compelling and if the
environmental damage is extensive enough or
potentially extensive or, more importantly, if human
health is at risk, then action can be taken and
generation of toxic wastes can be reduced .
GLASS RECYCLING
Glass at a neighborhood
recycling center. Could the
awareness that recycling is
necessary be expanded
someday to prevent the
fouling of the oceans? (Photo
by ElinorS. Beckwith PR)
Ideally, the removal of many toxic chemicals
from sewage sludge could be achieved by keeping
the material out of sewers in the first place. Controls
on industrial effluent releases to municipal systems
have been in force or proposed for several years. The
1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act require that
communities seeking waivers from wastewater
secondary treatment requirements develop
programs by which their most toxic industrial wastes
are removed from municipal wastewater. There is
debate about the application and expense of new
technologies to reduce industrial chemical releases.
Some people argue that the costs to consumers or
loss of jobs in a given region make the application of
effluent controls untenable. Certain toxic chemical
inputs to sewers will be decreased in the 1980s, but
there will still be enough industrial effluent input to
significantly contaminate many urban sludges.
Another problem of equal or greater
significance is the fact that many chemicals of
concern enter sewers via dispersive release to the
environment or because they are already used
extensively by society. Two examples illustrate this.
Some polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons are known
mutagens and carcinogens. These compounds enter
sewers as a result of chronic dribbling of oil from
industrial operations and automobile crankcases.
They also are released to the atmosphere during
combustion of fossil fuels and deposited on the
ground by dry fallout or by rain, and then washed
into sewers.
The second example concerns PCBs. Even
though they are no longer produced in the United
States, a significant amount of PCBs are still in use.
Burning of PCB-containing electrical components in
municipal incinerators or leakage from electrical
components in use releases PCBs to the
environment. A portion of this release is collected in
sewers via atmosphere deposition and runoff. Thus
we cannot look to controls on effluent releases from
industrial plants to completely solve the problem of
toxic chemicals in sludge.
Furthermore, a significant problem with waste
disposal in the oceans is related to contaminated
sediments from dredging operations near urban
areas. This is a problem of relocating toxic chemicals
already released to the environment. As indicated in
Figure2, dredged material is a majorocean dumping
input to the ocean. The 7 to 10 million cubic yards of
material dredged annually from New York Harbor is
sufficient to cover the borough of Manhattan six
inches deep. At present, the proportion of dredged
material worldwide that contains concentrations of
chemicals of concern is not known, but most dredge
spoils from industrialized harbors are heavily
contaminated.
Incineration of Waste
There is a growing conviction among scientists,
engineers, and officials of regulatory agencies that
high-temperature, high-efficiency combustion offers
the best means of disposing of certain very
hazardous chemical wastes. The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has allowed several test
burnings of chlorinated organic chemical wastes at
sea where the basic chemical nature of seawater
Incineration at sea. Here the Vulcanus, a specially designed
disposal tanker, burns polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in
the Gulf of Mexico. With the incinerators set at 1,350 degrees
Celsius, PCBs break down into hydrochloric acid and water,
which forms a vapor that precipitates into the water behind
the ship. The PCBs were drained from spent or recalled
transformers and other electrical components. (Photo
courtesy of Wasfe Management, Inc.)
rapidly neutralizes the hydrochloric acid that is the
main combustion product of concern. Burning such
wastes on land requires difficult and potentially
expensive controls on the release of this acid to
prevent adverse effects on nearby structures, plants,
animals, and people.
It appears that the incineration method could
be extended to sediments polluted with high
concentrations of toxic organic chemicals, using
specially designed rotary kilns on ships. However,
this technology is only in the early prototype stage.
The main concerns about adverse effects
associated with this treatment strategy are
1) ensuring continued high efficiency of operation;
2) preventing accidental spills of material during
collection, storage, loading, and transit at sea; and
3) the cost of the fuel necessary to achieve the
required temperatures. Current forecasts indicate
that this strategy will be economical and of best use
to society when applied to low volumes of highly
toxic materials.
Disposal on Land
Most of the sewage sludge currently generated for
disposal in the United States is disposed of on land.
Less than 15 percent is released in the oceans by
ocean dumping or by ocean outfalls. Nevertheless,
the difficulty of allocating sufficient land for landfill
disposal operations, spray irrigation, or land
spreading of composted sludge material is a major
obstacle to the land disposal option, especially near
urban areas where land is more expensive and more
wastes are generated. The second problem with land
disposal is the protection of public health.
Contaminated groundwater and polluted air plague
some land disposal sites, and thus are of potential
concern for all sites.
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Spreading of composted sewage sludge on
agricultural lands or spraying treated sewage in
forests has been researched and is in use in several
inland locations, particularly in the Midwest.
However, public health concerns related to the
presence of pollutant chemicals and pathogens have
prevented more widespread use. Also, suitable
agricultural lands and forests are not always within
easy reach of urban areas, where the bulk of waste is
generated, especially in coastal areas. Thus the costs
of transportation and land discourage the use of this
option.
In the United States, many cities are near the
ocean. A recent EPA study estimated that 25 percent
of all sludge generated for disposal comes from
counties that border the ocean. The costs of using an
area of ocean for disposal are not appreciable at
present, compared to the costs of land near urban
areas. Thus, ocean disposal has continued appeal; it
releases land for other uses.
Disposal in the Ocean
There are two basic man-made modes for delivery of
wastes to the oceans: pipes and ships (or barges).
The engineering aspects of each are not germane to
this discussion. However, there are some
fundamental decisions that need to be made as to the
mode used and the location of the release.
The two most prevalent scenarios (simplified
here) of ocean disposal are near-shore disposal and
deep ocean (far away from land) disposal .
Near-shore disposal. The arguments in favor of
this disposal scenario are:
Recoverability. If a mistake is made in estimating the
severity of adverse effects, then it should be
technologically easier to recover the wastes for
alternate treatment or disposal than if the material
had been disposed in the deepocean. This argument
presumes that the disposal area is a low-energy
environment an area where mixing and
turbulence by waves, currents, and storms will not
significantly disperse the material.
Impact could be restricted in area. Again, if a
low-energy environment is used, then it might be
possible to sacrifice a small area of extreme adverse
impact in order to minimize effects elsewhere. This is
the near-shore equivalent of the landfill disposal
option.
Impact could be minimized by dispersal in a
high-energy mixing area. The argument here is that
tidal and wind-driven currents, storms, and
wave-induced turbulence, prevalent in some coastal
areas, provide the extensive mixing needed for initial
dispersion and dilution.
Research monitoring and management of waste. It is
easier and less expensive to conduct research and
monitoring to verify predicted adverse effects and
discover whether unsuspected, unwanted adverse
impacts are about to occur, or have occurred. This
presumes our knowledge about coastal and
estuarine processes is more advanced than for the
open ocean and that it is easier to monitor and
conduct research in coastal areas.
Economic. Near-shore disposal is cheaper, often by a
factor of three or more, than deep ocean disposal.
More importantly, at a time when costs forall types of
disposal are increasing rapidly, near-shore disposal is
frequently much less expensive than any other
disposal alternative for coastal communities.
According to one wastewater treatment estimate,
sludge handling, transportation, and disposal now
account for 35 percent of capital costs and 55 percent
of annual operation and maintenance costs. Table 1
compares some current cost estimates of sludge
disposal by various means.
The disadvantages of near-shore disposal are:
Proximity to people. Disposal sites are close to land
and population centers. If an adverse impact is
discovered, there will be less time to protect human
health.
Proximity to valuable living resources in coastal areas.
The reasoning of the preceding point applies here as
well.
Neither high-energy mixing areas nor quiescent areas
are always near the activities generating the wastes.
Deep-ocean disposal. The proponents of
deep-ocean disposal generally cite the following:
Extensive dilution and dispersion. Concentrations of
toxic materials can be diluted in a large volume,
thereby minimizing effects on marine ecosystems.
Such extensive dilution also makes it less likely that
the material will return to man in harmful amounts.
Similarly, the exposure to contaminants is reduced
for the living resources of near-shore coastal areas.
The disadvantages are:
Recoverability may be impossible. If it is determined
that unwanted adverse effects are in progress, then
there will be a serious problem. Despite the resolve
and great technological ingenuity of society for
solving difficult problems, recovering dispersed
wastes from the open ocean will be a nearly
impossible task and certainly disruptive to the
economic well-being of the nation.
Research and monitoring are difficult. The volume of
oceanic areas involved and the limitations of our
present knowledge make it difficult to check on what
is actually happening.
Economics. The transportation of wastes to the open
ocean is more expensive than tor the coastal option.
International complications. While inputs to coastal
areas can eventually reach open ocean areas, the
direct dumping of pollutant chemicals in open ocean
waters beyond the limits of the contiguous zone
could affect the waters of neighboring countries and
contaminate living resources fished by nonadjacent
countries. For example, ocean dumping at the
106-mile site off New York could seriously
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Table 1 . Estimated current costs of sludge disposal by various means.
Municipality
The Question of Radwastes
I he disposal of radioactive wastes fits a special
category in the question of ocean dumping.
Congress is presently re-examining the ban on
the dumping of radioactive waste in the oceans.
In September of 1982, the House of
Representatives passed an additional two-year
moratorium on such dumping, except for
research purposes. The bill also requires the
monitoring of radioactive waste dumpsites and
an environmental/economic impact analysis
with each application for a dumping permit and
Until 7970, the United States dumped low-level
radioactive waste in drums such as this 55-gallon one
some 200 miles off the Maryland coast at 3,800 meters
depth. The rat-tail fish, Nematonurus armatus, is seen
swimming near the drum. Leakage ofsome
radioactivity has been detected in the immediate
vicinity ofsome drums. (Photo courtesy of Robert S.
Dyer Office of Radiation Programs, EPA)
gives Congress the power to review such
permits issued by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).
The U.S. Navy is seriously investigating
the option of sinking hulls of decommissioned
nuclear submarines in deep water after
removing the fuel rods from the power reactors
(see Oceanus, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 52). The
Department of Energy (DOE) is expected to
request permission to dump radioactive soil at
sea. The soil, now kept under plastic tarps in
New Jersey, was contaminated during
development of the atomic bomb in World War
II. The Navy and DOE proposals are both
covered by the proposed moratorium. There is
also an active research program investigating the
feasibility of emplacement of high-level nuclear
wastes under deep ocean sediments as a
long-term, safe disposal option (see Oceanus,
Vol.25, No. 2, p. 42).
Separation of the high-radiation-level and
long-lived radioactive waste from short-lived, or
low-level, radioactive waste has been and
continues to be a wise practice in order to
increase options for disposal of the much more
voluminous low-level radioactive waste.
Some radioactive chemicals decay rapidly
with half-livesofafewhoursordays. However, a
few of the toxic radioactive wastes, such as
plutonium isotopes, have half-lives of more than
10,000 years. This places constraints on disposal
options. Because of the longevity and highly
toxic nature of some components, disposal of
radioactive chemical waste becomes a special
case.
conducted when government responsibility is
fragmented among several agencies and spread over
several levels of government? Most studies to date
have focused on single disposal options or the effects
of disposal on a single disposal medium.
Flexible Policy. A major misconception about ocean
dumping is the expectation among the regulators
and the public that a decision is forthcoming, based
on solid scientific evidence. They also think that,
once the decision is made, we can get on with
investigating society's other problems. Such thinking
minimizes the complexity of the issues and
exaggerates the ability of science to provide
predictions that will stand the test of time. We
recognize that there has been important and exciting
progress on local, regional, and global scales in
understanding environmental processes. However,
there is still much research that needs to be
undertaken and completed.
Of equal importance is the fact that decisions
on the future of ocean dumping cannot be made on
the basis of scientific and technical information
alone. Regulators must be prepared to make
important decisions on questions of appropriate
societal values: how much pollution of land or water
is to be tolerated for the sake of economic, health, or
other social benefits that accrue because alternative
disposal options are not taken? Given the
uncertainties about scientific and technical facts, and
the changing nature of societal values, can a policy be
implemented that is flexible enough to incorporate
changes as a result of value shifts or new scientific
information? If a marginally tolerable level of ocean
pollution is to be accepted for the sake of economic
or other considerations, does the policy selected
include sufficient incentives forocean disposal users
to generate better waste management methods in
the future?
We are concerned that, once the decision to
continue or increase ocean dumping is made, there
will not be the follow-up in continued research and
monitoring which is required to assess the accuracy
of estimates made about the fate and effects of the
wastes. We caution that such estimates and
predictions are often no better than predictions of
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the behavior of the economy of the United States.
Economists are allowed to continue to collect data to
revise and update their predictions and assessments
because society recognizes that there are many
uncertainties in economic predictions. Scientific
assessments of many aspects of waste disposal in the
oceans are of a similar nature, and society should
accept that, too.
Research and Monitoring
Much of the required information for making
decisions can only come from fundamental research.
The remaining information comes from monitoring
what happens at a given site. Ideally, there should be
a five-to-ten-year period of study at a few dumpsites
and disposal areas with the various characteristics
previously described. In fact, studies of some of the
options have been under way for several years in the
New York Bight, the Southern California area, and
Deep Water Dumpsite 106 off the northeastern U.S.
coast. A few more studies like these, incorporating
revisions based on lessons gleaned from earlier
work, are essential.
There is a very great danger of the "snowball
made into an avalanche" effect with respect to ocean
dumping, which should be avoided at all costs until
reasonable assessment of the options is completed.
The problem is that if one municipality or industry is
allowed to use the oceans tor waste disposal, then
many others may cite the precedent and follow. One
recent estimate is that municipal sludge dumping
could increase by as much as 150 percent if all
municipalities that could exercise the dumping
option actually did. The situation then could get out
of hand before the required data and assessment
supportive of extensive dumping is available.
Understanding the fate and effects of
materials discharged to the oceans depends on our
fundamental knowledge of oceanic processes. At a
time when society is poised fora massive experiment
with the oceans continued and possibly
substantially increased ocean dumping -
fundamental ocean research, and even research and
monitoring applied to marine pollution studies, is
being severely curtailed. Oceangoing research
vessels are being decommissioned and tied up at
docks. Even many near-shore research projects
require an understanding of open-ocean processes.
For example, waves that provide mixing energy in
coastal areas are often generated in the open ocean.
Many research and monitoring projects on the
continental shelf and in areas such as the New York
Bight and the Southern California Bight require the
larger research vessels to safely handle gear and carry
enough scientists to study efficiently and synoptically
several facets of the problems. Furthermore, we
cannot rely too much on studies of coastal organisms
when considering effects on open-ocean organisms.
Sensitivities to pollutants are known to vary by as
much as factors of 10 or more when comparing
organisms for these two different oceanic regimes.
Certainly, remote sensing from aircraft and
satellites is a tool of growing significance in ocean
research. However, this is no substitute for most
ship-based work. Our warning is explicit. If ocean
dumping is to be a viable option for waste disposal,
then United States ocean scientists have to be able to
get to sea to make certain that estimates (many times
"guesstimates") of adverse impacts (or no adverse
impacts) are correct. There also has to be a
concomitant increase in stable research funding in
order to understand such important topics as what
governs natural fluctuations in marine ecosystems,
and to recognize the early indications of changes
induced by man's activities.
United States activities in ocean waste
disposal will be increasingly watched by other
nations and could become part of foreign policy
interactions. Wastes discharged to the oceans are not
contained by political boundaries. The failure of the
United States to support the Law of the Sea Treaty
could have repercussions if the U.S. ocean disposal
policy in its Exclusive Economic Zone differs from
standards agreed upon by other nations. Some
nations may well protest United States activities,
while others may adopt policies leading to less
rigorous standards for disposal of wastes in the
ocean. We should be cognizant of the ocean disposal
plans of our nearest neighbors in Canada and
Mexico, and evaluate the total input to our
contiguous oceanic areas. Likewise, if the United
A box corer, used to sample sediment, is brought up from
the seafloor in the New York Bight, as part of a monitoring
effort by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. (Photo by George Kelez NOAA)
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States engages in disposal of wastes in open ocean
areas, an evaluation of potential long-term impact
must take into account the activities of other
countries that may release wastes into the same or
contiguous areas.
For these reasons, we anticipate the 1980s will
be a period of vigorous national and international
debate about ocean dumping. The debate could
extend well into the 1990s.
Summary
We agree with those who argue that the oceans have
a capacity to receive some wastes without undue
harm to valuable living resources orto public health.
We also agree with those who are concerned that a
mad dash toward using the oceans as a less
expensive, quick fix for waste disposal will occur
without due consideration of the relative risks and
benefits of all options for waste management.
There are encouraging indications that those
who formulate policy and promulgate regulations
are evaluating all options. However, we are
discouraged that this policy evaluation will probably
acknowledge the essential role of continued
research and monitoring activities in the rational
evaluation and implementation of the various
options, while not providing the means for those
activities to be effectively carried out. We do not
advocate unnecessary delays in decisions about
where to put waste today. Rather, we advocate a
flexible policy which explicitly recognizes that
today's decision can be re-evaluated, modified, or
even abandoned as new knowledge is acquired.
One of the most serious mistakes that could
be made about disposal of wastes in the oceans is to
decide now that we have sufficient knowledge to
establish regulations for20 years or even 10years. We
do not. Our present knowledge of the oceans
teaches us how complicated oceanic processes can
be; it is rudimentary compared to the questions
asked. In the lexicon of computer buffs, "garbage in,
garbage out" is not a good way to decide where to
put the garbage.
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The_
Call
of
the
Arctic
by Melvin A. Conant
I he National Petroleum Council, in its important
study of petroleum potential in the U.S. Arctic
region, suggested that as much as 40 percent of our
undiscovered recoverable petroleum resources may
yet be found in that forbidding environment. There
are no reliable estimates of what volumes of oil and
gas could be recovered, apart from those generated
through a heady brew of speculation. But it is
unlikely that an offshore field of much less than a
billion barrels could be economic for many years to
come. It is possible that the Navarin Basin, far off the
coast of western Alaska, will be more promising.
The stakes are staggering. If present
accelerated lease plans are implemented, by June
1987 all of the Outer Continental Shelf areas of the
Alaskan Arctic may have been offered for lease to
industry. The bids alone for tracts in the Beaufort and
Bering seas eventually could total more than $10
billion, or so say the more optimistic analysts. In
October, 1982, a number of oil companies (23) bid
$2.1 billion dollars for tracts covering 1.8 million
acres in the Diapir field in Prudhoe Bay. The cost of
exploration wells is very large, in the range of $25
million to more than $60 million each, depending on
location (factors include depth of water and
problems of protection against ice). Man-made
islands surrounding rigs are a general requirement,
to withstand the enormous pressures of ice that
would otherwise demolish them. These "islands"
represent in themselves a staggering logistic
challenge involving the mining and transport of
hundreds of thousands of tons of gravel for the
construction of bases and ramparts. Each of these
costs about $2 million per foot of water depth. The
average depth of the initial series of wells is in the
range of 20 to 60 feet.
Yet it seems as if no physical problems
encountered in the Arctic environment are
insurmountable. A new generation of technology,
engineering, and ship design has emerged in the
pursuit of Arctic riches. Assuming vast oil deposits
are found and determined to be retrievable on
favorable commercial terms, we are on the verge of a
mammoth effort to exploit Alaskan resources. Never
before has the depth of interest in operating in the
U.S. Arctic been so great. Nor have the sums
committed been so large they are already nearly
$20 billion, with far more to come. Exxon USA
estimates more than $300 billion may be spent on
Alaskan petroleum resources. The Canadian Arctic
prospects, which may be as large, have involved
commitments in the range of $5 billion to $10 billion,
with more anticipated.
"
t
Issungnak Island in the Canadian section of the Beaufort Sea in September. This is a "sacrificial beach" island; the outer rim
breaks storm waves in summer and causes ice sheets to break up and form a protective rubble field around the island.
Sandbags and filter cloth reduce erosion. The island is made of 4.9 million cubic meters ofsand, dredged from the seabedand
delivered to the site through a floating pipeline. It is 26 kilometers offshore in water 19 meters deep. From November through
June, there is no open wateraround the island. In the winter, the sun does not appear on the horizon. (Photo courtesy of Esso
Resources Canada, Ltd.)
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Immense Riches
Thus the prospects and the investments in the U.S.
Arctic have their parallel eastward, with very large
Canadian undertakings in Canada's portion of the
Beaufort Sea, and further eastward to the Arctic
Islands, where the existence of substantial deposits
of natural gas is already established. Moreover, in the
U.S. Arctic, immense riches of coal (perhaps 130
billion tons) and other hard minerals (gold, silver,
iron ore) reinforce the long-held conviction that the
resources of these lands including timber are
great untapped assets; the Canadian Arctic is
thought to be one of the largest and richest of
geological regions. The effort to create extractive and
logistical infrastructures for these other resources is
under way, but efforts to obtain gas and oil now
dwarf all others.
In both the United States and the Canadian
Arctic zones, the greatest gamble today is probably
not in the actual hunt for recoverable resources, nor
with what most people think is a fragile environment,
but in the troubled economies and reduced energy
needs of both countries. It is entirely possible that
Arctic developers will never quite realize their great
expectations for lack of a large enough commercial
incentive. If we could know how soon economic
recovery will come, what increased energy supply
will be required, and how competitive Arctic
resources will be on the market, then the scope and
pace of Arctic exploration could be made
commensurate to those expectations. But without
some evidence of a return to economic health and
progress, it is doubtful that companies will continue
to commit huge investments to enterprises whose
return on capital will be neither generous nor soon.
Nevertheless, enough has happened already
to bring the historic dream of exploiting the Arctic far
beyond its living resources closer to reality; of the
goal of making passages east and west through ice
and heavy seas; of finding ways to work year-round;
of the fashioning of special means to penetrate the
frozen earth to great depths and then to recover the
resource; of learning much more about the Arctic
environment, its weather, its capability to recover
from pollution.
Government Presence Required
It also is becoming clear that the Arctic will be a
different undertaking economically, in that a federal
government presence is an essential component in
almost everything to be attempted. This presence is
required under law and in policy, as is the case
elsewhere in which multiple uses of the oceans and
coastal zones call for the weighing of interests, their
compromise, and oversight of performance.
Only the federal government has the authority
to exercise these responsibilities. The conflicting
interests such as fishing, energy needs, territorial
claims, pollution regimes, and considerations
affecting defense are nowhere more complicated
than in the Arctic, and only government can sort
these out, attach priorities, and aid in the drafting of a
broad range of objectives. These objectives must
relate to the responsibilities of the state of Alaska as
well as to those of the federal government, as to the
manner and timing of resource exploitation and the
revenues obtained from it. While the federal
government holds the bulk of Alaskan lands in trust
For all Americans, there are substantial Alaskan
interests that also have to be met.
Both federally sponsored research and outlays
by the private sector have given us greater
knowledge of the means of exploitation and the
necessary precautions. Neither funding source can
be abandoned. More recently, private-sector outlays
for research and technology have dwarfed those of
the government on the order of perhaps 20 to 1 , but
the federal role is still essential, especially in
consideration of those requirements not directly
germane to a single private investment or a
commercial enterprise. Nevertheless, the debate has
begun as to what the extent of the federal role should
be and what it should cost. It is somewhat ironic that,
at a time when great achievements in the Arctic are
emerging, the United States has an administration
which is convinced that the national interests are best
served by a lower federal presence in the defining of
policies and regulations to guide Arctic
developments. It is more than ironic; it is
paradoxical. It may even prove self-defeating as the
private sector finds it cannot persevere alone. There
are too many unresolved issues with the potential to
frustrate and prevent resource development.
The federal government has sole jurisdiction
and control over the Outer Continental Shelf (and
the overwhelming bulk of Alaskan lands). Its
definition of the circumstances in which resources
are exploitable, its responsibilities for safeguarding
the interests of those people most directly (and
possibly adversely) affected, and its duty to protect
the environment are all consequential enough, but
there are other issues involving relationships to
Canada and other Arctic nations that can only be
worked out by the sovereign states involved.
For example, boundary disputes in the
Navarin Basin (United States and Soviet Union) and
Beaufort Sea (United States and Canada) could come
to delay exploitation of resources that overlap. The
governments of Canada and the United States will
both have to be involved in planning for and
responding to an oil spill. And industry needs to
know how pollution controls over logistical systems
will be dealt with by both countries.
The mix of national and international
complexities in Arctic operations cannot be sorted
out on lower political and administrative levels
unless and until the federal interests are defined and
then agreed to between Ottawa and Washington.
Canadian and United States interests are entirely
comparable, but that does not mean that different
institutional processes, competing claims of
sovereignty, and differences in laws and policies will
be quickly resolved. We know very well they will not
be. It is thus all the more important that we begin
bilateral negotiations. Until the two governments
resolve their differences, there is a great chance that
the discovery of exploitable resources will not be
followed by their exploitation.
The Defense Factor
After World War II, the United States undertook,
with Canadian cooperation, the construction of early
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Unresolved Arctic Issues
Precise outer limits of the continental shelf, for
coastal-nation resource purposes.
> United States-Canadian boundary in the
Beaufort Sea.
> The uncertain location of the United
States-Russian Convention Line of 1867 in the
Navarin Basin.
The character (whether national or
international) ofpassages through the Arctic
islands (the Northwest Passage).
1
Dispute between the U.S. government and
the state ofAlaska over ownership of coastline
areas in the Beaufort Sea:
a) the area offshore of the National
Petroleum Reserve in Alaska (NPRA)
b) the coastline eastward of the NPRA,
including the Prudhoe Bay area.
c) the area offshore of the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge (ANWR)
The varying status with respect to oil and gas
leasing of onshore federal lands in Alaska.
The as yet unclear federal role as a supporter
and participant in Arctic development.
The need or lack of a need for a special Arctic
science policy.
United States response to the Canadian Arctic
Waters Pollution Prevention Act.
The appropriate balance between
development activities and environmental
protection.
warning systems against manned air attack. The
advent of the intercontinental ballistic missile
reduced the need for these expensive, far-flung air
defense undertakings and at the same time amplified
the need for closer surveillance of limited-range
missile-bearing submarines whose targets in the
United States and Canada required their approach to
the North American Arctic, especially to the
Canadian islands of the extreme north. New facilities
to detect a missile attack also were emplaced in the
northern region. By the late 1960s increased missile
ranges had reduced the need for the Soviet
submarines (and their United States counterparts) to
exploit the proximity of the Arctic regions to
industrial targets; the standoff of missile submarines
could be far more distant, and the difficulty of
tracking these submarines and their missiles'
possible trajectories was made much more
problematical.
Now, with the introduction of the latest
long-range missiles, submarines may elect to remain
in their own closely protected seas or move through
vast reaches of theoceans, approaching targets from
a multitude of vantage points. Thus the special
significance of the Arctic in the strategic balance of
the superpowers has faded from its earlier
importance.
Still unresolved, however, are the
contemporary and future requirements for ordinary
surveillance of the movements of aircraft, ships, and
persons throughout a vast region where detection
and tracking present enormous difficulties. The
objective ofsuch movements may be to test alertness
and the capacity to observe, either to test assertions
of sovereignty or for purposes of sabotage. The
North American Arctic more than ever must be
"policed"; facilities for rescue on a large scale also
The Northwest Passage
through the North American
Arctic.
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must be provided. All of these matters can be better
dealt with through explicit agreements between the
United States and Canada.
Issues of Sovereignty
There are several unresolved differences between
the United States and Canada over questions of
sovereignty. Especially important is the legal status of
the passageways between the Arctic islands. Are
they, as Canada asserts, passages within the territory
of Canada and thus of its jurisdiction or, as the United
States claims, of an international character to which
international law is applicable? The United States
view limits control of the passageways to
internationally agreed-upon conditions, among
which is the general principle of unimpeded
passage. And we shall have to look again at the
territorial division of the Bering Straits between the
Soviet Union and the United States a generally
dormant issue, butone which is likely tobe involved
when the Navarin Basin is explored and tankertraffic
begins to move through the Bering Sea.
The Manhattan voyage of 1969 brought these
matters into sharp focus, and the repercussions from
that ice-breaking experiment have not faded from
memory. There were disputes over legal control of
the passageways and over the Canadian claim that
data was withheld bythe United States, tonameonly
The Voyage of the Manhattan
*
..
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The tanker Manhattan (left) cuts its way through Arctic ice in 7969, accompanied by the Canadian icebreaker John A.
Macdonald. (Photo courtesy of Exxon Corporation)
In 7969, four U.S. oil companies put up $40
million to test the feasibility of tanker
transportation through the ice channels above
North America. The 500-year-old dream of a
Northwest Passage was thus revived, and the
Manhattan sef out from Chester, Pennsylvania,
on August 24 of that year.
The largest U.S. oil tanker at 115,000
deadweight tons, the Manhattan had been cut
apart, reinforced, and reassembled with an
icebreaking bow. The ship was equipped with
strain gauges, torquemeters, accelerometers,
and powerful radio gear. Closed circuit
television monitored ice under bow and stern.
The Canadian government provided
meteorologists, airplane reconnaissance, and
the icebreaker John A. Macdonald. Again and
again the icebreaker was called upon to free the
tanker from the ice, but the Manhattan
eventually made it through to Point Barrow,
Alaska.
Stanley Haas, Humble Oil and Refining
Company's project manager for the voyage, said
the Manhattan made the trip "to gather scientific
and engineering data for guidance in building a
fleet ofsupertanker-icebreakers that may turn
these desert wastes into teeming sea lanes.
"
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two. It was a classic example of that mix of
insensitivity and obduracy that makes United
States-Canadian cooperation difficult and
time-consuming when it comes to disentangling
important issues from those of lesser consequence.
So much more could have and should have been
done by the Americans to turn this exceedingly
important experiment into a cause for bilateral
congratulations instead of the raucous affair it
became. Anyone involved in an Arctic enterprise
involving issues of Canadian sovereignty should
make a special study of theS.S. Manhattan episode
- it contains all the lessons.
The question of sovereignty will become even
more pressing if Japanese intentions to purchase
some Arctic oil and gas from Canada and/or the
United States are realized. Tankers moving from one
national jurisdiction to another ought not to have to
meet significantly different environmental,
construction, and operational standards. The
Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Act of 1970 (an
immediate consequenceof the Manhattan's passage)
and parallel United States legislation have to be
reconciled.
The present stance of the Reagan
Administration, which removes the United States
from participation in the United Nations Law of the
Sea negotiations for a set of definitions governing
multiple uses of the oceans (and dispute settlement),
puts this nation immediately at odds with Canada,
which has been a leading advocate of the Law of the
Sea treaty (as was the United States untiM980). In the
text of the treaty, there is specific provision made for
national control over icy waters. This provision in
effect acknowledges the extension of Canadian
control, but the United States, which once accepted
the argument, has voted against the whole text. This
is an issue of great importance to the logistics of
Arctic supply, for the Administration's unwillingness
to persevere in the Law of the Sea negotiations
guarantees legal and political conflict over Arctic
developments.
Icy Waters Provision
Coastal states have the right to adopt and
enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations
for the prevention, reduction, and control of
marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered
areas within the limits of the exclusive economic
zone, where particularly severe climatic
conditions and the presence ofice covering such
areas for most of the year create obstructions or
exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution
of the marine environment could cause major
harm to or irreversible disturbance of the
ecological balance. Such laws and regulations
shall have due regard to navigation and the
protection and preservation of the marine
environment based on the best available
scientific evidence.
- Article 234 of the United Nations Law of the Sea
Convention, adopted April 30, 1982.
There is also the United States-Canadian
boundary question affecting the resources
underlying the Beaufort Sea. Eventually, incidents,
claims, and counterclaims will have to be dealt with
by an accord between the two countries. In the
meantime, 600,000 acres offshore are of uncertain
jurisdiction.
Environmental Consideration
As the number of activities in the Arctic multiply and
become more capable of wreaking heavy damage -
especially from oil facilities and tankers every
effort should be made to minimize the prospect of
large and long-term catastrophes. Neither the United
States nor Canada will be immune to accidents
occurring in the other's territory. Arrangements
between private interests for emergency procedures
in the event of an oil spill, for example, must include
a government presence to help insure their
adequacy. The Joint Canada-United States Marine
Pollution Contingency Plan, which operated first in
the Great Lakes, set an excellent example.
An additional environmental factor, and a
fascinating one, is that the Arctic is the climate-maker
for much of the rest of the world. We do not know
the extent to which North American Arctic
enterprises might come to affect that function, but
we cannot assume that Arctic operations will have
little or no effect. A Soviet plan to divert three large
Siberian rivers now flowing into the Arctic might
someday lead to a major change affecting the
region's climate-making role. Assumptions made by
either Canada or the United States should be
reached through joint scientific efforts to insure that
a total view is obtained.
The Support of Science
Not enough is known of the resilience of the Arctic
environment to the pollution and exploitation of its
living and nonliving resources. United States and
Canadian experiments have never been substantial
enough to provide answers. Yet commercial
enterprises proliferate. The United States Senate
attempted recently to correct this situation with its
consideration of Senate Bill 1562, the Arctic Research
and Policy Act. The bill, which would promote and
coordinate Arctic research, also has been introduced
in the House of Representatives, but its fate is
uncertain.
There has been a profound change in the
nature and scale of scientific efforts in the Arctic. The
economic potential of Arctic resources has attracted
very large and far-reaching efforts by industrial
laboratories efforts that eclipse the much more
modest federal efforts. The Administration's
reluctance to continue, much less expand upon, past
efforts, which until 1976centered on the Naval Arctic
Research Laboratory (Point Barrow) and other
defense-related undertakings, is partly the result of
other spending priori ties and partly the consequence
of an ideological belief that government's role
should be reduced.
Sooner or later the force of circumstances wi II
propel the government into sustaining and probably
enlarging its scientific role, largely because there are
questions about the impact of resource development
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on other uses, such as fishing, and the public has a
stake in seeing that the best means are available to
cope with environmental damage. Such matters can
never be left to private interests alone, however
extensive the latter's research may be in these and
other matters. But the Senate Government Affairs
Committee hearings on S. 1562 make it clear that an
enlarged federal scientific role is not likely in the near
future.
Economic Development
Last but tar from least of the federal government's
concerns in the Arctic is the promotion and support
of industrial enterprises there, under appropriate
safeguards. Washington could perform a catalytic
role, linking the many United States interests into a
comprehensive unit for Arctic undertakings. It is an
inescapable responsibility, given the federal
ownership of the land and the federal jurisdiction
over the Outer Continental Shelf. The state of
Alaska's own reach over these matters is
comparatively limited, as is any state's.
In sum, the federal role as a supporter and
participant in Arctic development is far-reaching,
consequential, and inescapable. It needs to be
defined for the long term. We know enough of the
whole Arctic context to be certain there are no
simple, inexpensive, and readily available solutions
to the host of technical, environmental, and,
possibly, meteorological issues. In some cases, these
issues are of equal interest to government and
industry, as in ship design and operations, where
there is a long tradition of pursuing common goals.
The U.S. Interagency Arctic Policy Group
(IAPG), from which recommendations for
government objectives and roles in the Arctic should
emanate, has not yet been able to reach agreement
as to the proper scope and direction of the
government's presence in Arctic affairs. The original
mandate of the National Security Council's Decision
Memorandum (December 11, 1971) gave only the
most general guidance: to promote sound and
rational development of the Arctic, minimizing
adverse environmental effects, and to promote
international cooperation while protecting security
interests such as freedom of the seas and the air
space above them. The effort of IAPG to give
meaning to these broad strictures has been largely
unsuccessful, owing for the most part to the
reluctance of the Department of the Interior, which
has traditionally emphasized its leading role in
determining the pace and means whereby Alaskan
resources are developed. The Department of the
Interior rarely welcomes the involvement of other
government agencies in the exercise of its
responsibilities.
One thing seems certain: the Reagan
Administration would like the federal presence in
Arctic development to be minimal. It is thus all the
more crucial that such a presence be concentrated
on three vital requirements: agreement on
boundaries; the defining and melding of
environmental safeguards; and accommodation of
different regimes for the control of ships and
shipping.
Noother responsibility, forthe longterm, isof
comparable importance. Industry's economic
performance and return on capital lie beyond the
government's purview; defense, it may be assumed,
will be adequately looked after; and most scientific
work will be financed by industry, whose need to
know will transcend government's willingness to
pay. A special effort will be required of research
institutions to make certain that important scientific
inquiries which may not be of sufficient interest to
industry are nevertheless supported in an adequate
and ti mely manner. A study of the role of the Arctic as
aclimate-makerformuch of the world would beon a
list of such needs.
The Arctic is being opened up as never
before; it is an irreversible process with the potential
consequence of great good or great harm. This calls
for a National Arctic Policy; a governmental
commitment that allows the goals of both the private
and the public sector to be advanced, but with the
oversight which the public interest requires.
Melvin A. Conant, formerly a Senior Government Relations
Advisor for the Exxon Corporation, is President of Conant
and Associates, a consulting firm that deals with world
energy and resources problems in Washington, D.C. He is
also Chairman of the Senior Advisors Committee of the
Marine Policy and Ocean Management Program at the
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution.
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Ocean Science
and Military Use
of
the
Ocean
by Robert S. Winokur
and Rene E. Gonzalez, Jr.
^eapower is a cornerstone of this nation's long
maritime heritage. Today, as in the past, seapower is
a vital element of United States defense strategy,
which stresses the principles of deterrence, flexible
response, and forward deployment. Accordingly,
the U.S. maintains a navy of multi-ocean dimension,
with plans to restore maritime superiority over the
Soviet Union within the decade. The Navy of today
represents the results of past technological
innovations and efforts, and its future will depend on
continued research and development. Thus a long
and abiding commitment to ocean science reflects
the Navy's requirement for knowledge of its
operating environment.
Modern naval oceanography has its origins in
World War II, when advances in underwater
acoustics and other branches of blue water research
contributed significantly to U.S. anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) efforts. Future advances in
oceanography will be similarly important. As
Secretary of the Navy John Lehman recently stated,
"we are becoming more aware that a favorable
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outcome in future conflicts grows daily more
dependent on new knowledge from the seas."
As weapons, sensors, platforms, and tactics
beome more sophisticated, knowledge of
environmental factors becomes more important in
system design and performance, and in force
deployment. Requirements for new knowledge are
thus greater than ever before, and will continue to
increase as naval
operations span the world ocean
from complex shallow regions to the deep basins. In
the 1980s, the Navy's research and development
program faces opportunities as well as challenges.
Military Use of the Ocean
The Navy's mission is to conduct combat operations
at sea in support of national interests. This mission
includes two basic functions: projection of power
and sea control. Power projection means being able
to bring strong forces to bear in remote regions of
the world, and keeping them on station as long as
necessary. Controlling the sea means being able to
counter all kinds of offensive threats, whether from
the air, surface, or subsurface.
By performing these functions, the Navy
makes critical contributions to each of the three
major elements of U.S. defense strategy: sea control
makes possible a forward deployment posture;
strategic nuclear forces in the form of fleet ballistic
missile submarines contribute to deterrence; and
the capability of showing force without actually using
A U.S. task group (A), consisting of the carriers Kitty Hawk, Midway, and Nimitz,sfeams through the Arabian Sea. (B) The Navy's
Tomahawk cruise missile, launched from a submarine. (C) The USS Ohio, the first of the Navy's new Trident submarines. Larger
than any U.S. submarine before it, the vessel carries 24 Trident missiles, each with multiple warheads and a range of4,000 nautical
miles. (Photo courtesy of General Dynamics Corporation). (D) A cruise missile launched vertically from a surface ship. Turning
once clear of the launcher, such missiles are aimed electronically. (Photos A, B, and D courtesy of U.S. Navy)
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it, for which seapower is inherently well suited, is
essential to the strategy of flexible response.
Superimposed on these basic functions are a variety
of naval tasks. Included among these are ASW, mine
warfare, amphibious warfare, special warfare,
electronics warfare, and support activities such as
search, rescue and salvage, construction, and
oceanographic research. The great scope and
challenge of this mission, then, has shaped the
Navy's force structure, a diverse array of
sophisticated systems and more than 500 ships. The
plan is to expand the fleet to more than 600 ships by
the early 1990s a "600-ship" Navy.
Since World War 1 1
,
the United States has
chosen a high-technology approach to military
systems. Today's weapons perform at faster speeds
and over greater distances than ever before. The
modern naval arsenal includes new "smart"
weapons quiet and fast submarines, antiship
missiles, over-the-horizon sensors and targeting
systems, semi-autonomous weapons, and improved
undersea weapons and surveillance sensors.
The development of new capabilities, and
even survival at sea, often depend upon knowledge
of and sensitivity to environmental parameters in the
ocean and lower atmosphere. Provision of this
knowledge and a superior technology base is the
focus of the Navy's ocean science program. And, as
Secretary Lehman has pointed out, "there is little
separation between that which is militarily useful and
that which serves fundamental human enterprise."
Some examples of warfare mission areas will
illustrate the applicability of ocean science to the
problems of modern naval warfare.
For the last 30 years, the Navy has aggressively
developed its ASW capabilities. Since sound is the
only practical means of detecting targets or
communicating underwater at long ranges, acoustics
has long been the backbone of ASW. Surface ships,
submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and advanced
weapons all employ acoustic systems in their ASW
roles. Strengthening tactical and surveillance ASW
capabilities is a continuing goal for the years ahead.
Mobile surveillance systems will augment fixed
systems, providing flexibility of response to changes
in Soviet submarine deployment patterns and
extending coverage to remote areas. Future
capabilities will also be enhanced by new tactical
towed acoustic arrays, and sensor and weapons
control systems.
The Soviet Union has recently begun to
develop capabilities in open-ocean ASW and is
investing heavily in advanced systems. This
represents a major challenge to U.S. undersea
system planners. The vital role of the all-nuclear
submarine force in the Navy mission demands that
we not overlook any possible means of detection and
protection in the future.
The development of ballistic missiles created a
new role for submarines in strategic deterrence. The
Poseidon ballistic missile submarines will see service
into the 1990s and the Trident submarines, starting
with the recently launched USS Ohio and USS
Michigan, will provide a sea-based deterrent well
into the 21st century.
Cruise missiles also have important
application in naval warfare, greatly increasing the
striking power of submarines and surface ships. The
deployment of such missiles has heightened the
demands for environmental data to enhance
submarine force protection, navigation, and missile
guidance.
The surface component of the modern Navy
also produces demands for better understanding of
the environment. For example, problems of safe
navigation, weapon and sensoroperation, detection,
deception, communication, and weapon
countermeasures, to name a few, are often
compounded by our limited knowledge and ability to
predict the weather and ocean conditions. Surface
ships serve as operating platforms for a complex
array of new missiles, guns, radars, and torpedoes,
each with its own environmental design constraints.
Amphibious operations face many problems
common to standard surface forces, but with the
added complexities of shoreline topography,
inshore wave and current actions, tides, and coastal
weather effects. Weapons and radars usually used in
open waters may be hindered by the noisy thermal
and electromagnetic background of the coast,
especially a defended coast. The environmental
conditions encountered by the British forces in the
Falkland Islands provide a vivid illustration.
Mine warfare has proved highly effective in
20th century wars from World War II to Vietnam, and
could be important in the future. A modern mine
incorporates a high level of technical sophistication,
no longer fitting the stereotype of a moored giant
sphere waiting for a ship to run into it. Mines can
respond to the sound and magnetic signatures of
A Navy F-14 "Tomcat" fighter
flies over open water with
wings swept back. Such
technically advanced aircraft
typify the modem systems
and weapons of the U.S.
Navy. (U.S. Navy photo)
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passing targets, detonating when something passes
nearby, or they may release acoustic homing
torpedoes toward submerged targets. The
sensitivity, accuracy, reliability, and safety of such
mines depend, as does submarine warfare, upon a
variety of acoustic, oceanographic, and geological
factors. As a consequence, the Navy wants to learn
more about the environments in which mines may be
deployed, especially shallow waters, straits, and
coastal regions. Mine countermeasu res are likewise
dependent on knowledge of environmental factors.
Military use of the ocean is not limited to
warfare and deterrence functions. The Navy also
performs important auxiliary tasks, such as general
fleet support; search, rescue, and salvage;
construction; and even arms control monitoring.
In the case of search, rescue, and salvage, the
Navy must maintain a capability, even if it is needed
infrequently. The search for a nuclear bomb lost off
Palomares, Spain, and the tragic loss of the
submarines Thresher and Scorpion showed the
necessity for state-of-the-art manned and unmanned
submersibles and deep-sea search capability, and
illustrated the difficulty of such operations in the
complex and relatively unknown environment of the
deep sea. Several sophisticated systems have been
developed or are under development for search and
salvage. These include new vessel types, such as
SWATH (small waterplane area twin hull) ships and
catamaran hulls, complex manipulator systems for
submersibles and towed vehicles, and deep-towed
camera and sonar systems.
Environmental factors also play an important
role in design, construction, and maintenance. The
effects of near-shore sediment dynamics and marine
fouling are but two examples of costly problems that
must be dealt with regularly.
Daily support to the operating Navy, in the
form of weather data and predictions, is critical to
fleet operations and wartime readiness. Advances in
computer technology, modeling, and remote
sensing (by satellite) present exciting opportunities
to enhance existing support capabilities in the 1980s.
Geographic Interests
As mentioned earlier, the United States employs a
forward strategy in which the ocean serves as a
barrier for defense and a means for projecting
power. Naval forces therefore are deployed
worldwide, protecting sea lanes and serving critical
U.S. interests in many distant areas.
To support military operations on a global
scale, ocean science activities must take into account
the Navy's interests in distant strategic areas where
the environment is poorly known, or in special
regions which are environmentally complex or
unique. Such regions include the Arctic, shallow
waters, sea straits, and the southern ocean.
The Arctic is strategic, separating the Eurasian
land mass from North America. ASW is critical in
controlling the Pacific and Atlantic approaches to the
Arctic. This underscores the importance of Navy
Arctic research efforts to better understand the
physical processes of this complex region, especially
those affecting acoustic systems, and to improve
Springtime in the Bering Sea. At left is a field of ice chunks,
each up to 4 meters wide, in the process of melting. The
streaks extending to the right are concentrations of ice
which may be formed by currents converging along sharp
lines. Ice edge dynamics, now poorly understood, will be a
subject of Navy research in the 1980s. (Photo by S. Martin)
naval operations in ice-covered waters. Research in
the 1980s will emphasize the eastern Arctic and the
complex transitional area referred to as the marginal
ice zone, extending from the perennial ice pack to
the open ocean.
Present U.S. policy toward the Arctic was
established in the early 1970s by National Security
Decision Memorandum 144, which provided a broad
framework for international cooperation, scientific
research, protection of national security interests,
resource development and environmental
protection, and interagency coordination. Recently,
however, it has been argued that national Arctic
research policy needs strengthening. Senate Bill
1562, "The Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1981 ,"
has been introduced to provide a comprehensive
research policy dealing with national needs and
objectives in the Arctic (see page 51). The
Department of Defense has long been a major
proponent of Arctic research and will continue to
support efforts to enhance research with respect to
national security interests.
The importance of shallow water in naval
warfare was shown in World War II; a high
proportion of merchant ship sinkings occurred in
coastal waters. Besides ASW and the protection of
shipping, other interests in shallow water include
amphibious warfare, construction, and mapping and
charting. Acoustic propagation in shallow water is of
prime importance and is complicated by boundary
interactions, reverberation, and oceanographic
variability. Future research efforts will investigate
these complications, along with improving
hydrodynamic models and studying near-shore
sediment dynamics and optical properties.
Assured access to shallow-water regions is
obviously important to future research efforts.
Primarily because of the provisions on deep-sea
minerals, the U.S. recently voted against the current
d raft of the Law of the Sea Treaty. The Treaty contains
articles that affect freedom of marine scientific
research, potentially reducing our access to about a
third of the world oceans. Several coastal nations
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Merchant ships sunk by German U-boats off the Atlantic
coast of North America from January to July, 1942. (Courtesy
of Marvin Lasky The Journal of the Acoustical Society of
America.)
already have adopted consent requirements tor
research within 200 miles of their coastlines.
Navy ocean science works within the
framework of national policy, reflecting international
political constraints as well as opportunities. Impacts
on research in shallow-water areas are ameliorated to
some extent by the fact that the United States shares
common security interests in these areas with a
number of allies. Thus international cooperation will
be an important element of studies in these regions
(seepage 13).
Sea straits are vital as choke points. For
example, in wartime a large percentage of NATO's
supplies from the United States would pass through
the Florida Straits. Experiments in sea straits have
been conducted sporadically, and only limited
progress has been made in understanding the
physical processes in these regions. New numerical
hydrodynamic models, improved instrumentation,
and remote sensing techniques will combine to
permit significant advances in our understanding of
sea straits during the next few years.
Because of their remoteness, the Indian
Ocean and South Atlantic are generally
undersampled, and thus not well understood,
despite their importance as sea lanes.
Multidisciplinary investigations in physical
oceanography and marine geophysics are planned to
improve our knowledge of these oceans.
The Future of Naval Oceanographic Research
The Navy's ocean science program is continuing to
grow, and the 1980s should see important progress in
many new directions, encompassing all the
oceanographic disciplines. ASW and undersea
warfare will continue as research focal points,
particularly in the science of ocean acoustics.
While acoustic applications are central to the
Navy's tasks, acoustics also provides a means for
studying the ocean itself. Research in acoustics has
led to new advances in marine biology, wave
measurement, and the study of ocean dynamics on
all scales. One noteworthy example of this is acoustic
tomography (see Oceanus, Vol. 25, No. 2, p. 12).
Acoustic tomography involves measuring
variations in sound wave travel time between
moored sources and receivers, and then using
special mathematical methods to compute density
and sound speed variations in the intervening ocean
volume. The method is analogous to the medical CAT
(computer-assisted tomography) scan procedure.
Experimental results to date demonstrate the
potential of tomography to monitor the ocean's
mesoscale eddy field and to provide information on
the dynamics of ocean fluctuations on a scale
applicable to ASW.
One of the Navy's goals in conducting
research on the naval operating environment is to
acquire improved predictive capabilities. Thus
acoustic modeling is an important element of Navy
ocean science. Although the basic physics of sound
transmission in the ocean are understood, efforts are
still required to improve the theoretical and
empirical basis of acoustic models. To be realistic and
reliable, models must be able to deal with complex,
varying oceanographic conditions, and must be
evaluated over a range of frequencies and situations.
Naval research programs in physical
oceanography emphasize studies of the open ocean
beyond the continental slope. Major research topics
include general circulation, air-sea interaction, the
deep-sea benthic boundary layer, numerical
modeling, small-scale processes and upper ocean
mixing, satellite applications, and mesoscale
features. Programs will expand in the southern
oceans and equatorial regions to test concepts
developed in northern latitude research while
investigating unique regional characteristics. Field
observation will continue as the mainstay of physical
oceanographic studies, supported by well-integrated
theoretical, numerical, laboratory, and
instrument-development efforts.
Physical oceanography in the 1980s will see a
growth in interdisciplinary research. One
noteworthy project is the study of air-sea interaction.
The goal of this research is a better understanding of
the transfer of kinetic energy, heat, momentum, and
moisture across the air-sea interface, so as to
construct more comprehensive and realistic models
of the ocean.
The 1980s should also see major advances in
numerical modeling. Large sets of oceanographic
data obtained during the past decade are providing a
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basis for new progress. While advanced models are
not yet practical on a global scale, work is under way
on the development of regional, mesoscale, and
upper-ocean mixed-layer models. In the future,
large-scale numerical models should be able to
assimilate satellite and ship data to analyze and
predict ocean thermal structure in support of naval
operations.
Another important research thrust will be
directed toward gaining a better understanding of
upper-ocean variability. The effects of weather on
the ocean, properties of internal waves, spatial
variability of temperature and salinity in frontal
regions, and fine-structure variability are some of the
subjects to be addressed.
Navy research in marine meteorology deals
with the lower part of the troposphere over the
oceans, known as the marine planetary boundary
layer (MPBL). Scientists are interested in its
interaction with the sea surface and associated
weather phenomena. Mesoscale modeling, of high
interest not just to the Navy but to the general
scientific community, will be one of the primary
thrusts of this research. Though superficially similar
to synoptic modeling, mesoscale modeling
represents a neworderottechnical difficulty, butthe
payoff will be the ability to accurately predict intense
local weather events.
Oceanic biology covers many topics of
interest to the Navy, including bioacoustics,
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biodeterioration, bioluminescence, zoogeography,
physiology, behavior, and ecology. New acoustic
and optical techniques for biological measurements
will alleviate some of the inherent limitations of nets
for sampling and the tedious work required to
analyze the samples. Advanced measurement
techniques, coupled with microprocessor
technology, will make it possible to study many
oceanic organisms in situ. Experiments will
complement process-oriented physical
oceanographic studies, thereby enabling a more
comprehensive understanding of biological
dynamics.
Advances in recombinant DMA technology,
genetic engineering, and biochemical research
promise new progress in the control of
microorganisms that cause marine fouling. Efforts
will be directed at understanding the genetic basis
and biochemical pathways of "biofouling" and
corrosion in the sea, and the possible use of
biotechnology to control these costly problems.
Another new research effort involves studies
of marine bioluminescence and the optical
properties of the ocean. Using recently developed
models of ecological succession, researchers will
study the biological influences on light scattering,
absorption, and luminescence.
In marine geology and geophysics, the
development of plate tectonic theory during the
1960s and 70s and the data that has been
accumulating during the last 30 years have
established a basis for major new advances in the
1980s. Improved measurement technology will allow
Robert D. Ballard, Associate Scientist at the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution, with an early prototype of Jason,
a remote cable vehicle equipped with a television camera for
an
"eye.
"
Deployed from Argo, a (owed vehicle with an array
of sonar and camera systems, Jason will one day eliminate
the need for a human presence on the deep seafloor (see
Oceanus, Vol. 25, No. 7, p. 30). (Photo by Ira Wyman)
scientists to study features at both larger and smaller
scales of resolution than in the past, and to put them
into the context of global processes. Such studies are
important forASW, bottom engineering, navigation,
and charting.
The/4rgo//ason system, underdevelopmentat
the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, will
provide a new capability for search and inspection in
the mid-1980s, filling a range and resolution gap
between current deep-ocean sonar and imaging
systems (see Oceanus, Vol.25, No. 1, p. 30). The
installation of high-resolution multibeam
echosounder systems, such as SEABEAM, in selected
research vessels will provide high-quality
bathymetric data for improving our understanding of
the seafloor and for interfacing with Argo/Jason. The
Deep Towed Array Geophysical System (DTAGS),
under development at the Naval Ocean Research and
Development Activity (NORDA) in Bay St. Louis,
Mississippi, is a high-resolution geophysical system
towed near the ocean bottom. It incorporates a high
bandwidth, low-frequency sound source, a towed
hydrophone array, and a high-data-rate
communication system. DTAGS will help advance
understanding of the geophysical and geoacoustic
properties of the seafloor.
Multichannel reflection profiling,
ocean-bottom hydrophones and seismographs, and
ocean-bottom seismic sources will be applied to
high-resolution, three-dimensional studies of the
crust and upper mantle. New down-hole recording
tools, such as the seismic data logger and borehole
television, will aid in extend ing our knowledge to the
deep crust.
Satellite technology will benefit marine
geology and geophysics in two ways. First, navigation
with NAVSTAR will allow continuous fixes
throughout the world and permit bottom sites to be
relocated with confidence. Second, satellite
observations of global gravity and geoid fields,
combined with improved knowledge of crustal
structure, will permit bathymetry to be inferred from
satellite data.
The technology of satellite remote sensing is
likely to improve (see Oceanus, Vol. 24, No. 3). As in
the past, it wi II be used to study ocean fronts, surface
winds, internal waves, topographic and current
variability, ice processes, and surface temperature
distribution. Recently we have gained insights into
the potential of synthetic aperture radar to observe
surface waves, internal waves, current speed, and
density structure. Other advances include the
application of visible and infrared passive imaging to
study oceanic processes and variability, and the use
of microwave sensors to measure winds.
Microwave precision altimeters, in
combination with satellite imagery and other data
sources, will permit improved numerical models of
the oceanic and marine boundary layers. Further
development of such capabilities may lead to global,
all-weather synoptic monitoring of oceanic
processes. When combined with other techniques,
such as acoustic tomography, the future for
application of remote sensing is especially
promising, both as a data source for supporting the
fleet and as a research tool.
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With a hydrophone array up
to 1,000 meters long and the
capability to operate within
TOO meters of the bottom at a
depth of 6,000 meters, the
Navy's Deep Towed Array
Geophysical System
(DTAGS) will provide
detailed insights into the
geoacoustic properties and
sedimentary structure of the
ocean floor. (Courtesy of
NORDA)
Concerns for the Future
The Navy's ocean science program in the 1980s will
continue to build on past progress while also
growing in some new directions, reflecting new
needs. Although there is cause for optimism, there
are many challenges. To be healthy and robust, the
program must have adequate funding and facilities,
make efficient use of costly resources, and be
responsive to mission requirements, all the while
remaining flexible enough to respond to unexpected
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discoveries. Taken together, these requirements
comprise a difficult order.
As naval systems become more complex, the
incorporation of scientific advances into systems
development and operation requires close
interaction between naval oceanographers, systems
developers, and fleet commanders. The fleet users
must have the best possible characterization of the
environment in their operations plans, while the
designers must have a clear and early articulation of
the oceanographic considerations to be factored into
systems design and development. Promoting the
necessary dialogue is one of the continuing
challenges.
The high cost of maintaining an
oceanographic research fleet is a major concern. The
Navy requires research vessels capable of operating
anywhere in the world, with a proper balance
between large and small ships and between general
purpose and specially configured vessels. The
viability of this fleet is crucial, as an ocean science
program cannot succeed without ships. Yet, during
the last 10 years, the Navy had to reduce its research
fleet by five ships. This reduction paralleled the
general decline in the size of the national
oceanographic fleet caused by increased costs,
obsolescence, and constrained budgets. Pressures
to economize and optimize ship use will continue
during the 1980s, and fundamental changes in the
composition of the national fleet are likely during the
next few years. Navy assets are national assets, and
the Navy, other federal agencies, and national
organizations are jointly trying to address this
concern.
Advances in data collection capability tend to
be expensive and can create complex problems in
data handling, storage, retrieval, and utilization. For
example, the advent of satellite remote sensing,
while promising to provide new opportunities to
study the ocean, also presents the challenges of
effectively handling the voluminous data flows and of
correctly defining measurement requirements, to
avoid unnecessary costs. In addition, major at-sea
multiplatform experiments are costly. We may have
reached the point where large-scale experiments like
those done in the past are no longer affordable.
Moreover, there is concern that in some instances
we have not effectively utilized data that already
exists. The increasingly high cost of obtaining new
data demands good management of limited assets
and existing data.
Central to all these issues is the basic problem
of fiscal climate. Research budgets during the last 10
to 15 years have been severely constrained. Growth
of a 600-ship Navy and development of new, costly
systems, while generating increased needs for
oceanographic research, is expensive and makes
budgetary increases for research difficult.
These cautionary words notwithstanding,
ocean science will continue to play an important part
in this country's military use of the ocean. The Navy is
committed to conducting a vigorous program to
support its mission and to meet the scientific
challenges of the 1980s, thereby contributing to an
important national enterprise.
Robert S. Winokur is Assistant Technical Director for Ocean
Science under the Chief of Naval Research in Washington,
D.C. Commander Rene Gonzalez, USN, is Special Assistant
for Ocean Science under the Chief of Naval Research.
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Roger Revelle
i
Senior Senator of Science
Irom any angle, Roger Revelle is
an eminence. If you survey him,
from his great shoes to his sharply
stooped shoulders, you can see
that once he was a very big man.
And indeed he was. On occasion
in his early days, he obligingly
by William H. MacLeish
planted himself in the cold surf of
California so his colleagues could
use him as a two-meter wave staff.
And if you review his career no,
his suite of careers you can see
that at 73 Revelle is now a senior
senatorof science, giving counsel
and guiding projects in that
ill-defined but increasingly
important borderland between
research and public policy.
Oceanographers tend to
think of Revelle as the man who
was Directorot Scripps Institution
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of Oceanography during the
1950s and early 1960s, a time when
marine science was experiencing
one of its most impressive growth
spurts. Some practitioners
remember that when Time
magazine decided to do a feature
piece on oceanography in 1958,
two men were selected as
possibilities for the cover portrait.
One was Revelle, the other
Columbus Iselin, Director of the
younger and smaller but
independent Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution
(Scripps is part of the University of
California system). The choice
could have gone either way. It
went to Iselin, the remarkable
sailor-scientist who died in 1971 at
the age of 67.
But the sea is only part of
this story. Revelle has helped to
found a new university. He has
advised developing nations, on
problems ranging from
agriculture to education to energy
to population. He has helped
establish the international
machinery of oceanography. And
he is an expert on one of the most
powerful long-term effects of
global industrialization the
rising levels of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere caused by the
burning of fossil fuels.
Revelle was in Halifax,
Nova Scotia, this past summer for
the Joint Oceanographic
Assembly when we caught up
with each other. He was walled in
by planning meetings and strategy
sessions, but was free for a
Sunday breakfast. We met in the
coffee shop of one of the larger
hotels in Halifax. Revelle ordered
a large breakfast and sat down to
regard me with eyes that,
somehow, looked hooded and
candid at the same time. He
allowed as how he really isn't
much in touch with the frontiers
of oceanography these days.
"I went to a physical
oceanography meeting in Tokyo
and could only understand about
10 per cent of what was said. The
young people have gotten so far
ahead of my generation in
mathematics, in understanding
hydrodynamics." The same, he
said, was true of the group of
modellers and mathematicians
then gathered in Halifax to study
Oceanographic aspects of climatic
change. I asked if he didn't
happen to chair that group of
geniuses. Yes, he said, for the past
three years. "They need an old
man like me to get 'em started."
Revelle himself got started
in marine science by what he calls
a series of lucky accidents. He was
in Berkeley, a graduate student in
geology, when the then director
of Scripps dropped by shopping
for someone to work on some
deep-sea muds awaiting analysis
back in La Jolla. "I applied for the
job," said Revelle, "because I was
about to get married to a girl who
was born in La Jolla. I thought it
would be nice to spend the first
year of our married life in the
place we'd gone to in the
summers." Revelle did not
mention that his bride's
grandfather was James E. Scripps,
founder of the newspaper
dynasty.
"Like many big men he
tended to be clumsy.
You could tell pretty
well where he was on
the ship by the thumping
noise on the overhead/'
The Revelles settled in
during the summer of 1931. Two
weeks after he arrived, he got his
first taste of life aboard a research
vessel, a small converted purse
seiner. They putted out to the San
Diego Trough, where the larval
oceanographer occupied his first
station, catching water, sampling
plankton, taking temperatures -
and cooking.
"Scripps always feeds
well," Revelle told me. "I cooked
what I thought was a first-rate
lunch of steak and boiled
potatoes and sliced tomatoes.
Everyone came down to the galley
and wolfed the meal down in
complete silence, as sailors do.
Then they stood up, told me it was
making them seasick down there.
They went topside, saying I could
wash the dishes." He did, and by
the time the boat tied up that
evening, back in San Diego,
Revelle had decided something:
"They were never going to get rid
of me at the Scripps Institution; I
had just had the best time of my
life."
Revelle revelled. "I worked
on the solubility of calcium
carbonate in seawater, and the
way carbon dioxide and boric acid
buffer the seawater, maintaining
the pH. I got involved in a little bit
of physical oceanography and
chemical oceanography. And I
never really looked at those
goddamn muds."
He did eventually. He
wrote his dissertation on them
and in 1936 gothis Ph.D. "It wasn't
avery good dissertation,"he said.
"But since I was determined not
to leave, they decided they might
as well put me on the faculty. I
became an instructor instead of a
research assistant. They raised my
salary by 50 percent, from a
hundred to a hundred and fifty
dollars a month."
Revelle was spending
perhaps a quarter of his time at
sea. "Like many big men," a
colleague recalls, "he tended to
be clumsy. You could tell pretty
well where he was on the ship by
the thumping noise on the
overhead." The old purse seiner
had blown up, killing one crew
member and maiming the other.
The replacement, the E . W.
Scripps, was a topmast schooner
that had belonged to a movie
actor. Refitted for oceanography,
she plied the coastal waters from
Baja California to southern
Oregon. The Scripps Institution
stayed within 200 miles of the
North American coast until after
World War II. Its first real venture
into blue water came in 1950,
when Revelle organized an
expedition to the mid-Pacific. He
became acting director of Scripps
that year and the genuine article
the next.
Administrative demands
curbed Revelle's research a good
deal. He worked with others on
heat flow through the seafloor, on
the interrelationships of sea level
and the spin of the earth, and on
carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere. Drawing on his
earlier work on the carbon
mechanism, Revelle came to
realize that "most of the CO 2
released by fossil fuels would stay
in the air and not get into the
water. Up until that time,
everybody thought almost all of it
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would go into the ocean. We were
able to show that only about halt
would go in, perhaps even less.
That was quite an important
paper."
"Roger is not always the
most tactful man. When
you have strong beliefs,
you annoy more and
more people over the
years. They forget their
agreements with you
and remember the
disagreements, and
before long you've lost
your brownie points/'
According to some who
have worked with him, Revelle
the scientist has the habit, at once
admirable and frustrating, of not
letting go of a piece of work until
he has squeezed it dry. "He's a
perfectionist," says one. "But put
in another sense, that also means
he procrastinates. To do anything
with him takes a helluva long
time. I don't know if the result is
any better in the end, because if
you delay for too long a time you
lose the thread of thought."
Walter Munk of Scripps,
himself an oceanographic
eminence, admits to "total
prejudice" in his admiration for
Revelle, whom he first met in
1939. Munk worked with Revelle
on various aspects of nuclear
bomb testing in the Pacific, on
carbon dioxide problems, and on
the sea level-spin rate problem.
"He collects huge amounts of
materials and reads them all,
making long and complicated
notes. He doesn't follow through,
I think, by deductive logic. He's
more like Conan Doyle. He
assimilates a large body of
evidence and then eliminates the
unlikely."
Revelle's deliberativeness
often seemed to affect the pace of
his decision-making as director of
Scripps, according to critics. But
in another field, it brought him
remarkable success. In the
mid-1950s, when Clark Kerr, then
president of the University of
California, wanted to start a new
campus near San Diego, he
turned to Revelle for help. "I
didn't exactly abandon Scripps,"
Revelle said, "but my principal
activity was starting the new
university."
Revelle went
head-hunting. "The whole magic
of his recruiting was very simple,"
says Munk. "He asked himself:
what can we do to help this
person perform better than he
does in his present position?
Roger listens well. He comes to
know what people want to do,
often better than they do
themselves. That is how he was
able to get some very remarkable
individuals to pull up stakes and
risk this educational adventure in
a small California town."
One problem was the site
of the adventure. Revelle wanted
it right next to Scripps, "so as to
start off with a bang and not like
some struggling liberal arts
college." The opposition was
powerful. There was talk that
Revelle's site was too close to San
Diego flight paths and would
require expensive soundproofing
of buildings. But Revelle got ahold
of a letter from a planning expert
stating that a hospital scheduled
to go up on a site even closer to
the airport flight patterns should
have no problem with noise. Two
things happened. Revelle got his
site for the University of California
at San Diego. In so doing, he lost
the job most thought he should
get: the chancellorship of the
new campus.
"Roger is not always the
most tactful man," says Munk.
"When you have strong beliefs,
you annoy more and more people
over the years. They forget their
agreements with you and
remember the disagreements,
and before long you've lost your
brownie points." The
chancellorship went to Herbert
York, now a colleague and close
friend of Revelle. The Regents
named the first college of the
new university after Revelle.
To give York a free hand at
La Jolla, and to give himself a
change of pace, Revelle went to
Washington, D.C., ostensibly as
science advisortojohn Kennedy's
Secretary of the Interior, Stewart
Udall. He ended up working more
closely with Kennedy's own
science advisor, Jerome Wiesner.
Before he knew it, Revelle was
working on problems of
waterlogging and salinity in the
Indus plain of West Pakistan. "I
think the way it happened," he
told me, "is that jerry said 'Aha!
We've got Roger. He's an
oceanographer. He knows
something about salt. Let's put
him in charge of this.'
'
Revelle and his
multidisciplinary team soon
discovered that the waterlogging
problem could be addressed with
modern agricultural techniques.
The real problem was population
growth pressing down on
primitive technology. The
interactions of food, education,
and population trends fascinated
Revelle. It led to his accepting, in
1964, the suggestion of several
members of his Pakistan team that
he come to Harvard to run a
university-wide center for
population studies. He stayed for
14 years.
"I never was a
demographer or a family planning
expert," he said. "I didn't think
family planning was a university
subject. What I was concerned
about was resources, the kind of
thing we'd done in Pakistan. We
organized quite a group of people
in a systematic approach to land,
water, and energy. My idea was to
concentrate on the population
you're going to have rather than
on methods of reducing
population. When you provide
education and give people
mobility and hope, they'll have
fewer children."
"I am thinking about the
possibility of an ice-free
Arctic Ocean and its
effect on hydrology, on
agriculture/'
Our breakfast was
finished. Revelle led the way to his
hotel room, where resource maps
lay like throw rugs on the floor.
He exchanged his cigarettes for a
pipe that wouldn't stay lit. He
described his current work as
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professor of science and public
policy at the University of
California, San Diego the place
he founded. He teaches three
courses there. He also works on
energy and resources, particularly
those in developing countries,
and on the carbon dioxide
problem. "I've stayed with
oceanography mostly on a
friendly or bureaucratic basis," he
told me, and then outlined a
series of huge oceanographic
experiments planned for later in
the decade. One will rely on
remote sensing from satellites
and acoustic measurement of
seawater properties.
"I'm a member of the
carbon dioxide assessment
committee of the National
Academy of Sciences," Revelle
said, fiddling with his pipe. "My
particular responsibility is all the
odds and ends, especially
concerning the polar ice caps. I
am thinking about the possibility
of an ice-free Arctic Ocean and its
effects on hydrology, on
agriculture. A report on that and
related work is due in a year or so.
Meantime, the theory that a
doubling of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere would cause a two-
or three-degree temperature rise
globally is bearing up well under
tough examination."
"It's going to happen if we
keep on burning fossil fuel. It's a
game in which some countries
will win and others will lose.
Probably the Soviet Union will be
among the winners. They'll have a
longer growing season, and a lot
of tneir northern lands will be
cultivatable. Canada also. The
U.S. is liable to lose, because
we're in latitudes where
precipitation is likely to decrease
-
particularly in the corn belt.
Sea-level rise is also a possibility
with the warming. The question is
how fast it will occur. If it happens
over two hundred years, it would
inundate a lot of places faster than
people could easily adjust:
practically all of the Netherlands,
most of Bangladesh, most of
Florida, a lot of big cities."
It was getting on to
mid-morning. I stepped over the
maps on my way to the door, and I
couldn't hold back a remark about
how much my host had done with
his life. "Well," said Revelle, again
with that gentle self-deprecation
that can come with his kind of
accomplishment, "I've lived a
longtime."
William H. MacLeish is a former Editor
of Oceanus. He is now writing a book
about Georges Bank and serving the
magazine as Consultant.
Announcement:
Advertising/Information Section
With the next issue, we begin a full-scale adventure in paid advertising
(actually, we accepted a few ads for this issue from advertisers who had
specific deadlines to consider). We are accepting advertising for two basic
reasons. First, the revenue will help us meet some of our rising costs.
Second, we see advertising in Oceanus as an extension of our editorial
matter in that the ads will give you additional information about the
business side of Oceanography. If you are interested in books about the
seas, or the marine programs of universities and institutions, or the latest
instruments for laboratories or ocean research vessels, then you will find
advertising messages about them to be a service. For these reasons, we
welcome such advertising to our pages. We hope you will, too. Should you
be interested in advertising, contact Lexes Coates, Oceanus magazine,
WHOI, Woods Hole, MA 02543 or call (61 7) 548-1 400, ext. 2393.
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The Cessation
of Commercial Whaling
VICTOR
Fi&T ONE TO
WHALES
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Supporters ofban on commercial whaling celebrate outside Metropole Hotel in Brighton, England, after International Whaling
Commission vote on July 23, 1982. (Photo by Pierre Cleizes Greenpeace)
I he problem of the
over-exploitation of whales is one
example of the complexities
associated with the international
nature of a marine resource. The
problem combines a wide range
of scientific, technological,
political, economic, legal,
diplomatic, and marine policy
concerns that will fall under the
new Law of the Sea Convention
when and if it is ratified (see page
7). This article addresses the
recent decision of the
International Whaling
Commission (IWC) fora cessation
of commercial whaling, and,
although not exhaustive, it
attempts to give an idea of the
difficulties in making a majority
vote represent, in practice, an
effective protection for one of the
most remarkable groups of
animals on earth.
A Little History
During the 1972 United Nations
Conference on the Human
Environment held in Stockholm,
Sweden, 53 countries adopted a
United States proposal calling for
a 10-year moratorium on all
commercial whaling. This
expression of international
concern over a dramatic decline
in whale populations was
described in the Japanese media
as a U.S. maneuver to distract
world attention from the
problems of the Vietnam war. The
next year, the United States
formally proposed a moratorium
on the International Whaling
Commission agenda, and, in 1974,
Australia called for an indefinite
moratorium for all whale
populations that had fallen below
the level of maximum sustainable
yield.
By 1975, the IWC
established a New Management
Procedure (NMP) which allowed
catch quotas by species and
stocks based on the best available
scientific evidence. The NMP
resulted in a rapid decline of
quotas and the protection of
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highly depleted stocks. In fact, the
whale catch in 1982 was about
14,000, compared to more than
45,000 whales in 1974.
In 1979, the IWC approved
a ban on pelagic whaling by
factory ships, except for minke
whales. Also in 1979, a meeting of
the Convention on the
International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES), held
in Costa Rica, adopted a proposal
for the inclusion of the entire
cetacean order in Appendix II
(threatened species) of the
Convention. By then, there was
growing international awareness
that whales were not the property
of the nations that killed them,
but that they represented, in the
thinking of Arvid Pardo, the
common heritage of mankind. In
the meantime, the IWC
membership grew, with the
addition of such whaling nations
as Spain, South Korea, Peru, and
Chile, plus Switzerland (which
supported the moratorium), and
other non-whaling nations.
This international
awareness developed parallel to
the Law of the Sea negotiations in
which all countries were giving
serious consideration to their
rights to marine resources. By
July, 1982, more than two-thirds of
the world's population was
represented in the IWC; new
members included China, India,
Monaco, Egypt, St. Lucia, Kenya,
the Philippines, Senegal, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines,
Costa Rica, West Germany,
Uruguay, Dominica, Belize, and
Antigua and Barbuda. This new
membership shifted the
traditional balance of power in the
Commission.
The IWCs Scientific
Committee makes recommen-
dations, reflecting both whaling
and non-whaling points of view,
to the Technical Committee,
where recommendations are
adopted by a simple majority.
These recommendations are put
forward to a Plenary Session that
requires a three-fourths majority
for the adoption of a resolution.
In 1980, there were 25 member
countries. The nine remaining
whaling nations Brazil, Chile,
South Korea, Iceland, Japan,
Spain, Norway, Peru, and the
Soviet Union could block the
conservation-minded nations
Japanese workers crating whale meat for sale in Japan. (Photo by Rebecca Clark,
Greenpeace)
because the majority rule
required at least 27 votes to pass a
ban on commercial whaling.
In February, 1981, an
extremely important event took
place. West Germany, in a
meeting held in India, proposed
the inclusion of the sperm, sei,
and fin whales in Appendix I
(endangered species) of the CITES
Convention. All member nations
supported the proposal with the
exception of Japan. Listing in
Appendix I prohibits all trade in an
endangered species. The vote
included Brazil, Peru, Chile, and
other nations, which, in view of
the highly depleted status of all
sperm, sei, and fin-whale stocks,
supported their inclusion in
Appendix I.
At the July, 1981, meeting
of the IWC, a proposal was put
forth for a quota for sperm
whales, with a provisional quota
for the northwest Pacific stock
(the Japanese fishing grounds),
pending the result of a special
meeting called by Japan for
March, 1982, to examine the
status of that stock. The quota
was approved by a vote of 25 to 1
(Brazil, Chile, South Korea, Peru,
and Spain supporting it; Japan
casting the only negative vote).
During the meeting, another
important proposal was adopted
by consensus: a ban, beginning
with the 1982/83 pelagic and the
1983 coastal whaling seasons, on
theuseofthenonexplosive(cold)
grenade harpoon used to kill,
with prolonged suffering, the
relatively small minke whales.
The sperm whale and cold
harpoon decisions were part of a
negotiated compromise in which
whaling nations agreed to support
the proposals and not object later
on the condition that they would
be allowed a higher quota for the
next year. In fact, an increase in
the minke whales quota (1 ,030,
Southern Hemisphere) was the
price that conservationist
countries had to pay for the
passage of the sperm whale and
cold harpoon bans.
Subsequently, Japan, Norway,
Brazil, and the Soviet Union (but
not South Korea) filed objections
to the cold harpoon ban despite
the previous agreements.
At the special IWC meeting
in March to review the scientific
information on the northwest
Pacific sperm whales, Japan
presented a population estimate
that would allow for the taking of
890 whales in the 1982/83 coastal
season. The other members of the
Scientific Committee presented a
recommendation for a quota.
There was no agreement, and the
matter was postponed until the
July, 1982, annual meeting. At that
time, the Technical Committee
finally approved the
recommendation for a quota.
During 1981 and early 1982,
three other isolated but important
events took place: 1) the
European Parliament banned, as
of January 1, 1982, the import into
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the European Economic
Community (EEC) of any whale
products; 2) the Spanish
Parliament approved a
moratorium on whaling; and 3)
the government of Chile
indicated that it would impose
sanctions on that country's only
whaling company, and that no
new permits for whaling would be
approved, because of serious
infractions made by the company.
In essence, these events meant
that the whaling block of nine
countries might be reduced to
seven, or even six. With only six
votes, the whaling nations could
be overcome by a majority of only
18 nations. In other words, for the
first time in the history of whaling
and the IWC, a moratorium was
not only possible but probable.
International Pressures
The uncertainty surrounding the
outcome of the July, 1982,
meeting in Brighton, England, had
interesting consequences. The
most concerned country, of
course, was Japan, the main buyer
of whale products. Japan's Prime
Minister at that time, Zenko
Suzuki, had close political and
personal ties with the whaling
industry. On March 17, 1982,
Suzuki addressed the Diet,
attacking the anti-whaling
movement and stating that "we
are promoting various public
relations activities through
diplomatic channels in the
non-whaling countries. The
government is ready to further
efforts for protecting and
fostering the whaling industry."
Such a statement was a
reminder of the extent of Japan's
"public relations." In 1978, for
example, Japan threatened to
cancel a $9.7 million sugar deal
with Panama unless that country
dropped a proposal at the IWC for
a whaling moratorium. Panama
not only dropped the proposal, it
withdrew from the IWC.
During 1981 and 1982,
Japan's diplomatic missions
pressured IWC members in a
variety of ways. An example is
Jamaica, which played a leading
conservationist role at the 1981
meeting. Japan threatened to
cancel the purchase of Jamaican
coffee; the Jamaican government
subsequently did not permit their
commissioner to attend the
special meeting on sperm whales
in March of 1982. Coincidentally,
he was invited to visit Japan on the
same dates as the sperm whale
meeting. The commissioner
declined the invitation. Jamaica
did not attend the 1982 regular
annual meeting either. If the
change in Jamaica's marine policy
is due to external pressure, it sets
an unfortunate precedent for the
country that probably will
become the headquarters for the
Law of the Sea Treaty's
International Seabed Authority.
Prior to the July, 1982, IWC
meeting, Suzuki visited Brazil
(which abstained on the
moratorium vote in 1981) and
Peru, signing several aid
agreements and publicly
requesting an "understanding" of
Japan's whaling position. In
Brazil, the Japanese tied a $400
million agricultural investment
program to Brazil's vote at the
IWC. In 1982, Brazil changed its
1981 abstention and voted against
the cessation of whaling despite
strong public support at home for
an end to whaling. Other
examples of Japanese political
and economic pressure on the
whaling issue can be found in
public accounts of events in the
Seychelles, the Philippines, Costa
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Rica, Antigua and Barbuda, St.
Lucia, and Switzerland. Suzuki's
unexpected announcement, on
October 12, 1982, that he would
step down as prime minister may
be partly related to his failure to
counter, as promised,
international opposition to
Japan's whaling interests.
The Vote
All whale populations have been
heavily exploited and almost all
are seriously depleted. Scientific
uncertainties, meanwhile, are
very great. The assumptions made
for estimating the population
dynamics of whale stocks and
their exploitation are highly
questionable on both biological
and statistical grounds. In
addition, there are critical
difficulties with models where
data has been withheld or is
inaccurate. However, the data on
pregnancy rates, recruitment,
differences in catches by sex,
growth, stock definition and
boundaries, migration, mortality,
and behavior all suggest that
commercial whaling should stop.
Furthermore, commercial
whaling is not the only factor
operating against the survival of
whales. Other threats are
decreases in the availability of
food due to fishing, pollution,
increased shipping traffic, high
noise levels in the sea, and pirate
whaling.
At the 34th annual meeting
of the IWC in July of 1982, the
countries that had submitted
proposals for a total ban on
whaling withdrew them in favor of
a proposal put forward by the
delegation from the Seychelles:
Notwithstanding the other
provisions of paragraph 10,*
catch limits for the killing for
commercial purposes of whales
from all stocks for the 1986
coastal and the 1985/86 pelagic
seasons and thereafter will be
zero. This provision will be kept
under review, based upon the
best scientific advice, and, by
1990 at the latest, the
Commission will undertake a
*Paragraph 10 refers to the management
procedures for the classification of stocks
comprehensive assessment of
this decision on whale stocks
and consider modifications of
this provision and the
establishment of other catch
limits.
The vote, on July 23, was:
In Favor, Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina, Australia, Belize, Costa
Rica, Denmark, Egypt, West
Germany, France, Kenya, the
Netherlands, India, Mexico,
Monaco, New Zealand, Oman,
Senegal, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and
the Grenadines, Spain, the
Seychelles, Sweden, the United
States, Britain, and Uruguay.
Against: Japan, Peru, Iceland, the
Soviet Union, Norway, South
Korea, and Brazil./\bsfa/n/ng:
China, Switzerland, Chile, South
Africa, and the Philippines.
Absent: Dominica and Jamaica.
The proposal, approved by
a 25 to 7 vote, has four main
advantages: 1) it is not an
indefinite moratorium, 2) it allows
the whaling industries a
phase-out period, 3) it supports
the work of the IWC and its
Scientific Committee, and 4) it
provides for a comprehensive
review of the stocks by 1990.
Will World Opinion Prevail?
The initial 90-day objection period
for the IWC expi red on November
4, 1982. Four governments filed
objections to the vote: Japan, as a
controversial (in Japan) lame-duck
action at the end of Suzuki's
government; Norway, despite
lawsuits against the government
for acting contrary to the
country's animal cruelty laws;
Peru, where the only whaling
company is a subsidiary of a
Japanese fishing conglomerate;
and the Soviet Union. The IWC
decision will be binding if these
countries withdraw their
objections.
The only significant
sanctions that can be imposed on
countries defying the ban are
based on U.S. legislation the
Pelly amendment to the
Fisherman's Protection Act of 1971
and the Packwood-Magnuson
amendment to the Fishery
Conservation and Management
Act of 1976. These amendments
allow the United States to
embargo fisheries imports from
countries conducting fisheries
operations that diminish the
effectiveness of any international
conservation program, and to cut
by 50 percent or more a nation's
fisheries allocations in the U.S.
Fishery Conservation Zone if the
country engages in trade that
diminishes the effectiveness of
the International Convention for
the Regulation of Whaling. Japan
imports the vast majority of whale
meat caught by companies in
other whaling nations. The U.S.
Senate made it absolutely clear to
whaling countries that it would
use the Pelly and Packwood-
Magnuson amendments to the
fullest extent if there were
objections to the IWC decision.
Since the 1972 Stockholm
resolution calling for an end to
commercial whaling, more than
300,000 whales have been killed.
Until the IWC decision comes into
effect, perhaps another 20,000
could be slaughtered. As Prince
Philip, Duke of Edinburgh and
President of the World Wildlife
Fund, said, we have now achieved
an important vote in the IWC, but
what really matters is not the vote
but the protection of the
remaining whales.
The end of an
anachronistic slaughter is in sight.
What is needed most now is
1) U.S. determination to sanction
countries that defy the IWC
decision, 2) a growing number of
nations in the IWC committed to
protect whales, and 3) a
commitment by all nations to
preserve for future generations all
endangered wildlife. Turtles,
seals, manatees, orchids,
elephants, caimans, parrots, and
many other species and
ecosystems are also threatened.
Therein lies one of the most
important biological challenges of
our generation.
Francisco j. Palacio, Director,
Tinker Center for Coastal Studies in
Latin America, Rosenstiel School of
Marine and Atmospheric Science,
Univeristy of Miami, Florida.
The views presented in this article are
the author's and do not necessarily
reflect those of the institutions or
other groups with which he is
associated. Dr. Palacio represented
the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) at the
1982 annual meeting of the IWC.
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Women in Oceanography
//v
Tou know how perverse
women are," one distinguished
male oceanographer wrote to
another in 1949. "If we made a
policy prohibiting them from
going out on the ships, we would
find two or three in the chain
locker every time we cleared the
whistling buoy." Not wanting to
appear closed-minded, this
gentleman-scientist urged his
colleague to "consider each
situation on its merits," but
followed with an entreaty to
"think up reasons whenever
possible to discourage women
from participating in the work at
sea," concluding: "An unwritten
policy which does not prohibit
but subtly discourages their
presence will best achieve our
rather dubious ends."
American society has
changed since then. Although
there are a few complaints from
women in oceanography today,
there is little bitterness. Women
are not altogether new to the
field. Many have made
distinguished names for
themselves the list is long, and
growing daily. Though this brief
article cannot be a comprehen-
sive history, it is worth noting that
the early rosters of the first marine
science laboratories in the United
States show a healthy number of
female biologists, and indeed the
life sciences have always been
more open to women than some
other disciplines. It is the physical
sciences the "hard sciences,"
as men like to call them that are
just now getting their first women
practitioners. In physical
oceanography, marine geology
and geophysics, and ocean
engineering departments, for
instance, it is still unusual to find a
woman, whether it be the
scientific staff of a research
institution or the faculty of a
university.*
*ln the decade ot the 1920s, women
earned 4.8 percent of the doctoral
degrees granted in the earth and
environmental sciences, according to
the National Research Council. This
figure dropped slightly in the 1930s,
rallied to 5.7 percent in the 1940s,
slumped to lows of 1 .9 percent in the
1950s and 2.0 percent in the 1960s, and
has been rising since, to 10.2 percent
in 1980. For all the physical sciences,
women earned 12.2 percent of the
doctorates granted in 1980. This
compares with 25.2 percent of
doctorates awarded in the life
sciences, 34.6 percent in the social
sciences, and 39.6 percent in the arts
and humanities.
A summer class in "Invertebrates" at the Marine Biological Laboratory in Woods Hole, Massachusetts, in the 1890s.
(Photo courtesy of MBL)
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The number of ocean-
ography doctoral degrees granted
to women has gradually increased
during the last 10 years. Figures
for 1979 show that 9.4 percent of
oceanographers were women,
about halfway between the 5.7
and 15.1 percent totals forwomen
scientists in the combined
physical sciences and the
combined life sciences,
respectively. At the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution
(WHOI), there are presently six
women (all in the chemistry and
biology departments) on the
108-member resident scientific
staff. Ten years ago (June 1, 1972)
there were two women on a staff
of 93.
Lawrence Peirson, registrar
and assistant dean at WHOI
,
has
been watching the trends. In the
Institution's postdoctoral scholar
program, there were only three
women between 1961 (the first
year of the program) and 1974, out
of a total of 63. Since 1975, the
program has averaged 23 percent
women. Of the eight postdoctoral
scholars now at WHOI, three are
women. The Ph.D. candidates in
the Institution's graduate
program, a five-year course
administered jointly with the
Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT), are 33 percent
women. And in the WHOI
summer fellowship program for
undergraduate students, the
proportion of women applicants
for the summer of 1982 reached a
new high of 51 percent.
Then there are the salary
figures. According to the U.S.
Department of Labor, the
earnings of women in 1981 in the
life and physical sciences were 71
percent of the earnings of their
male counterparts. The median
weekly salary for men is
substantially higher than for
women, reflecting the fact that
there are more men in senior
positions. This comparison is for
scientists only. Typical roles for
women in science are still
secretaries, technicians, and
assistants.
Women interested in
oceanography generally face
three main obstacles. First, there
is the problem of family
obligations. Second, there is the
longstanding tradition of male
domination in the physical
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sciences. The scientists in most
children's books are still men, and
for decades schoolgirls were told
they might as well not bother with
higher mathematics. Finally, there
is the whole mystique of men at
sea, and that one dies hard.
Judith Grassle, a biologist
at the Marine Biological
Laboratory in Woods Hole,
Massachusetts, says there really
isn't time to have both career and
family, "but some women go
ahead and do it anyway." Her
choice to have just one child was a
career-affected decision, she
adds. "The problem I see is
students who want to have a
career and a family and they want
to have a nice life as well. I think
the nice life has to go by the
boards."
One woman
oceanographer remembers
serving as the only female on a
large committee to review
applications for graduate school.
One of the finalists, a man, had
spent two years at home with his
young children while his wife
worked. In reviewing his file, the
men on the committee saw those
years as a detriment. The woman
thinks this was a factor in the
applicant's rejection, though only
20 percent of the finalists were
accepted.
"No one would have cared
if he had gone around the world
hiking," says the woman, "but he
decided, maybe for the only time
in his life, to be there to watch his
children grow up. One man said,
That is what a woman does,' and
that's when it really hit me that it's
going to take a long time for this to
become accepted; it's looked
down upon by society. The family
is still left up to the woman, so
parental leave is an accepted thing
only for a woman."
Some claim that many
women have been turned down
by graduate schools because of a
longstanding male complaint that
women graduate students are
more likely to drop out before
attaining their degree. Ironically,
they sometimes drop out to
become the wives of the
scientists, professors, or
admissions officers who voice
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such complaints. "It is tempting to
go for that dream of settling down
and starting a family," another
woman told us, "as an escape
from all the baloney you have to
put up with to get through
graduate school."
Some of the younger
women scientists we spoke with
mentioned the problem of
self-worth. Unless a woman has
an inner wellspring of self-
confidence, they say, she is
headed for a downward spiral,
personally and professionally.
The federal Affirmative Action
Program, while bringing more
women into the work force, has
given some men the impression
that unqualified women have
been hired just because of their
sex. Remarks such as "You won't
have any trouble you're a
woman," which one scientist was
told when she applied for a job
and again when she was up for a
promotion, can be demoralizing.
And there is the matter of
looks. Woman scientists report
that whether they are applyi ng for
graduate school, in line for a
promotion, or presenting their
life's work at a scientific meeting,
men evaluate them for
attractiveness as well as ability.
One woman regularly sees letters
of recommendation, from men
on behalf of female applicants for
graduate studies in ocean-
ography, that mention the
applicants' good looks. "They're
really blatant," she says. "Some of
them are so disgusting I just want
to
rip them up. They wouldn't
think of saying that for a man."
It takes extra drive to
overcome such obstacles. "Men,
at this point in history, do not take
women as seriously as they do
another man," explains Ellen
Druffel, a WHOI chemist. "You
just have to compensate for it by
being very competent. You can
maintain their respect if you work
at it saying things twice and so
on."
Thirty years ago, when a
woman in oceanography was a
real rarity, even more drive was
required, according to Betty
Bunce, one of two female
scientists emeriti at WHOI. After
running experiments on
explosives for the Navy during
World War II
,
Bunce went back to
school for a master's degree in
physics. Later, as a research
associate back in Woods Hole,
she passed a correspondence
course in geophysical
prospecting and taught herself
seismic retraction. She recently
came out of retirement to serve as
Acting Chairman of the Geology
and Geophysics Department on a
part-time basis. Today's
oceanography students have it
easier, she says, pointing out the
various fellowships and loan
programs that did not exist when
she was in school.
"My feeling is that if you
put your mind to something, you
can do it," says Bunce. "I never
thought about my name being
Betty instead of John I did
something because I wanted to
do it. I'm not a women's libber."
One of the first women to go out
on a WHOI research vessel in the
1950s, Bunce was a minority of
one on many cruises. "If you are
going to sea with 50 men, you
have to do something better than
any one of them can do it," she
advises.
PatBiesiot, aWHOI-MIT
graduate student, has noticed that
a new female student gets more
help. Because she is not expected
to know already, all the men in the
lab volunteer to teach her how to
use the instruments. New male
students, however, are on their
Betty Bunce. (Photo by Vicky
Cullen WHOI)
own. While this sort of polite
condescension can be helpful at
first, some women report that it
works against them later in their
careers. One scientist
commented that women often
lose credit for their own work.
"When you team up
collaboratively with a man, many
assume that you are working for
him instead of with him," she
says. "And his reputation might
swallow you."
Pioneers get lonely. The
fewer women there are in a field,
the less their needs and wishes
are taken into account. But as
women progress up through the
ranks, it becomes easier to follow
them. To have another woman
nearby, especially one who has
experienced the very frustrations
you need to discuss, can be a
confidence-builder. The most
frequently cited problem for
today's female oceanography
students is the lack of role
models.
Stephanie Pfirman is in her
fourth year of the WHOI-MIT
doctoral program. Specializing in
marine sedimentology, she
studies in the WHOI Geology and
Geophysics Department, where
nearly half the students are now
women. Yet she never had a
female professor in college, and
she is usually the only woman on
her scientific cruises. "Most men
don't ever think about the
role-model problem because
there are so many other men
around," she says.
Several of the women we
talked to mentioned mothers or
teachers who actively encouraged
them to pursue a career in
science. Indeed, the role-model
issue touches on what could be
the main reason there aren't more
women in oceanography already
- the lack of qualified female
applicants.
Traditionally, our
educational system, including
family, counselors, teachers, and
even textbook illustrators, has
discouraged girls from
succeeding at mathematics, the
subject on which all the physical
sciences hinge. The effect was to
screen out future female scientists
as early as junior high or even
elementary school, simply
because of the often sub-
conscious though widespread
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perception that science was too
hard for girls, and did not make
for an appropriately feminine
career goal anyway. Just
suggesting this sort of thing to a
child can have an impact, and of
course most science and math
teachers were men. Not until the
1960s was there a push for better
science and math education that
included girls as well as boys.
"I think the math block was
real," says Bunce, recalling her
college years. Women studying a
science other than biology were
frowned on, she adds. "They
were not welcomed. They were
discouraged. You just didn't
compete with the men. Most gals
didn't feature that they were
going to have to earn a living; they
were training to be wives and
mothers."
What sets oceanography
apart from other sciences is
research at sea. It is here that
women have made the most
progress, but it has been a
struggle. Up through the 1950s,
research vessels were off limits to
women, with a few exceptions.
Gradually, more women scientists
were allowed on cruises, but
there are still restrictions at many
universities and research
institutions, and women crew
members are extremely rare.
Women were given all sorts of
reasons for their exclusion.
Probably the most commonly
used were the lack of a special
sleeping area or separate toilet
facilities aboard ship. Lynda
Murphy, a biologist with the
Bigelow Laboratory for Ocean
Sciences in West Boothbay
Harbor, Maine, remembers being
told as recently as 1966 that she
could not go out on a National
Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration ship because it
was generally understood that the
whole crew would walk off the
job.
Naturally, those years had
an effect on the careers of
would-be women ocean-
ographers. Those determined
enough to stick with the field
sometimes were diverted into
clerical or editing jobs because
they couldn't go to sea to make
their own observations. A woman
intent on doing research had to
rely on men to take samples or
readings according to her
instructions. Bunce remembers
how frustrating this could be.
"They didn't take data the way I
would have," she recalls. "There
is only one way to take good data,
and that's to go out and do it
yourself."
Although accepted as the
rules of the game by the few
women oceanographers of the
period, the exclusion from
research vessels began to irritate
some of the younger female
students. One of these
was a 23-year-old Radcliffe-
Harvard graduate student who
asked, in the summer of 1956, for
permission to go out on a five-day
WHOI cruise. The chief scientist
for the cruise was her academic
advisor at Harvard. When he
turned her down, she appealed to
the ship's captain and even to the
director of the Institution, but the
answer was "no" all around.
Shortly before the vessel was
scheduled to depart, she hid
under its floorboards, just over
the bilge, and stayed there 12
hours. Convinced she had waited
until the ship was too far out to
turn back, she came out of hiding,
to the great surprise of the crew
and scientific staff. The rumor,
undenied by the chief scientist,
is that she received a spanking
from him.
Now a schoolteacher in
Alaska, the stowaway regrets her
action. She is convinced the angry
backlash, in the form of a failing
grade from a professor, cost her
the master's degree she sought at
Harvard. "It has made me very
bitter after all these years," she
told us. Enrolling in graduate
school to study marine ecology,
she did not learn of the unwritten
men-only rule until she had paid
hertuition and classes had begun.
Her frustration led her to test and
then to break the rule, as a
protest. "I wanted to go because I
was so interested in ocean-
ography and I wanted to know
more about it," she explains. "It
wasn't just for fun; it was what I
was interested in doing as a
career." She finally attained the
equivalent of a master's degree in
1981 at the University of
Pennsylvania.
Richard Backus, a Senior
Scientist at WHOI, has seen his
colleagues gradually change their
attitude since those days. "All the
specific objections men had
against women at sea were, one
by one, proved to be superficial,"
he recalls. "For instance: they
won't have separate toilet
facilities. Well, you don't have
separate toilet facilities for
women at home either. The basic
objection was that it was against
tradition. Men defended the idea
of the ship at sea as a male
bastion. That's always been a
reason for going to sea to
escape responsibilities and
those responsibilities involve
women. Today women have
made life at sea more like life
ashore, with all the advantages
and complications."
By 1964, the policy at some
research institutions had
loosened up enough for a student
to be told by her supervisor that
women were allowed on scientific
cruises, but only if they were
absolutely essential to the project.
"Nowadays if someone
told that to a woman, they'd get
punched in the nose," says Tanya
Atwater, now a professor of
geophysics at the University of
California in Santa Barbara. "Men
could go out for any reason at all,
just to get the experience." A
graduate of the Scripps Institution
of Oceanography in La Jolla,
Calif., Atwater eventually got her
share of at-sea research, which
she carries on today. She dove to
the Galapagos hot vents in the
WHOI submersible/4/wn.
"Today there's a
completely different feeling. The
women feel like they have the
right to be there [on a research
vessel]." According to Atwater,
the tables have turned : if a man
denies a woman access to a
research vessel, it is he who is
challenged. "Itusedtobethatthe
man was always right," she
explains, "and the woman felt she
might be a little crazy." She
attributes the change directly to
federal civil rights and equal
employment opportunity
legislation in the 1960s and early
1970s. "Some people say laws
don't really make a difference, but
I think they tend to set the spoken
rhetoric in a society, and the
rhetoric has a big influence on
how a person feels about his or
her acceptance in that society."
Though pleased with
recent progress and optimistic
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about the future, Atwater is quick
to point out that all is not yet rosy
on today's oceanographic cruises.
Because women are still a small
minority in the field, there are
bound to be problems, whether
from short-sighted rules or
insensitive men. Two rules that
are still popular with admin-
istrators and ship captains often
have the effect of keeping women
off research vessels, sometimes
"bumping" them from a cruise at
the last minute: the requirement
that there be an even number of
women on board, so that each
woman has a female roommate
rather than rooming alone (called
the "Noah's Ark theory" by its
detractors), and its corollary, the
taboo against a man and a woman
sharing the same room unless
they are married to each other.
Once a woman is granted
accommodations aboard a
research vessel these days, a
remaining source of aggravation
is the male mind. One woman,
serving as chief scientist on a
recent cruise, was busy
organizing her project when the
ship's captain brought her a pair
of his ripped pants he wanted
them mended.
There is the pressure to
prove you can work at sea, of
course ("They're waiting for you
to fall on your face," said one
woman), and there is also the
tightrope woman ocean-
ographers walk between
necessary assertiveness and what
is seen by men as bitchiness. If a
male scientist feels strongly
enough to insist that certain work
proceed in a particular way, an
onlooker's response may be, "He
really defends his project." The
same insistence by a female
scientist, however, can elicit a
nasty remark such as, "That
macho female."
The most common
complaint we heard was that
women at sea get too much
attention. "You sort of feel like
community property," says
Maggie Goud, a WHOI-MIT
doctoral student. "A lot of times
you just get tired of always being
in the spotlight; it starts to wear
on your nerves. All your
movements are watched so
carefully. And if you ever get
involved in a romance at sea, you
must never display affection.
There will be problems with
gossip, jealousy, and morale, and
it's always the woman's
reputation that is at stake, along
with her right to even be there."
The other side of the coin is
that women now have the
opportunity to "develop a kind of
camaraderie at sea that is
impossible in the day-to-day lab
operation," as Goud put it. "It's
sort of a club you're left out of if
you don't go to sea."
Still another issue is the
question of special treatment for
women. On one cruise, four
women oceanographers shared a
cabin. One morning the ship's
engineer knocked on the door
and immediately walked in. He
was there to fix the shower, but
one woman, who was in her
underwear, was so upset that she
later wrote letters to higher-ups
protesting the intrusion. "But
that is exactly how the man
would have entered men's
MARINE POLICY AND OCEAN
MANAGEMENT
RESEARCH FELLOWSHIPS
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution of-
fers 1-year fellowships to professionals in
social sciences, law. or natural sciences
who will apply their training to problems
that involve the use of the oceans, including
coastal zone management, fisheries man-
agement, marine mineral management,
marine policy problems and opportunities
in developing countries, implications of the
Law of the Sea Treaty for ocean manage-
ment, use of scientific information in
decision-making and policy planning, and
U.S./Canada marine resource management
issues. Other research topics may also be
appropriate. Recipients of awards are
selected on a competitive basis with pri-
mary emphasis placed on research promise.
Applicants must have completed a doctoral
level degree or possess equivalent profes-
sional qualifications through career experi-
ence.
Fellowship stipend is $21,500. Recipients
are encouraged to pursue their own re-
search interests independently or in associ-
ation with resident staff. Completed appli-
cations must be received by 1 March 1983
for 1983-1984 awards. (A second year's
appointment may be possible.) Awards an-
nounced in April. Write for application
forms to:
Dean of Graduate Studies, Education Office,
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution,
Woods Hole, Massachusetts 02543.
Equal Opportunity/Affirmative
Action Institution
quarters," one of the women
points out. "The conflict is that a
woman has to decide if she wants
to be treated equally or specially.
Here you are in a nontraditional
field for women. You can't have it
both ways. Every ship I've been
on made an effort to give women
the better accommodations.
There is no reason for that. It is
detrimental, in the long run, to
the advancement of women."
The rewards and joys of
scientific research the
unraveling of the mysteries of
nature are identical for men
and women. And the call to
"go
down to the sea again" is just as
strong for female oceanographers
as it is for men. Some women we
interviewed felt they had not been
discriminated against in the least.
One of these is Peggy Delaney, a
fifth-year WHOI-MIT graduate
student studying paleocean-
ography. "I think I've been
lucky," she says. "I hesitate to say
this, but I was talented; that made
a lot of difference. We'll know
we've really made it when women
have the right to be mediocre at
things."
I n any case, the percentage
of female students in ocean-
ography continues to climb. As
these students enter the job
market in the next few years, they
will test the commitment to
fairness at research institutions,
universities, government
agencies, and corporations.
Marriages, too, will be
tested, as more women search for
ways to juggle an oceanographic
career and a family. Joan
Oltman-Shay, now in her fourth
year of the doctoral program for
applied ocean science at Scripps,
sees herself as a fortunate
beneficiary of the victories of the
women's liberation movement.
Yet she is likely to fight new
battles of her own. Her husband,
a geophysicist, is also an artist. It
seems likely that he will someday
quit his job to devote himself to
his painting, and that would make
her the breadwinner. "When I
first accepted that, my stomach
hurt for a few days," she says.
Perhaps such marriages will bring
about societal changes that will
allow people still more freedom
to choose their own roles, to live
the lives they want to live.
Ben McKelway
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To the Editor:
I would like to applaud John M. Teal's views, as expressed in
your fall profile, regarding political involvement on the part
of the scientific community. Having worked for Senator
Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.) on the Clean Air Act during part
of my year off from school, I was able to see firsthand the
problems that arise when politicians make science policy
decisions without an adequate background.
John Teal is right in saying that "you don't have much
of an excuse for complaining about what is happening in
society if you don't contribute." There is an urgent need for
scientists to become involved and consequently take a
much greater role in shaping the policies that shape our
environment.
I sincerely hope that many other scientists will follow
a path similar to that taken by John M. Teal and start to fill the
void that is created by their absence.
Eric Jay Dolin,
Brown University,
Providence, Rhode Island
To the Editor:
The four pages of letters to the editor in your latest issue
contained very little of value or interest. They might better
have been devoted to a four-page article.
If you're going to continue to print letters to the
editor, for Pete's sake, be an editor: cut them down to their
essential content and eliminate those that just ramble on
and say nothing.
One page of letters is enough, nof four.
Carroll W. Dawson,
New York, New York
To the Editor:
I think that articles or, perhaps, entire issues of Oceanus on
the following subjects would be of interest to your
subscribers and other readers:
1) The international politics of the oceans, including
territorial claims and jurisdictions, sharing (or not sharing)
the oceans' resources, the provisions of any Law of the Sea
agreements, and the Reagan Administration's refusal to
support the current Law of the Sea agreement, the role of
the UN (if any), implications forthe United States' and other
nations' naval strategies, and the means to enforce
International Whaling Commission bans on whaling.
2) U.S. and Canadian university degree-granting
programs in physical, biological, economic, and political
oceanography, and information on any programs allowing
for job experience as well as academic credits for entrance.
3) The sea-land interface and how it changes due to
erosion and deposition, storms, rising sea levels (such as
along the Delmarva Peninsula), and man's activities
(dredging, filling, bulkheading).
4) Oceans as a recreation resource for sailing,
surfing, swimming, fishing, and just enjoying the salt air and
scenic beauty of coastal environments, including a capsule
history of ocean resort communities.
5) Small oceanic islands: their unique features
physical, biological, and cultural.
John Sherman,
Dover, Delaware
To the Editor:
Having seen in practice (in the Fall, 1982 issue) some of the
changes you suggested were in the wind, I offer some
comment which I hope will be helpful.
I subscribed to Oceanus this year, as I subscribed to
Natural History 14 years ago, because of sheer ignorance
about oceanography. I read Susan Schlee's history when it
first came out (history, I think, is the best way to approach
any science), and I have followed the subject in popular
articles and introductions to the subject written tor laymen.
The waters of oceanography do not, however, cover my
feet. So subscribing to Oceanus was, for me, taking the
plunge.
I can follow the articles in the first three issues I have
received somewhat uncertainly where the chemistry is
involved and would not want you to simplify. If I can
understand, anyone can.
So far, I have been most fascinated with the nuts and
bolts articles (such as submersibles in spring and Robert W.
Knecht's discussion of methods of deep-sea mining in fall),
but that may just be beginner's wide-eyed amazement,
which may pass.
I am not so sure I need the "Concerns" section,
though Oceanus might. Every publication needs a character
it can get only through a few, anchored features. The book
reviews, however, are a big plus from my standpoint; no
one needs library help more than I do.
Contrary to the implication of my fellow Trentonian's
letter in the Fall issue, I don't see how Oceanus can avoid
articles on public policy, but its main thrust should be
toward working science and research.
I know that it's the nature of sand to move, and,
contrary to what F. W. Roebling III wrote about New Jersey's
coastal management, the state is spending a lot of taxpayer
dollars trying to prevent sand from moving. This may benefit
someone although King Canute didn't get far with a
similar effort but it isn't benefiting fh/s taxpayer. If
Senators Pell and Kennedy know anything about sand, this
New Jerseyan would welcome their advice.
Tom Blackburn,
Trenton, New Jersey
To the Editor:
I am very interested in the ocean and sea. When I was 16, I
had pimples. An old man gave me a small bottle of water.
The bottle said "Black Sea" on it. He told me it was from the
Black Sea. He told me to put the water on my face and my
pimples would be gone. I thought to myself, "Sure, and I'm
the Queen of England!" But I figured since I had tried
everything else, I might as well try this. So I tried it and my
pimples were gone in two days. I couldn't believe it! It was
amazing. I'm 24 now, and to this day I can't find anything
about this anywhere. I no longer have pimples, but I'd like
to get my hands on some more of that stuff for my little
sister.
Maryann Socha,
Sterling Heights, Michigan
To the Editor:
I became a subscriber to Oceanus for the first time this year.
Please do not change a thing!
However, I see no harm in accepting advertisements
if that will help pay the costs of printing. Scientific American
is no less scientific for printing advertisements.
Geoffrey Wallis,
Master, M/V Nan Ta,
Singapore
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No Sea Too Deep: The History of Oceanographic
Instruments by Anita McConnell. 1982. Adam Hilger
Ltd., Bristol, England. 162 pp.
Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke, David Brewster, Charles
Cavendish, Humphrey Davy, William Thomson,
Charles Wheatstone: these are only a few of the
scientists who have taken an active role in the
exploration of the oceans. Not all went to sea, but thei r
ideas did, and through them the unknowns of the sea
have gradually decreased . If I saw this list of names and
was asked on what common problem these men
worked, I don't believe I would have picked ocean
instrumentation.
In this delightful book, Anita McConnell puts
together the history of Oceanographic instruments,
for a period of approximately 300 years, from 1600 to
around 1900. It was already known that the seas were
not boundless in horizontal extent, but how deep they
were and what currents and monsters lurked there,
ready to make the way of an honest or dishonest
seafarer difficult, were unknown. I n No Sea Too Deep
we see how these puzzles of nature were solved -
slowly, by many people and many ideas.
Modern day (1980) oceanographers bemoan
the fact that instruments can be lowered to all ocean
depths only at certain maximum winch speeds;
imagine what it was like when, for each ocean depth
measurement, acrew of 20 hauled back the hemp in a
many-hours-long process. But that is what they did,
and that is how the ocean slowly became a
better-known place.
Amply illustrated, with descriptions of how
things worked, or were supposed to work, this book
does oceanographers and those who are interested
in how things happen a great service. For readers
wishing to know more, the references at the end of
each chapter will lead the way.
If you are an inventor at heart you will enjoy this
book, because there are many examples of
instruments used to measure current, temperature,
and depth, with drawingsand explanations. Or if you
make measurements at sea, this book is worth
reading. You will see howthechief engineer orhis
equivalent can come to the rescue; how an
administrative decision can affect cruises because of
resource allocation; how things are rediscovered,
then forgotten. You will find that there are few "new"
concepts, and that good measurements at sea are
difficult. But that is how we learn about the ocean.
Earl E. Hays, Senior Scientist,
Ocean Engineering Department,
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution
Marine Mesocosms: Biochemicaland Chemical Research
in Experimental Ecosystems, George D. Grice and
Michael R. Reeve, eds. 1982. Springer-Verlag, New
York, N.Y. 430 pp. + xiii; $39.80.
Mesocosms are experimental enclosures, larger than
10 cubic meters, designed to bridge the gap between
experiments in laboratory flasks and observations in
complex natural marine systems. The use of
mesocosms as tools for interpreting relationships
among marine plants and animals and their
environments has mushroomed over the last two
decades; the most famous enclosures were those
constructed under the Controlled Ecosystem
Population Experiment (CEPEX) , with volumes of up to
1 ,300 cubic meters. This book, the proceedings of a
conference held at the completion of CEPEX in 1980,
reviews the contributions and limitations of enclosure
research. Although the CEPEX data are the best
represented, other data sets are discussed in detail,
including those from Loch Ewe in Scotland, from the
Marine Ecosystems Research Laboratory (MERL) on
Narragansett Bay, and from the harbor of Den Helder,
Holland.
Chapter topics include reviews of
mesocosm-research applications in the study of
plankton, larval fish biology, and chemistry; reports of
chemical results from MERL (for example,
radiotracers, natural radionuclides, and
hydrocarbons); reviews of pollution-effect studies
(oil, mercury, and trace metals); discussions of
problems in enclosure research (sinking of plankton,
experimental replication, effects of predators, and
other manipulations and their effects); results of the
final CEPEX experiment; and speculations on the value
and future of experimental enclosure studies. The
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book contains a wealth of information for plankton
biologists and chemists interested in species
responses to toxic substances and nutrients in the
ocean. This data, plus that on biotic interactions and
growth, plus the excellent reviews, make the book
worth reading. Especially good are the reviews on the
history of mesocosms by K. Banse, and on enclosures
of pelagic systems by J. Gamble and J. Davies.
Enclosure research has moved beyond mere
observational studies; C. O. Davis summarizes how
dominance can be changed, from diatoms to
microflagellates or dinoflagellates, by manipulating
nutrients, mixing, and light. This is the first step, and a
very important one, toward understanding
populations, processes, and interactions of the
ecosystem inamarinemesocosm. Certain parts of this
special ecosystem are well understood (such as the
predation rate of ctenophores on copepods), and
Marine Mesocosms amply illustrates them. A strong
case is made for mesocosm research; it must continue
in parallel with other kinds of biological studies of the
ocean. After all, how can we hope to understand the
causes of changes in species and numbers of
organisms in the real ocean when we cannot
understand the causes of changes in ten cubic meters
of water, under controlled conditions? Of course
mesocosms are not reality, but research done in
controlled environments may be the most effective
way to improve our understanding of the ocean itself.
The editors and authors have produced a
readable summary of the art of mesocosm research.
They point out where we are today. One author, M.
Mullin, even ventures to predict areas of research that
could now be studied with mesocosms: turbulence
and community structure; origins of control of
community structure; population dynamics and the
secondary production of zooplankton; coupling
between pelagic and benthic communities; and
zooplankton behavior. These are many of the
important questions in modern plankton research,
and the fact that they are considered here illustrates
the power of the mesocosm in marine biological
research. Just as important are the possibilities for
studies of chemical and physical processes, and how
they interact with the biota. The book does have some
weak spots, but it provides a strong argument in favor
of further mesocosm research.
John E. Hobble,
Senior Scientist, Ecosystems Center,
Marine Biological Laboratory,
Woods Hole, Mass.
The Road to Jaramillo: Critical Years of the Revolution in
Earth Science by William Glen. 1982. Stanford
University Press, Stanford, Calif. 459 pp. $37.50.
For the uninitiated, the Jaramillo event was a reversal
of the earth's magnetic field that occurred between
970,000 and 900,000 years ago. William Glen, a
geologist turned science historian, focuses on the
discovery of this event as one of the stepping stones
on the road to the acceptance of sea-floor spreading
and continental drift the revolution in earth
science.
During the 1950s and 1960s, there was a rapid
accumulation of geological and geophysical data,
from all over the world, that allowed the identification
of this sequence of reversals in the earth's magnetic
field. The potassium-argon dating technique also was
perfected, permitting the dating of magnetized rocks.
Lastly, scientists found that these reversals could be
seen in marine magnetic anomalies, and, as a result,
they could date the seafloor and trace the path of
drifting continents. Most of the people who worked
on these problems are still with us today. Glen
interviewed 89 of them and made tape recordings of
most of their accounts.
First the author describes the early post-World
War II mass spectrographs; these eventually were
improved enough to be used to separate isotopes for
radiometric dating. Glen then discusses the
continuing problems of atmospheric argon
contamination in the potassium-argon method. He
describes the early identification of
reversely-magnetized rocks, and the attempts that
were made to explain them as being due to
self-reversals. All of these things set the scene for the
big push that Allan Cox, Richard Doell, and Brent
Dalrymple made, when they documented and dated
the earth's magnetic field reversals over the last few
million years. Most of the book is devoted to the
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paleomagnetic and radiometric dating work that these
three did at Berkeley, and later at the U.S. Geological
Survey in Menlo Park, California, and how they
interacted with the scientists in Europe, Iceland,
Canada, Japan, Australia, and the United States, who
were studying the same phenomena. The author tells
of the scramble for credits (the sort of thing our
science could do without) and the problems of getting
funding; but mainly, Glen tells of the competence and
dedication this group had, ultimately producing an
accurate magnetic-reversal time scale. From 1959 to
1966, eleven different time scales for the last 3.5
million years were published, and each was an
improvement over the one before. Most of them were
published by the Menlo Park group.
By 1966, the Menlo Park scientists were
struggling with the question of whether the
measurements on normally magnetized rocks found
at Jaramillo Creek, New Mexico, were to be believed.
At the same time, marine magnetic anomaly studies
were producing a continuous record of reversals, back
10 million years, clearly showing the Jaramillo event.
After 1966, marine magnetic anomalies and the
magnetization of marine sediments became even
more important. The magnetic anomalies permitted
dating of the ocean crust, showing how the continents
drifted and were reconstructed through sea-floor
spreading. The roles of the marine scientists at
Cambridge University and at Columbia University's
Lamont-Doherty Geological Observatory, and their
attitudes for and against sea-floor spreading, are
detailed in The Road to Jaramillo.
The major contribution Glen makes is that he
followed the scientists' thinking and actions on a
personal level, beyond what they published, during
these formative years of a major scientific discovery.
As time lapses after any scientific study, many of these
things are forgotten and a simplified picture, which
mayor may not be true, remains. Even the participants
in the work reported here, which took place some 20
years ago, do not remember each event in the same
way their colleagues do, nor as Glen reports them. But
he certainly gives the flavor of the times, shows that
Books Received
many scientists contributed to these discoveries, and
has done an amazing job of putting the story together
accurately. The tapes of his interviews, and other
prime historical material, are on file at the Bancroft
Library, University of California, Berkeley.
J. R. Heirtzler, Senior Scientist,
Geology and Geophysics Department,
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution
Aquaculture
Inputs as Related to Output in Milkfish
Production by K. C. Chong, Maura S.
Lizarondo, Virginia F. Holaso, and Ian R.
Smith. 1982. ICLARM Technical Reports
3, Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines.
82 pp. $4.00 surface; $10.00 airmail.
The focus of this technical report is on
the estimation of input-output
relationships, or production
functions, in the economics of the
milkfish industry. The findings show
that increasing certain inputs (such as
stocking rates of fry and fingerlings,
fertilizers, and farm size) can
increase both production and profits.
The authors recommend a more
intensive technology be adopted by
milkfish producers, and make a case
for group farming.
Biology
Response of Marine Animals to
Petroleum and Specific Petroleum
Hydrocarbons by Jerry M. Neff and Jack
W. Anderson. 1981 . Halsted Press
Division, John Wiley and Sons, New
York, N.Y. 177 pp. $34.95.
The deleterious impacts of oil on the
marine ecosystem may persist long
after the visible oil pollution has been
cleaned up or washed away. This book
is the result of extensive research into
the toxicity and sublethal biological
effects of petroleum and specific
petroleum hydrocarbons to marine
organisms, summarizing the major
results of this research.
The Estuarine Ecosystem by Donald S.
McLusky. 1981 . Halsted Press, New
York, N.Y. 150 pp. $29.95.
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The problems of estuarine pollution
create interesting case studies of
man's intervention in the normal
working of an ecosystem. This book
begins by describing the estuarine
environment in a general way;
examines trophic levels (primary
producers, primary and secondary
consumers); discusses the problems
of life in estuaries; and examines
human influences on estuarine
ecosystems. Examples included are
worldwide, showing the similarities
and differences in estuaries with
contrasting geographical conditions.
Early Life by Lynn Margulis. 1 982.
Science Books International, Boston,
Mass. 160 pp. $16.50 hardcover; $9.95
paperback.
This book is an account of the
evolution of early cells. These bacteria
invented the chemical and biological
strategies that make multicellular life
possible, including moving, sensing,
sex, and diverse energy-transforming
and feeding strategies. Many
questions are raised and discussed in a
fashion that does not require one to
have a specialized scientific
background to understand.
Aquatic Entomology: The Fisherman's
and Ecologist's Illustrated Guide to
Insects and Their Relatives by W. Patrick
McCafferty, with illustrations by Arwin
V. Provonsha. 1981 . Science Books
International, Boston, Mass. 448 pp.
$50.00.
As a book intended for a broad
audience, this comprehensive volume
incorporates biological and ecological
information, much of which has been
generated in the last 15 years, and
provides a sound introduction to
insects for the fly fisherman, with
up-to-date association of scientific and
fisherman's names for insects.
Technical jargon is avoided. Binomial
identification keys, aided by line
drawings, classify the families of
insects, and references are included
for students interested in generic and
species identification. There are more
than 1,000 original illustrations,
including 124 color paintings.
British and Other Marine and Estuarine
Oligochaetes by R. O. Brinkhurst. 1982.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
England. 127pp. $32.00.
Knowledge of saltwater oligochaetes
(worms) has greatly expanded in the
last 10 years, and much taxonomic
confusion has been straightened out.
Brinkhurst, in his synopsis, employs
an unusual style of keying that makes
use of a series of decision levels based
on a few readily visible characteristics.
The purpose is to permit estuarine
biologists to reduce the number of
unidentified oligochaetes in their
surveys.
Marine Ecology by Jeffrey S. Levinton.
1982. Prentice-Hall, Inc. Fnglewood
Cliffs, N.J. 526 pp. $35.95.
Levinton aims this text at
undergraduate/graduate courses in
marine biology and biological
oceanography. He starts with an
introduction to the adaptations of
marine organisms to their physical
environment. Next, he outlines the
structure and dynamics of marine
communities, with emphasis on the
distribution and abundance of species
and the interaction of species within
communities. The author then
discusses the ecology of plankton and
several benthic habitats, including the
intertidal and subtidal benthos,
estuaries, and coral reefs. Levinton
emphasizes invertebrates in benthic
communities.
The Biology of Seaweeds, Christopher S.
Lobban and Michael J. Winne, eds. 1 982.
The University of California Press,
Berkeley, Calif. 786 pp. $85.00.
There are three major groups of
seaweeds: the marine benthic red,
brown, and green algae. This volume
reviews their biology. Besides
systematics and life histories, it covers
ecology, physiology, biochemistry,
and commercial utilization. The
writers are teachers and research
workers, all considered experts in the
fields they discuss. The book is
illustrated with photographs and line
studies and has a long list of references
following each chapter.
The Rainbowfishes of Australia and
Papua New Guinea by Gerald R. Allen
and Norbert J. Cross. 1982. T. F. H.
Publications, Inc. Neptune, N.J. 160 pp.
$16.95.
The rainbowfishes Melanotaeniidae
are a small freshwater family of the
Australia-New Guinea region. Their
range, in which they are enormously
abundant, includes lakes, ponds,
streams, and swamps; some species
The Newest Federalism:
A New Framework
for Coastal Issues
COMS
Edited by Thomas D. Galloway, University of Rhode Island
This timely volume explores the new federal approach
to U.S. coastal issues. The Reagan administration is press-
ing for a new federalism in which the major responsibili-
ties between levels of government do not overlap. Attention
is focused on the nation's shorelines, offshore regions, and
inshore coastal areas in the 1980s as the federal government
returns powers and dollars to state and. local governments.
Proceedings from the sixth annual conference of the Center
for Ocean Management Studies, held June 20-23, 1982.
To order, send $19.95 plus $1.50 postage and handling to:
Center for Ocean Management Studies
University of Rhode Island
Kingston, RI 02881
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live in brackish waters. The authors
explain aquarium care for these
animals, their classification, evolution,
and zoogeography. There are keys to
genera and species, a brief glossary,
and many illustrations from photos
of specimens to maps of collecting
areas.
Animals ofthe Tidal Marsh by Franklin C.
Daiber. 1982. Van Nostrand Reinhold,
New York, N.Y. 422 pp. $19.95.
Daiber's goal for this book was to bring
together the literature pertaining to
the biology and natural history of
those animals characteristic of tidal
marshes, from protozoa through the
birds and mammals. In doing this, he
specifically identifies the origins of the
animals of the tidal marsh; examines
plant-animal interactions, feeding,
and trophic relationships; reviews
community organization; and looks at
the reproductive biology of marsh
animals. Finally, the author briefly
discusses those areas of tidal marsh
ecology which are not well
understood.
Educational Books
Islands of the Seals: The Pribilofs. Alaska
Geographic, Vol. 9, No. 3. 1982. Alaska
Northwest Publishing Company,
Anchorage, Alaska. 1 28 pp. $9.95, plus
$1.00 for postage.
The Pribilof Islands St. Paul, St.
George, and the much smaller Walrus
and Otter islands are due north of
Unalaska in the Aleutians, 800 miles by
air from Anchorage. This issue of
Alaska Geographic explores the
Pribilofs through their geography,
natural history, and native people, the
Aleuts. It explains the fur seal industry,
which many people criticize but the
Aleuts are dependent on. The issue is
illustrated with many color
photographs, making these faraway
islands and their people much more
real to those of us who will never have
an opportunity to go there.
Essentials for the Scientific and Technical
Writer, Hardy Hoover, ed. 1982. Dover
Publications, Inc. New York, N.Y. 216
pp. $4.00
Practical help for the scientist,
engineer, technician, or student who
needs to improve his/her technical
writing. Starting with organizing
thoughts, or planning, the manual
proceeds through sentences,
paragraphs, and reports; also covered
is
"Writing to Spec." Each chapter has
exercises and questions, and there are
several checklists, designed to help
writers improve communication
quality and efficiency.
McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science
and Technology: An international
reference work in 15 volumes, including
an index. Fifth edition. 1982.
McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York, N.Y.
$850.00.
This updated edition of the
encyclopedia has an astounding
number of contributors, some 3,000.
The editors' goal was to provide
accuracy, clarity, comprehensiveness,
and thorough research on each topic.
There are 75 disciplines covered, from
acoustics to vertebrate zoology, with
completely new material on subjects
such as genetic engineering and
gluons. There are more than 15,000
illustrations; these volumes could be a
good starting point for research
outside one's own field.
The Discovery of the Sea by J. H. Parry.
1982. University of California Press,
Berkeley, Calif. 279 pp. $25.00
hardcover; $8.95 paperback.
The purpose of this book is to narrate
and explain the principal events of the
late 15th and early 16th centuries,
when Europeans gained access to
great areas of the world previously
unknown to them. It was then that the
unity of the sea was discovered, along
with southern and eastern Africa,
southern and eastern Asia, and the
Americas. The original edition of this
book (1974, Dial Press) is heavily
illustrated and correspondingly
expensive. This is a more modest
version visually; however, it has a
revised text, incorporating results
from recent research.
The Yankee Mariner and Sea Power:
America's Challenge of Ocean Space,
Joyce J. Bartell, ed. 1982. University of
California Press, Los Angeles, Calif.
299 pp. $20.00.
This is a maritime history, leading to
discussion of contemporary uses of
the sea. The book argues the
importance of the oceans to the future
of seagoing America. Its 15 authors
investigate the commitment and
scientific and technical support
needed for the United States to
"regain its momentum" in sea power.
The History of Modern Whaling by J. N.
Tonnessen and A. O. Johnson. 1982.
University of California Press, Berkeley,
Calif. 798 pp. $45.00.
This history charts the progress of
modern whaling. It began around
1864, off the coast of northern Norway,
when steam-driven vessels carrying
shell harpoons replaced open boats
and hand-thrown spears. Soon ships,
ever greater in size and power, hunted
whales worldwide, backed by shrewd
and powerful investors. This
expansion led to "pelagic" whaling,
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using factory ships, and to the
continuing battles over regulation and
national quotas. The latter part of this
history recounts the tale of national
and private interests so intent on
immediate gain or prestige that the
warnings of scientists went unheeded.
Combat Fleets of the World 1982/83:
Their Ships, Aircraft, and Armament,
lean Labayle Couhat, ed.; English
language edition prepared by A. D.
Baker III. 1982. Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis, Md. 873 pp., plus addenda.
$78.95.
This volume covers all the world's
navies. The length of the edition (15
percent greater than the previous one)
reflects the expansion of naval forces
worldwide and the increased
coverage of China's Navy. The guide
has extensive information on the U.S.
Navy, descriptions and photographs
of the Soviet Navy's new ships, and an
account of Britain's Royal Navy; much
attention is paid to the world's smaller
navies. Correspondents from around
the globe did the research; the book
contains comprehensive technical
descriptions of naval ships, their
personnel and paraphernalia, in a
reference format.
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Energy and Environment
The State of the Environment: 1982.
1982. A report from the Conservation
Foundation, Washington, D.C. 2,1 39 pp.
$1 5.00, plus $1 .00 shipping and mailing.
This report describes the resources
and environmental problems of the
United States, presents data to show
whether the problems are getting
better or worse, and discusses
institutional changes and options that
affect environmental and resource
policy. The Foundation reports some
progress in air pollution control and
energy conservation. However, soil
erosion is worse, and water quality
control is not at hand. We have, the
report states, improved awareness of
such things as the consequences of
toxic waste disposal, but scientific
knowledge is limited in many areas.
The Dynamic Environment of the Ocean
Floor, Kent A. Fanning and Frank T.
Manheim, eds. 1982. Lexington Books,
Lexington, Mass. 502 pp. $39.95.
Though many nonscientists may think
it is an inert bowl, the seafloor is
actually an active, important
contributor to many marine
processes. This book is designed for
those who study benthic processes; it
begins with a review of sampling
methods, then has a section on the
description and quantitative studies of
the most important interactions
between solid particles and water at
the seafloor. Following that is a
discussion of biological interactions,
and then six chapters on interstitial
trace metals. The book ends with two
chapters on hydrothermal processes.
The Role ofSolar Ultraviolet Radiation in
Marine Ecosystems, John Calkins, ed.
1982. Plenum Press, New York, N.Y.
724 pp. $79.95.
In this volume, an international,
multidisciplinary group of scientists
outlines the methodology and the
specific details needed to evaluate the
role of ultraviolet radiation in marine
ecosystems. Specialists in their fields
discuss current concepts of the
biological actions of this
phenomenon, studies on the
responses of plants and animals,
ecological and evolutionary aspects of
the ultraviolet components of
sunlight, and the computation of the
level of ultraviolet radiation reaching
marine organisms.
Introduction to Tides: the Tides of the
Wafers of New England and New York
by Alfred C. Redfield. 1980. Marine
Science International, Woods Hole,
Mass. 108 pp. $12.95.
Redfield hopes, in this book, to give
those who work and play along the
coast from Sandy Hook to the Bay of
Fundy a better understanding of
matters that influence the daily
ordering of their lives. It is based for
the most part on information given in
the tide and current tables published
by the U.S. Department of
Commerce, and tries to explain why
the tide locally is as it is, and why it
varies from place to place.
Geology
Mineral Deposits and Evolution of the
Biosphere, H. D. Holland and M.
Schidlowski, eds. 1982.
Springer-Verlag, New York, N.Y.
333pp. $19.00.
Based on the Dahlem Workshop on
Biospheric Evolution, this volume
investigates the relationships
between organic evolution and
mineral deposits the sedimentary
ores. Sedimentary processes account
for such things as aluminum, gold,
gem minerals, and iron ores.
Following the introduction, the book
has background reports and group
papers. The subject matter is divided
into three areas: past and present
microbial processes and ecosystems;
morphological and chemical records
of the Precambrian biosphere; and
the relationships between the
formation of mineral deposits and
biological processes.
Geology of the Northwest African
Continental Margin, U. von Rad, K.
Hinz, M. Sarnthein, and E. Seibold, eds.
1982. Springer-Verlag, New York, N.Y.
703 pp. $49.00.
This volume concentrates on
geophysical, paleontological, and
geochemical studies, and on the
structure and evolution of the
onshore coastal basins and the
offshore continental margin. It
includes deep crustal geophysical
surveys, studies of the Cape Verde
and Canary Islands, paleoenviron-
mental research, and a comparison of
the Northwest African continental
margin with its counterpart oft
eastern North America.
Marine Policy
The Baltic Straits by Gunnar
Alexandersson. 1982. Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, Kluwer Bosion, Inc. Boston,
Mass. 132pp. $32.50.
This is part of a series from the Center
for the Study of Marine Policy at the
University of Delaware.
Alexandersson describes the
physical-hydrographic elements of
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the Baltic Sea and its approaches; he
discusses the historical interests,
both political and economic, of the
littoral states, and the legal status and
uses of the Baltic Straits over time.
The Baltic region has an important
role in the global struggle between
the western alliance and the Soviet
bloc, and this is highlighted in the
author's examination of the various
legal views of the straits, especially as
they pertain to the emerging Law of
the Sea Treaty.
The Red Sea and the Gulf ofAden by
Ruth Lapidoth-Eschelbacher. 1982.
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Kluwer
Boston, Inc. Boston, Mass. 265 pp.
$65.00.
This study, also a part of the
University of Delaware series, begins
by describing the physical and
historical featu res of the Red Sea and
its surroundings. The author, who is a
member of the Israeli delegation to
the United Nations and legal advisor
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
goes on to analyze the legal regime of
the Red Sea and the Gulf. The Suez
Canal is discussed, with special
reference to the Canal's military and
commercial importance.
Books Policy
Oceanus we/comes books from
publishers in the marine field.
All those received will be listed
and a few will be selected for
review. Please address
correspondence to Elizabeth
Miller, editor of the book
section.
Impact of Marine Pollution on Society,
Virginia Tippie and Dana Kester, eds.
1982. J. F. Bergin Publishers, Inc. South
Hadley, Mass. 304 pp. $29.95.
This is a compilation of papers and
discussions from a conference of the
same name, held at the University of
Rhode Island's Center for Ocean
Management Studies. There are five
units, following the format of the
conference program. They are: Status
of Marine Pollution, outlining the
political and social framework for
controlling pollution, the
development of our understanding of
human impact on the marine
environment, and international efforts
to deal with marine pollution; three
very different case studies; and Future
Prospects and Strategies, in which the
authors encourage linking public
interest with scientific knowledge, to
try to develop a working definition of
pollution.
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Edmond Ocean Hot Springs: A Status Report a photo essay Hot Vent Life Forms and Sea-floor Geology -
Leah J. Smith and Susan Peterson Pitfalls in Third WorldAquaculture Development a photo essay Minute
Marine Organisms Found in Tropical Oceans John E. Kelly and Cordelia E. SheaTheSubseabed Disposal
Program for High-Level Radioactive Waste-Public Response Richard E. Moore, Philip Helfrich, and
Gregory M. L. Patterson 'The Deadly Seaweed of Hana.'
Number 3, Fall, Deep Ocean Mining: Paul R. Ryan Comment Robert W. KnechtDeep Ocean Mining
(introduction) William P. Pendley The Argument: The U.S. Will Need Seabed Minerals Joel P. Clark
The Rebuttal: The Nodules Are Not Essential J . K. Amsbaugh and Jan L. Van der Voort The Ocean Mining
Industry: A Benefit for Every Risk? Bernardo Zuleta The Law of the Sea: Myths and Realities Clifton
Curtis The Environmental Aspects of Deep Ocean Mining G. Ross Heath Manganese Nodules:
Unanswered Questions Randolph A. Koski, William R. Normark, Janet L. Morton, and John R. Delaney
Metal Sulfide Deposits on the Juan de Fuca Ridge William H. MacLeish, Profile:7ohn MolineTeal-Marsh
Man Paul R. Ryan, Concerns: Navy Studying the Disposal ofOld Nuclear Submarines M. Grant Gross,
Concerns: Big Ocean Science in the 1980s Letters Book Reviews.
Number 4, Winter, Marine Policy for the 1 980s and Beyond: Paul R. Ryan Comment John A. Knauss Marine
Policy for the 1980s and Beyond (introduction) Paul M. Eye The Law of the Sea David A. Ross and Michael
C. Healey International Marine Science: An Opportunity for the Future James P. Walsh The Coastal Zone
Management Program: Will Revenue-Sharing Save It? Spencer ApollonioF/sher/es Management John W.
Farrington, Judith M. Capuzzo, Thomas M. Leschine, and Michael A. Champ Ocean Dumping Melvin A.
ConantVhe Call of the Arctic Roberts. Winokur and Rene E. Gonzalez, Jr. Ocean Science and Military Use
of the Ocean William H. MacLeish, Profile: Roger Revelle-Senior Senator ofScience Francisco J. Palacio,
Concerns: The Cessation of Commercial Whaling Ben McKelway, Concerns: Women in Oceanography
Letters Book Reviews I ndex.
Oceanus
The International Magazine
of Marine Science and Policy
Published by Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution
SUBSCRIPTION ORDER FORM
Please make checks payable to Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution.
Checks accompanying foreign orders must be payable in U.S. currency and drawn on a U.S. bank.
(Outside U.S. add $3 per year to domestic rates.)
Please enter my subscription to OCEANUS for
D one year at $20.00 D payment enclosed.
D two years at $35.00 (we request prepayment)
D three years at $50.00 D bill me
Please send MY Subscription to: Please send a GIFT Subscription to:
Name (please print) Name (please print)
Street address Street address
Oceanus
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution
Woods Hole, Mass. 02543
Oceanus
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution
Woods Hole, Mass. 02543
Unanswered Questions Randolph A. Koski, William R. Normark, Janet L. Morton, and John R. Delaney
Metal Sulfide Deposits on the Juan de Fuca Ridge William H. MacLeish, Profile: John Moline Teal-Marsh
Man Paul R. Ryan, Concerns: Navy Studying the Disposal of Old Nuclear Submarines M. CrantGross,
Concerns: Big Ocean Science in the 1980s Letters Book Reviews.
Number 4, Winter, Marine Policy for the 1980s and Beyond: Paul R. Ryan Comment John A. Knauss Manne
Po//cy for the 7980s and Beyond (introduction) Paul M. Fye The Law ofthe Sea David A. Ross and Michael
C. Healey International Marine Science: An Opportunity for the Future James P. Walsh The Coastal Zone
Management Program: Will Revenue-Sharing Save It? Spencer ApollonioF/sher/es Management John W.
Farrington, Judith M. Capuzzo, Thomas M. Leschine, and Michael A. Champ Ocean Dumping Melvin A.
ConantThe Call of the Arctic Roberts. Winokurand Rene E. Gonzalez, Jr. Ocean Science and Military Use
of the Ocean William H. MacLeish, Profile: Roger Revelle-Senior Senator ofScience Francisco J. Palacio,
Concerns: The Cessation of Commercial Whaling Ben McKelway, Concerns: Women in Oceanography -
Letters Book Reviews I ndex.
88
Oceanus
MBL WHO! LIBRARY
1930
Limited quantities of back issues are available at $4.00 each; a 25-percent discount is offered on orders of five or more. We
accept only prepaid orders. Checks should be made payable to Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution; checks
accompanying foreign orders must be payable in U.S. currency and drawn on a U.S. bank. Address orders to: Oceanus Back
Issues; 1440 Main Street, Waltham, MA 02254.
Oceanus Oceanus Oceanus
,
Deep Ocean Mining, Vol. 25:3, Fall 1982 -- Eight articles
discuss the science and politics involved in plans to mine
the deep ocean floor. Also included area profile of a marine
scientist (John Teal) , book reviews, letters to the editor, and
a concerns section (an article on the U.S. Navy's plans to
dispose of old nuclear submarines and a piece on the future
of big ocean science in the 1980s).
General Issue, Vol. 25:2, Summer 1982 Contains articles
on how Reagan Administration policies will affect coastal
resource management, a promising new acoustic technique
for measuring ocean processes, ocean hot springs research,
planning aquaculture projects in the Third World, public
response to a plan to bury high-level radioactive waste in the
seabed, and a toxic marine organism that could prove useful
in medical research.
Research Vessels, Vol. 25:1, Spring 1982 -- Despite rising
costs, ships continue to play a key role in marine science.
Sharks, Vol. 24:4, Winter 1981/82 Shark species are more
diverse and less aggressive than the "Jaws" image leads us
to believe.
Oceanography from Space, Vol. 24:3, Fall 1981 Satellites
can make important contributions toward our understand-
ing of the sea.
General Issue, Vol. 24:2, Summer 1981 A wide variety of
subjects is presented here, including the U.S. oceano-
graphic experience in China, ventilation of aquatic plants,
seabirds at sea, the origin of petroleum, the Panamanian
sea-level canal, oil and gas exploration in the Gulf of
Mexico, and the links between oceanography and prehis-
toric archaeology.
The Coast, Vol. 23:4, Winter 1980/81 - - The science and
politics of America's 80,000-mile shoreline.
Senses of the Sea, Vol. 23 : 3, Fall 1 980 A look at the complex
sensory systems of marine animals.
A Decade of Big Ocean Science, Vol. 23 :1 , Spring 1980 As it
has in other major branches of research, the team approach
has become a powerful force in oceanography.
Ocean Energy, Vol. 22:4, Winter 1979/80 How much new
energy can the oceans supply as conventional resources
diminish?
Ocean/Continent Boundaries, Vol. 22:3, Fall 1979 Conti-
nental margins are being studied for oil and gas prospects as
well as for plate tectonics data.
Oceans and Climate, Vol. 21 :4, Fall 1978 Limited Supply
only.
General Issue, Vol. 21:3, Summer 1978 -- The lead article
here looks at the future of deep-ocean drilling. Another
piece, heavily illustrated with sharply focused micrographs,
describes the role of the scanning electron microscope in
marine science. Rounding out the issue are articles on
helium isotopes, seagrasses, paralytic shellfish poisoning,
and the green sea turtle of the Cayman Islands.
Marine Mammals, Vol. 21 :2, Spring 1978 Attitudes toward
marine mammals are changing worldwide.
The Deep Sea, Vol . 21 : 1 , Winter 1 978 Over the last decade,
scientists have become increasingly interested in the deep
waters and sediments of the abyss.
General Issue, Vol. 20:3, Summer 1977 - - The controversial
200-mile limit constitutes a mini-theme in this issue, includ-
ing its effect on U.S. fisheries, management plans within
regional councils, and the complex boundary disputes
between the U.S. and Canada. Otner articles deal with the
electromagnetic sense of sharks, the effects of tritium on
ocean dynamics, nitrogen fixation in salt marshes, and the
discovery of animal colonies at hot springs on the ocean
floor.
Sound in the Sea, Vol. 20:2, Spring 1977 - - The use of
acoustics in navigation and oceanography.
Issues not listed here, including those published prior to Spring 1977, are out of print. They are available on microfilm through
University Microfilm International; 300 North Zeeb Road; Ann Arbor, Ml 48106.
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